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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church; a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

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SAINT PAUL: TEACHER OF THE NATIONS.¹

I.

With its own subtle sense of justice the Christian Church has conferred from very remote antiquity the title of doctor or teacher on certain famous bishops like Augustine or Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen or Chrysostom. She has recognized in these men sanctity of life, depth and purity, vastness and pertinency of doctrine, evident vocation, and large discipleship. And these have sufficed in her eyes to make her single out such men and lift them up on the great cathedrae of authority, whence their very words in all future time become spiritual law and guidance, as once the opinions of an Ulpian or a Papinian sufficed for the citizen of Rome or Antioch. The world has always yearned for instruction. Man is an *animal docile*, a teachable animal. Whether it be poet, prophet, law-giver, king, judge, philosopher, or historian,—man has always admired, sometimes too ardently, those who have loosened the bonds of his ignorance and taught him necessary truths, useful arts, the reasons of things, the mysteries of life and death. Of all the Greek myths that of Prometheus, the teaching-god, is the most human-natural; he must be cold indeed who can read unmoved the woeful plaint of this bright spirit, riveted by jealous Zeus “with clenching teeth of adamant” to the stony face of Caucasus!

¹ Discourse delivered on the occasion of the Commemoration of the Conversion of St. Paul (Jan. 25), feast of the Faculty of Theology.

To this immemorial gratitude of our race we owe the names and deeds of a Solon and a Lycurgus, a Numa, a Socrates, an Herodotus, to speak only of those worthies whom the classic peoples have embalmed in their memories as their best and greatest teachers.

It was not, therefore, without reason that the Christian Church symbolized her gratitude for the services of her great teachers by the selection of an ancient term, which she elevated from mean surroundings, and consecrated henceforth to the illustrious company of those who teach the things of God, the soul, human conduct, the future life, the nature, qualities, beauties, and uses of all being,—notably of man, and the world and the infinite relations of the creature to the Creator.

We are gathered to-day to make our yearly commemoration of the selection of such a teacher at a turning-point of the world's history. Only, a teacher immeasurably greater than any Augustine or Chrysostom, one at whose feet they confessed themselves happy to listen and learn, a teacher whose calling was directly from the mouth of God Himself, whose doctrine was acquired by no slow process of human training, but poured from above into his capacious mind, even as the drawer of water fills his vase or urn from the generous outpouring of the fountain.

Paulus Doctor Gentium! Paul the Teacher of the Nations! This is an ancient title, so ancient that it comes down to us from those dim ages when the first Christians were making, not writing, history. It is imbedded in the oldest and sweetest prayers of the Roman Church. It must have echoed in the centuries of persecution from the mouth of a Pius or a Cornelius as he besought the intercession of the founders of his see. It is solemnly acknowledged by the original churches as often as they make mention of the episcopal supremacy, the "pontificium" of St. Peter. Indeed, more than once he lays claim to it himself, directly, as in the Epistle to the Galatians (c. II) and indirectly in the account of his conversion that the Acts furnish us (c. IX). It is as a teacher that he makes his first public appearance in the Christian communities, as autodidact, as *ισαπόστολος*, the equal of any of the twelve in knowledge and commission. And throughout

the documents that have come to us from his hand he maintains at its original high rating the office of teacher, whether he be summarizing in vigorous and luminous traits the history of human morals, or expounding the philosophy of human wrong and imperfection, or pleading for a fugitive slave, or reviewing the astounding dealings of God with Israel.

But no teacher becomes such without preparation. He may be called out of the regular order, and his doctrine may be delivered to him, *totum teres atque rotundum*, from a superior and infallible source. Yet he is a man, with a mind and a heart. He has behind him infancy and boyhood and youth. There are in him indestructible elements of heredity, parental, racial, mental. And he has lived in given surroundings, long, intimately, unsuspectingly,—among other men who themselves are mouthpieces of old tradition and custom. His mind and heart have each their own life-history, very even and uneventful, it may be,—and then again, perhaps, very checkered, broken, and stormy. Still, in either case, there is in every human soul an organic growth, an unfolding as of a flower or a fruit. Indeed, what flower or fruit suffers the thousand delicate, shifting, elusive influences that the mind of a child does,—influences more varied, more constant than the play of shadow and sunlight, the motion of the atmosphere, the flowing ether, the heaving of the sea?

So this Jew, born at Tarsus in Cilicia, in that hollow of the Mediterranean where the Hellene and the Semite were wont to meet as at a common outpost, bore all his life the traces of his early education. It colored his teaching, his arguments, his language, his similes. He was an Hellenistic Jew, but not like that Jew whom Aristotle knew and who was an Hellene in very spirit and temper, not like those Asmonæans and Herodians who were even then frittering away the last relics of the traditions of Israel. No, Paul was a Jew, *intus et in cute*, of the soundest “stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, as touching the Law a Pharisee.” He had gone through the primary schools of the Jewish quarter at Tarsus, had learned the text and the interpretation of the Law, perhaps been the equal of Josephus who was a learned teacher of it at the age of fourteen. Thrice a day he had

turned his face to the Holy City and poured out the glorious benedictions of the Schmone-Esre, the Jewish Credo, the very text which one may yet read in any Jewish book of prayer. Twice a day he had piously uttered the Schma, the confession of Jahve's unity and power and glory taken from Deuteronomy and Numbers,—the Doxology of Judaism. He had worshipped regularly in the synagogue by the blue and tideless waters that laved the wharves of his native town. There he read the Scriptures through in a three years course, commented on them and heard them commented on. He observed the three signs of a strict Jew,—the fragments of white wool on the four corners of his cloak that kept the commandments before him, the little roll of parchment containing the Law hung up on the right-hand door post of his room, the Tephilim or the parchment slip of the Law fastened upon his right arm, and the Tephilla or similar slip bound tight upon his forehead. In the observance of sabbaths, foods, fastings, purifications, none was stricter than Saul of Tarsus. And when he went up, between thirteen and sixteen, to the advanced school or academy of Gamaliel at Jerusalem, every Pharisee and Scribe rejoiced, for now a new strength appeared upon the horizon, even a youth of destiny. He was indeed a little Origen of the Jews, whose bosom seemed already the abiding place of the Holy Spirit,—a refreshing fountain of prophecy so long dried up.

Nevertheless, in all these years he had not escaped the omnipresent influences of Hellas. Since Alexander, the Orient was slave to the charm and the puissance of Greek letters, Greek art, and Greek philosophy. Parthian kings assisted at the plays of Euripides, and the Greek drama left the impress of its genius even beyond the Indus and as far as the sacred waters of the Ganges. Asia Minor, though only its fringes were Greek in blood, counted numerous cities of Greek origin scattered among the ancient inhabitants of its high valleys and tablelands. This was notably the case along all the great roads by sea or by land. And Tarsus was at the juncture of two such roads, the sea-way coming westward from the Hellespont and northward from Tyre, Sidon or Caesarea, and the land-way that came down through the deep and narrow passes of

Cilicia. In the time of Paul it was even an academic centre. The Stoic Zeno had once lived there and caught from life-worn and world-wise Orientals the germs of his powerful doctrine. Roman law was doubtless taught in its schools, or in not distant Berytus. There is some slight smattering of Greek culture, not in style or thought, but in fragments of poetry or proverbs, in the great Apostle. He knows considerable about the law of the Empire. He has not the pastoral simplicity of Amos, or the love of nature of Isaias, but draws his metaphors from the camp, the arena, the lives of soldier and wrestler and runner, from the city-world, the world of resolve and action. When he was not earning his living by weaving the coarse Cilician cloth made of goats' hair, he must have had leisure to move about among the splendid monuments of old Greek civilization, temples, baths, markets, porticoes, hippodromes, fountains, statues, inscriptions. Here, too, perhaps, in this old centre of Greek and Oriental philosophies, in this minor university town, he imbibed that supreme contempt for the "wisdom of the world," "the disputers of the world," the "loftiness of human speech," the "persuasive, the learned words of human wisdom." Such phrases refer not to human reason, but to the impotency of philosophy to usurp the office of religion. One day in Athens the disputers will call him, in turn, a "sower of words," and turn a contemptuous back upon his glorious message. But his teaching will grow, and Justinian will at last close their useless schools that a Nero is now flattering.

The soul of Paul, then, must have undergone a remarkable formation. It was filled with intense religious enthusiasm from youth. It was forced into profound acquaintance with the theology of Judaism. Its fibre was hardened like finest steel by hourly conflict with self, by reasoned contempt of human wisdom and glory, above all by the worship of an ideal Messiah of Israel who should one day reward him and his for their most painful finical fidelity to the Law, their long sorrowing exile among these infidel Greeks and Asiatics,—a Messiah who should come, even soon, in splendor and majesty and power, and inaugurate in the Holy City the final reign of the just and the saints, of all those who had been loyal and true

as adamant in the midst of wretched apostasy and pitiful composition and accommodation.

It was a mighty time, big with the new humanity, one to which all the ages had been looking forward as to their complement, the very fullness of time. The melodious Mantuan and the aged Simeon echo the same cry of the bursting human heart. The forces of the earth were erasing or eliminating one another in favor of Rome. The political world was taking on an entirely new bent and trend, to last for many a day—nay, to our own time, just as when the material cover of earth was finally warped and swollen and sunk into its actual shape. The agitation of the times threw out extraordinary characters,—Syllas, Pompeys, Caesars, Herods, Augusti,—in the mad race for the prize of universal dominion. It was truly a struggle of god-like giants of personality.

But for firmness and tenacity of purpose, clear vision of his scope and the means to realize it, utter self-abandoning devotion to a cause infinitely higher and holier than himself; for long-biding patience, intense sustained activity, iron will that laughs all obstacles away; for thorough dominancy of men and situations, and the power to compel the whole army of his workers within the lines laid down by his own personal genius,—in a word for all the qualities of a commander, St. Paul is more than equal to any man of his time. This is the view of St. Chrysostom, perhaps the most sympathetic and observant of the students of St. Paul, out of whose delicate analysis more than one modern has drawn.

In St. Paul character shines out dominant, supreme. Out of whatever loom came that great heart and mind, they were of one pattern, fitted perfectly to one another. He is a man, rude and hard and stern, if you will, but certain, self-identical, reliable. There is in him no shiftiness of the ordinary apostate, no plasticity of the standard Greek. It is always yea, yea, or nay, nay. He sees all things in one clear, strong, unwavering light, a light that so permeates his conscience and floods its remotest corners that he may not be false to it. Through all theorizing and casuistry of human ingenuity, Jew and Greek, he sees the original golden threads of duty and righteousness that lead directly from the soul to God. And seeing them he seizes them and holds them forevermore.

It is because St. Paul, as a disciple of Judaism, developed every native energy of his being that he was one day pre-eminently fitted for the office of a teacher ; because in him the most ideal Judaism of the last days came to the front that he was fitted above all other Jews to be specially called by Jesus ; because in his heart met the tides of Pharisaism and Hellenism, that he was chosen to be the saving unction of the latter. Who else of the Pharisees had the magnanimous soul capable of penning the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, of announcing an apostleship for obedience to the faith in all nations for the name of Jesus Christ, of declaring himself debtor to the Greeks and to the barbarians, i. e., to all humanity ?

II.

The world was indeed the only fit school for a man of his training. Alexander wept because he had no more worlds to conquer ; Paul was heart-broken because he could not offer to his Master, Christ, every one of those miniature worlds called men, in whom alone the outer world has meaning, praise, end, and dignity. For over thirty years this extraordinary teacher travelled the highways and the by-ways of the *Orbis Terrarum*,—the Greco-Roman world of antiquity. It is doubtful if any official or legionary was more frequently on the great strata or roads that bound the principal cities ; certain that none traveled them more foot-sore, worn, and weary, but radiant with faith and beaming with resolution. Who knows as he that narrow strip of Syrian coast, northward from Caesarea, scarcely more than a ribbon of stony pathway in some places ? How often he read the pompous inscriptions of dead conquerors on the rocks above him ! There is the Gulf of Issus on whose shores Darius staked and lost the Orient ! There are the Gates of Syria and the Gates of Cilicia through which all Eastern conquerors have passed to reach the highlands of Asia Minor and thence the Hellespont ! How often he crossed and recrossed the *Ægean* and the *Mediterranean*, moving among the islands famous in ancient story ! There is the coast of proconsular Asia with its five hundred Greek cities, its rich trade with East and West piled up in Miletum and Smyrna and Ephesus, its countless ateliers of

Rhodian sculptors, the remnants of whose works now fill the museums of a world, its schools of philosophers, poets, and rhetoricians,—all its golden human life, abundant, throbbing, and varied! There, too, is old Ilion, on the slope of Ida, between Simois and Scamander; and if the Apostle knew Homer, perhaps some verses of that strange shadowy struggle of men and gods crossed his mind, as the timid, shore-keeping galley drifted by, so close, perhaps, that his eyes could rest on “Maeander’s crooked arms” and “Xanthus’ gulfy flood.”

It was a time of infinite curiosity and endless peregrination, this golden age of peace and wealth,—but in Paul of Tarsus there is no trace of things that were then, and to him minor and insignificant. On every journey he is the herald of Jesus Christ. Whether he toils among the mountains of Cappadocia, or the plateaus of Galatia, or the swamps of Lycaonia; whether he goes from one Macedonian town to another, or crosses the Midland Sea to face great Caesar himself,—he is everywhere and always teacher, missionary, apostle, prophet, founder. In all history there is no such example of sustained concern and anxiety for the growth of an idea. And if the origins of our religion are mean and humble as far as power and wealth go, they are grandiose, sublime, if we reflect on the men who planted it, the hardships they bore, the contempt they lived down, the hatred they turned to love, the love they lifted to the enthusiasm of martyrdom.

What a world it was! The external order was faultless; the Roman Peace was everywhere observed, save by a wandering pirate or some irreducible brigands. Arts and letters and philosophy flourished on all sides. Commerce grew and industry flourished, and the court-poets could flatter the brain of the vast machine that the golden age of Saturn had come, precisely at the time when the Jews looked for a Messiah who was to break the wings and crush the talons of that Roman eagle which looked down exultantly from the gates of the Holy City.

But withal it was a hard and a wicked world. And when its apologists have said all that can be said for it, there remains yet so sad a picture that the heart instinctively shudders, a picture of might priming right without the defence

of eternal protest, of labor despised and poverty trampled upon, of slaves without rights, children without moral training, and women without honor or respect. The moral sense was all but dead. Philosophy had lost its power over the multitudes, even if it served to console or guide an unhappy few. Letters were yet a thing of joy, a refuge. But when did letters ever fill the cravings of the soul that is morally weak and unsettled? Moral advice never flowed more elegantly than from the lips of Seneca, yet who followed it? He himself as little as any one. The Stoics themselves felt that what was wanted was a model, a perfect just man, in whom every virtue should see mirrored all its possibilities. It was this personality which Christianity offered. It bridged by the life of Christ the hopeless gulf between the abstract and the concrete. And then it sent forth into the world universal teachers like Paul who lived over again, as men, the life of their Divine Teacher, and shed on all sides the aroma of His infinite virtue.

III.

As a teacher St. Paul has had no equal in the history of humanity. Overflowing with the consciousness that his doctrine is not of man, but of God, he knows no wavering, but goes straight to the point at issue,—Jesus Christ is God and Man. He was crucified and rose again. In Him our broken and weakened nature was dipped, as it were, in a refreshing bath, and a new love and energy added to it. We are again, by these mysteries, children of the Father now appeased, and brothers of the Son of God who has atoned through all eternity for the shortcomings of human nature, has wiped out the contractual slavery under Satan, and reopened the narrow but straight path to eternal life, to re-union with the juridical head of our race, Christ Jesus, foreshadowed by Adam's original headship and responsibility.

It is a deep and subtle teaching, so deep that the plummet of thought has not yet fathomed its last recesses, so subtle that it furnishes food for minds of every type and calibre. This first commentator on the Life of Christ rose at one bound to the highest empyrean of thought, and exhausted all the fundamental capacities of the mind as against the life and

spirit of Jesus. Paul may defend his conclusions by a sublime dialectic of his own, very peculiar and very forceful. He has not reached them by any slow-winding staircase of digressive thought. Paul has seen; it has been revealed unto him, in the blinding light of that dread hour amid the flowery fields and apple orchards and flowing waters that surround Damascus, in the cabinet of Ananias, in those three years of meditation and self-searching beyond the lines of Greek and Jewish life,—among the aboriginal Saracens or Bedouins of the Arabian desert. Here he has learned to know the difference between the spirit of the law, its scope and character, and the ugly thorny hedge which degenerate doctors had built up about it. Here God transformed, in the silence and peace of nature, the proud and ardent soul into an instrument of choice, supple, devoted, courageous, intelligent. He shed the fantastic theology of the Pharisees; he rose to a sublime conception of the One God as Father, all-merciful, the parent of all humanity. He learned that Judaism was not the end of creation, but a step, a phase, a temporary refuge, a beacon, a pulpit, and that Man, humanity, all life, all the crowding ages that shall ever be,—this was the reason of the Messias, His kingdom, His triumph, and His glory.

In long and tender colloquies with his Divine Master Paul rose above all mankind, and took on something of the personal manner and authority of Christ Himself. In the same breath he is dust and ashes, and then again he thunders and flashes truth after truth, warning after warning, appeal after appeal. His bosom is the channel of divinest thoughts and ardors, and at times he swoons away,—the frail vessel of the flesh is all but consumed by these terrific fires. He stands an intermediary between the soul and God, like the very binding link of religion, and he is filled with the most solemn consciousness that on his vicarious tongue and action depends the fate of a world. He is like one of those narrow estuaries through which the waters of an ocean are driven, whose bed and shores are torn and churned and gashed by the elemental conflict of wind and waves.

Not only is this man a devoted teacher, holding back nothing of himself; he is also a man of single purpose. His own

person sinks away and is lost,—he is voice, hand, channel, only an instrument fitted to the will of Jesus Christ. Faith and love have all but drowned his individual self,—he is willing to be an anathema, a castaway, a thing of scorn and pity for his brethren, because his own love hath so loved them.

He is also a teacher of sublime courage. Men admire to-day whoever stood out in former ages for truths we now perceive in their entirety,—Galileo, Harvey, Jenner, any forerunner of the true, the good, and the beautiful as we taste or know them. But how faint the merit of all such when compared with the courage of a man like Paul! His teaching was unpopular, new, and difficult. It was full of rock-like principles about which the powers of earth must one day rage and the peoples shout vain things. It cut in between man and wife, between father and son, between the spiritual and the temporal, between the soul and the body, between God and Satan, between the City of Sin and the New Jerusalem. Scarcely had it been formulated when men nailed its Founder to a gibbet that He took for a throne. And scarcely had it got across the borders of Palestine when all life and society were filled with uproar, when there was a cry throughout all humanity: "To your tents, O Israel!"—and almost in the twinkling of an eye there stood over against one another the hosts of organized society and the little band of brethren who knew that now the hour had come to go out from kin and home and neighbor, and seek the New Land of Promise.

Could we do it, my brethren? Let us admire, at least, the unparalleled courage of the man who broke down that alliance of earth-powers, and freed the soul of humanity from the vain terrors and superstitions, and still vainer errors and prejudices, that held it like a crust.

He is not a teacher from his cathedra alone, a Plato or a Zeno; he is a man of action. See how he follows up the openings for Christ at Corinth, in Galatia, in Macedonia! See how he forecasts his journeys to Rome, to Spain! See how he bears about in his heart the needs of the poor over-taxed decaying city of Jerusalem, how he is anxious over schisms, elections, friendships, new doctrines! He has caught from the heart of Jesus Christ something of His undying enthusiasm of humanity.

A teacher must be called by higher authority, so great are the responsibilities toward society, so supreme are the demands made upon the office, so far-reaching, for good or evil, the effects of its administration. Almost at death's door, St. Patrick took up the pen in his aged and palsied fingers to prove that he had not entered Ireland without a proper calling. St. Paul himself avers that no one may minister unless called of God, like Aaron. Again and again he recalls his own vocation, though through Christ. His secretary puts down the history of it in the notebook of their travels. It is his pride and support; he will even go up to Jerusalem to the chief of the Church and the principal Apostles, to have their juridical approbation, lest he run in vain, or outside of the new society.

Yet his calling was an extraordinary one. How often since then has it happened in the history of the Church that the greatest things have been done, not by those born in the faith, but by men who have drifted into it by many long and painful wanderings! It is the mystery of the eleventh hour, of the vocation of our ancestors, of the corner stone that the builders rejected, the mysterious law of the success of failure, of the triumph of minorities. Justin, Athenagoras, Clement, Cyprian, Augustine,—to speak only of very ancient examples,—are not these the later teachers of the Christians, and did they not all go through the preliminary schools of paganism?

For us, members of the School of Theology, St. Paul has a real domestic significance. He is the father of Christian theology. In him are contained *radicitus*, in germ, all the ecclesiastical sciences,—the interpretation of Scripture, the basic theories of Christian doctrine, the principles of morality and the details of conduct, the origins of the public worship or liturgy, the first chapters of Christian history, the spirit and method of apologetics, the primitive institutions of Christian life and practice. What Homer was to the Greek mind, the source of all progress and evolution; what Vergil was to the Roman mind, the mentor of Roman virtue, the index of Roman fortune, that and infinitely more St. Paul was to the Christian mind. In him Jesus Christ raised up and inspired an infalli-

ble lawgiver and teacher, as a sure corner-stone to His little society, about which all the weak, uncertain human elements of the time must coalesce.

St. Paul is, moreover, the parent of all great Christian literature. St. Justin and the Apologists, St. Clement of Rome, St. Irenæus,—all the leading Christian thinkers are dominated by him in the second century. Old Abercius of Hieropolis is right in asserting his leadership, and Renan is wrong in saying that his influence paled in that century. The heresy of Marcion and its vigorous refutation show that during all the sub-apostolic time St. Paul was the focus of Catholic theological life. The story of Paul and Thecla shows how well he was remembered about the middle of the second century, when legend had already begun to spin its web about his life-story. St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, the Cappadocian fathers, St. Patrick, St. Gregory, St. Bernard, are great torches lit along the ages from his flame. Of St. Patrick, Tillemont said that no other saint so recalled the Apostle Paul. The great Christian councils of the first six centuries are dominated by his theology, and it has been well said that in spirit and guidance he is their true president.

In his Pastoral Epistles he has left us, as it were, the first manual of clerical conduct. And all later works, like the Apologia of Gregory Nazianzen, the *De Sacerdotio* of Chrysostom, the *Regula Pastoralis* of Gregory the Great, the *De Contemptu Mundi* of Innocent III. are but echoes, adaptations of these first chapters of formation and guidance.

Finally, he is to us the model of our dealings with the people of God. He has *flammanitia verba* and *sæva indignatio* for evil, but only pity for the sinner. He is full of compassion and gentleness for the poor, the humble in society, the outcast. For those who are Christ's his heart overflows with love; for those who are not yet of Christ he is thoughtful, ingenious, laborious,—he must win them or perish in the attempt. For Jew and Gentile he has reason and argument, history and philosophy, when occasion demands it. He takes up the discussion in the Areopagus; perhaps he conversed with Seneca. In his Roman apartment all were free to come and go, and he was no indolent dreamer in those years.

There opens before us a world not unlike that into which Paul went down and came out victorious,—a world to be won again for Jesus Christ by the example of our lives and by the victories of the mind,—a world as proud and self-satisfied as any Rome or Greece, yet gentler, milder, more refined and accessible. On the other hand, it is harder to convert it to the Christian view of things, for it has once fallen away, and the saving dew does not often fall twice on the same pastures. To speak to this world, to be believed by it, we must appropriate something of the spirit and the methods of the Apostle of the Gentiles. It must be convinced of our genuine affection for it. It must see in us the natural virtues it admires and practices. It must find in us elevation of view, breadth and abundance of human sympathies, gentlemanliness, genuine tolerance, courtesy of mind, heart, and tongue, a large and hopeful patience in God's wise management of His own work. We must, in very fact, according to our talent and our circumstances, become all things to all the men of our age, if we would truly take up the mission and the teaching of the Apostle of the Nations.

God grant that the number of such disciples of St. Paul increase, and that under the ægis of his spirit and his faith there may be again an united Christendom, the only worthy outcome of the labors of so sublime a guide and teacher! God grant us, as time goes on, an ever larger number of men devoted to the work of the ministry, possessed with one purpose, filled with the old and the new learning, passionately fond of their own age and their own country, with great hearts to feel for their needs, sure and clever instincts to adopt what is needful, enlightened minds to execute the same, and transcendent enthusiasm to sustain them in their work and to inflame with the same consuming spirit each his own time and generation!

Impendar et superimpendar! Let this be the cry of every noble soul who would live for others, not for himself! Let it be your answer to every temptation to a life of ease and security when the vast conflict calls for zeal, fiery and morrant, but breathing love and self-sacrifice! Let no cynicism, domestic or foreign, dim the freshness and the impact of your

ardor! Let no tale of worldly-wise rationalizing experience relegate you to the rear as camp followers! Rather be ever well up in the front, along the red ridge of battle, where alone the prizes of success are to be had! *Mors acerba, fama perpetua, stabit vetus memoria facti.*

There are yet mighty deeds to be done for Jesus Christ, even the reconquest of an apostate and disillusioned world; and they can only be done in the uncalculating warrior spirit that sustained St. Paul and enabled him to create anew for his Divine Master a real world, the inner world of the soul, belief, ideals, hopes, that world of which things and sciences are only the beautiful but transitory envelope.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION.¹

The question whether tribes exist quite devoid of religious sentiment and practice was warmly contested a generation ago, but is now, as a rule, met with a negative answer. Quatrefage's characterization of man as "un être organisé—doné de moralité et de religion,"² is one from which few anthropologists of the present day would withhold their assent. Of course, the proposition that man is everywhere religious does not imply that his religion is always of the highest type, just as the statement that man is a moral being does not mean that his moral standard is always complete. In the sense applicable to the present purpose, religion may be defined as the acknowledgment by acts of homage of man's dependence on a supernatural being or beings, conceived as having control, to some extent at least, over man's destiny and over the forces of nature. In this sense religion may be said to be practically coextensive with mankind.

Closely connected with the universality of religion is the question of its origin. This problem does not find a welcome with some Christian scholars, for they think it tends to bring prejudice to the Christian faith. But this, I think, is a mistake. For, leaving aside for the present the question of positive revelation, we may legitimately ask ourselves if there is in man a natural basis for religion. Though the question of the origin of religion creates in some minds the impression that there was a time when man had no religion at all, still it is plain that it need not carry this assumption with it. Religion may prove, like morality, to be a natural and inevitable outcome of the use of reason. Hence it may well have existed from the beginning, and been even prior to a revelation of religion in a higher and purer form. The all-important point is: If religion is the natural outcome of the use of reason, is it the result of a legiti-

¹ A criticism of the theory of Mr. Herbert Spencer, as expounded in his "Principles of Sociology."

² *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1860, p. 820.

mate mental process, or is it to be relegated to the rubbish heap of erroneous judgments? In a word, has religion, viewed independently of revelation, anything like a solid foundation, or is it built on the shifting sands of superstition?

Various, indeed, are the views that have been called forth by this question. Among the prominent thinkers of to-day who deny to the religious sentiment in man a legitimate foundation and object, is Mr. Herbert Spencer. With his characteristic display of erudition, he has discussed the origin of religion at great length in his *Principles of Sociology*, an important subdivision of his vast work on *Synthetic Philosophy*.

Mr. Spencer derives primitive notions of the spiritual world from dreams and visions. Through them man arrived at the conception of the phantom, or soul, living more or less independently of the body and surviving it at death. Hence arose the worship of ancestral spirits, and the appeasing of hostile ghosts, some of which in the course of time became transformed into higher deities and demons, till finally, in a few favorable instances, one deity was fancied to reign supreme, to the gradual extinction of all the rest. Thus, according to Mr. Spencer, with the souls of the dead all deities of a higher order are identical. The gods of nature, aye, the supreme God of the Christians, are but transformations of human phantoms, are but human ghosts in disguise. Thus all higher religion is the mistaken outcome of an extravagant ancestor-worship. The first prayers were appeals made to the dead. The first sacrifices were the offerings of food placed on the grave. The first altar was the mound of earth or heap of stones covering the remains of the dead. The beginnings of the temple betray themselves in the burial cave and in the rude shelter set up above the grave.

Let us examine the process of reasoning by which Mr. Spencer seeks to make good his theory. Of course, in keeping with his philosophic views, he looks upon all religion as upon civilization in general, as the result of a gradual, progressive development from the simple conditions in which man found himself after emerging from the brute. As the beginnings of civilization were coarse and rude, so the beginnings of religion. Both were natural effects of the workings of primitive human

intelligence, and both developed by natural laws of progress, till in some favored instances they reached high levels of excellence. But in less favorable conditions they either maintained a constantly low level or, after a certain grade of progress, degenerated to a state not far removed from the primitive condition. To explain, then, the origin of religious ideas, Mr. Spencer passes over the higher forms of religious philosophy, and turns to the religious notions of rude and savage peoples, for it is there, he claims, that we have the nearest approach to the primitive human mind.

Though exception might be taken to this radical method of procedure, let us allow it to pass, for the sake of argument, and briefly review with him the religious notions of uncultivated peoples.

The first thing that strikes the student of primitive religions is the rude psychology underlying the savage's notion of life and death. To this point Mr. Spencer devotes a careful study, which approves itself, in the main, to the unprejudiced mind.

From the first the mind of man seems to have occupied itself with the explanation of sleep, dreams, visions, trances, sickness and death. In sleep the body lies motionless, and yet the dreaming individual seems to move about from place to place. The familiar forms of deceased relatives and friends appear to him; enemies present themselves and try to slay him. How account for these strange and often vivid experiences? The almost universal explanation of untutored minds is that there is in every man a light, airy, film-like substance, the exact counterpart of the body, giving to the latter its life, but capable of existing apart from it. This phantom-like principle of life and consciousness, variously known as the soul, spirit, ghost, breath, shade, which Mr. Spencer calls the other-self, or double, is thought to be temporarily absent from the body in sleep, swoons, trances, and extreme sickness, returning to the body when consciousness is resumed. At death it leaves the body for good, and leads an independent existence, but appears to friends and relatives in dreams and visions. This curious explanation, so puerile in our eyes, of dreams as something real, of mental phantasms

as objects in actual existence, finds exemplification in the beliefs of peoples in every quarter of the world. Thus the Greenlander will tell you in all seriousness that the soul quits the body during sleep to go visiting, dancing, and hunting. The New Zealanders, in like manner believe that in sleep their souls often travel to the land of the dead to converse with those they knew in life. Fr. Charlevoix, the famous Jesuit missionary of the eighteenth century, testifies to similar beliefs among the Indians of North America. Some people refrain from waking a sleeper suddenly on account of the fancied absence of the soul.

It is in keeping with this primitive psychology that many savages identify their souls with the reflections of their bodies in the smooth water, or even with their shadows. The recognition of the shadow as a manifestation of the soul is common to the Indian tribes of North and South America, to the Tasmanians, the Fijians, and many negro tribes of Africa. The Basutos of South Africa take care not to walk along the river bank when their shadows fall upon the stream, for fear a crocodile might seize the shadow and draw the luckless owner in.

Being the exact counterpart of the body, the soul or phantasm is thought to have the same characteristics, the same defects as the human frame with which it has been united. Thus the Australian will cut off the right thumb of a slain enemy, so that its ghost, likewise hostile, cannot hurl its spear at him. The negro stands in dread of a long sickness, which will send him lean and feeble into the next world. The great horror which the Chinese have of decapitation is chiefly due to the persuasion that their souls would thereby be sent headless into the realm of the dead.

Besides having all the external characteristics of the body, the phantom, when set free at death, is fancied likewise to be animated by the same desires and tastes, to have the same needs and occupations that marked its earthly life. The ghosts of the dead eat, drink, hunt, fight and dance. They have need of wives and attendants. Hence the custom the world over of burying or burning with the corpse the things needed for the next world. The child is buried with its playthings; the woman with her carrying strap, cooking utensils, blankets,

bead ornaments and cosmetics; the warrior with his weapons and his favorite horse or dog. Hence, too, the cruel custom so world-wide of killing a number of the warrior's wives and attendants to keep him company and minister to his wants in the next world.

It is easy to see how, in consequence of such primitive philosophy, the souls of the dead could become the object of a religious cult. Partly out of affection, partly from a sense of duty, offerings of food are made at the graves of the dead or before their bones or mummified forms. The spirits of the dead are thought to be refreshed by these tokens of piety and to show their good will and appreciation by acts of kindness in return. On the other hand, sickness and ill-luck come to be ascribed to the anger felt by the dead by reason of some neglect on the part of the living. Thus, if an Algonquin Indian happened to fall into the fire, he was persuaded that the spirits of his dead relatives had pushed him in for neglecting to make them the proper offerings.

The Zulus hold that the spirits of their dead, if provoked by lack of offerings, inflict disease, but if rightly treated, give health, abundance of corn and cattle, and help them to strike down their enemies. When the Kafir doctor is called to the sick he declares the dead relatives of the patient are the cause of his affliction, and need to be appeased by the sacrifice of a cow or by some other offering. In Tanna, one of the New Hebrides Islands, the ancestral spirits are supposed to watch over the growth of yams and fruit trees. The natives pray to them and make them offerings of fruits.

Examples like these of religious worship of the dead are most abundant, nor are they confined to the lowest grades of civilization. They have a place as well in the religious systems of China, of ancient India, Persia, Greece and Rome.

The prevailing sentiments towards the dead are those of affection and reverence, rather than of fear. But apart from the great mass of the dead stand certain ghosts that assume the rôle of destroyers, and are consequently held in dread. Such are the souls of enemies slain in battle, of persons deprived of proper burial, of sorcerers and others of evil repute. If they show themselves unusually hostile and threatening,

offerings are made to allay their wrath. A case is on record of a British officer in India who, after a life of cruelty and wickedness, was elevated by the superstitious natives to the unenviable rank of a demon, and was duly appeased at times by offerings of brandy and soda, which it seems was his favorite beverage in life.

Enough has been said to show how deeply rooted and how widespread is the worship of the dead among people of low culture. On this feature of their religious life Mr. Spencer enlarges at considerable length. But there is another feature of at least equal importance, on which he fails to lay sufficient stress, and that is the belief in higher spirits and deities identified with the great forces of nature and manifesting their presence in striking phenomena like the sky, earth, sun, moon, thunder and tempest. This belief in nature-deities is as widespread as the belief in friendly and hostile ghosts. It finds expression among tribes that stand lowest in the scale of culture, tribes that, until recently, were declared to be destitute of religious ideas. Notun frequently one of these nature-deities, generally the heaven, sun, or thunder-god, is recognized as supreme, and is honored with the title of maker of all things. We have not the time to enter fully into this subject, and so we shall content ourselves with a few striking examples.

The rude Khonds of India distinguish clearly the revered souls of the dead from the higher nature-deities, among whom the sun-god and creator, Bura Pennu, and the earth-goddess, Tari Pennu, hold the highest rank. The worship of the sun, generally as the first among a number of nature-deities, is common to many savage peoples, as the Kol tribes of Bengal, the Ainos of Yesso, the Muyscas, Botocudos, Tobas, and Puelches of South America, not to speak of other peoples like the ancient Peruvians, Natchez, and Apalaches, who stood on a higher plane of culture.

The Australians, classed among the most degraded of peoples, and long thought to be without religious sentiment, recognize high above the ghosts and spirits swarming in the jungles, a few nature-gods. They give the place of supremacy to Baiame, the Thunder-god and maker of all things. In like manner, the fierce Araucanians of Chili brought offerings to

the sun, but worshipped as the highest deity, Pillan, the Thunder-god. Tupan, the god of thunder, worshipped by the rude Tupi tribes of Brazil, furnished the early Catholic missionaries with the name by which they made known to these unenlightened peoples the nature and attributes of the true God.

The natives of the Andaman Islands, a pigmy and feeble-minded remnant of the black Dravidian race of South Asia, credited till lately with utter ignorance of religious ideas, believe in a supreme being whose name is Puluga. He was never born and will never die. He made all things. Invisible, he dwells in the sky. He knows all things, but can see only while it is day. So too the negroes of Africa, with but few exceptions, recognize among other higher deities the heaven-god, who sends the rain and the lightning, who is generally honored with the title of creator. We all know how familiar to the North American Indian was the Great Manitoo or Spirit who dwelt in the sky, and who was above comparison with the wind, water, thunder, and fire-gods, much more with the souls of the dead.

The religious energy of primitive peoples is, therefore, divided between ancestor-worship on the one hand, and the worship of nature-deities on the other. These two classes of spirits are scarcely ever confounded. It sometimes happens, indeed, that the higher nature-gods, especially the heaven and sun-god, are less frequently honored, being conceived as too remote from men to care much for their gifts and too good-natured to take offense at their neglect. And so it comes to pass that their rights to submissive worship are often set aside in favor of the claims of lesser gods and spirits, and of the souls of the dead as well, who are felt to have a more direct influence over the destinies of man, and whose powers of doing evil are especially dreaded. But the nature-deities are, perhaps without exception, recognized to be superior to ghosts in rank and kind.

But this conception of superior nature-deities, Mr. Spencer contends, is not primary in the human mind, but rather of secondary, indirect origin. It could not have come to the mind by way of inference from the contemplation of nature.

It implies the mistaken notion of primitive man that the sky, earth, sun, moon, and sea are living things. But the mind of man in its lowest state of enlightenment could not make so egregious a blunder, unless led astray by some erroneous prepossession, for even the higher brutes are able to distinguish between things living and things without life. "Shall we say," he writes, "that the primitive man is less intelligent than the lower mammals, less intelligent even than insects? Unless we say this, we must say that the primitive man distinguishes the living from the not-living; and if we credit him with intelligence higher than that of the brutes, we must infer that he distinguishes the living from the not-living better than brutes do" (ch. ix. § 65).

For this reason Mr. Spencer declares himself against the view so widely accepted that the conception of nature-deities arises directly in the mind of primitive man from the observation of the striking phenomena of nature.

But it is just here that the first serious flaw in Mr. Spencer's argument betrays itself.

For, in the first place, the recognition of nature-gods does not in every instance imply the notion that the phenomena with which they are associated are living things. In many cases it implies no more than that the phenomena are the *embodiments* of superior beings, or the *manifestations* of their power. This is certainly true of the thunder-god so familiar to rude peoples in every part of the earth. There is no visible object with which he is identified, the lightning and thunder being simply the evidence of his existence, the manifestation of his power. The wind and tempest-gods are likewise instances in point.

Again, when the North American Indian sent his puff of smoke in reverent worship to the Great Spirit in the sky, or threw a handful of tobacco to the spirit in the river or the lake, he did not confound the sky, or river, or lake, with the spirit who dwelt therein. So, too, the heaven-god of the Guinea negroes, of the Andaman Islanders, of the Australians, is conceived as abiding in the sky, not as being the living sky itself.

It is only, then, to *some* deified phenomena as the sun, moon, planets, stars, possibly the sea, that Mr. Spencer's objection, even if valid, could be made to apply. But even here, its val-

idity can not stand the test of careful scrutiny. For what he says of the comparative ability of men and of brutes to discern the presence or absence of life, applies only to objects of familiar experience. It can not legitimately be extended to objects that, like the sun and moon, exhibit motion but do not admit of familiar inspection. What certainty have we that brutes are able to discern the lifeless character of such objects as these? It is plain that we have none at all. And yet Mr. Spencer argues as if he knew all about it, for only on that condition is his argument of any worth.

He says, indeed, that brutes distinguish motion implying life from mere lifeless motion by the spontaneity of the former. This he thinks, "is clearly shown by the behavior of animals in presence of a railway train, which shows no spontaneity. In the early days of railroads, they displayed great alarm; but after a time, familiarized with the roar and swift motion of this something which appearing in the distance, rushed by and disappeared in the distance, they became regardless of it. The cattle now continue to graze; and even the partridges on the embankment slopes scarcely raise their heads" (ch. ix. § 62).

But is this a sound inference? Is it because the cattle and birds have discovered the rushing train to be *lifeless* that they now regard it without alarm? Or is not their absence of fear due rather to the fact that they have found it to be *harmless*? This, it seems to me, is the more sensible explanation. It is not because the train appeared a *living* thing that the animals were at first afraid, but because it appeared a *dangerous* thing. Familiarity with its movements restored confidence, just as familiarity with the movements of harnessed horses on our roads has taught the birds and beasts to take no fright from their swift running. Such animals doubtless recognize a horse dashing by with a carriage as a living thing; but whether they fancy the moving train to be inanimate or living, we have no certain means of judging. Surely their conduct, which is the same in the presence of a train as in the presence of a horse, gives no safe ground of inference. And though Mr. Spencer assures us that the absence of spontaneity in the train enables brutes to discern its lifeless character, we may ask what about those brutes in the neighborhood of a station, that see the train

come to a stop as if of its own accord, and soon move on again? Here is spontaneity of motion as far as brutes can judge, and yet we find them looking on with the same stolid indifference as their less favored congeners. In like manner, whether brutes see in the sun or moon merely lifeless things is a problem we have no certain means of solving, though some think the baying of dogs at the rising moon implies that they take the moon to be a living thing.

But there is a reason why man should take the movements of the sun and moon, the violent blasts of winds, the crashing and destroying force of the lightning to be manifestations of personality. Primitive man is ignorant of the physical laws by which these phenomena are governed. By the natural impulse of his rational nature he is led to ascribe these various movements to causes, and in his ignorance of mechanical causes, he attributes them to personal, living causes. When he hears the thunder he naturally thinks of the thunderer; as he views the sun and moon he is apt to take them for living beings.

How natural this is to primitive minds is shown by instances mentioned by Mr. Spencer himself. "By the Esquimaux, Ross' vessels were thought alive,—moving as they did without oars; and Thompson says of the New Zealanders, that when Cook's ship hove in sight, the people took her for a whale with wings." Andersson tells us that by the Bushmen a wagon was supposed to be animated and to want grass; its complexity, its symmetry, and its moving wheels, being irreconcilable with their experiences of inanimate things" (ch. ix § 65).

Enough has been said, I think, to bring out the weakness of Mr. Spencer's reasoning that the recognition of nature-deities cannot be a primary process in the mind of primitive man.

Let us now go with him a step further and see how he tries to bridge over the immense gulf that separates nature-worship from ancestor-worship, for it is from the belief in ancestral ghosts that he derives the world-wide notion of nature-deities.

To make the transition from the worship of the comparatively feeble ghost of man to that of the mighty spirit inhabiting

the heaven, or sun, or revealing its presence and power in the raging tempest or the lightning-crash, Mr. Spencer has recourse to a supposed misinterpretation of language and traditions on the part of primitive man. After laying stress on the rudimentary state of language of unenlightened tribes, its poverty of diction, its superabundance of metaphors,—all tending to render the expression of thought difficult and liable to frequent misunderstanding, he attempts to show how the deification of certain features of nature, as, for example, the mountain or the sea, might have been brought about by mistaking the traditional place of origin for the ancestor of the tribe. Thus, after giving instances of a mountain being deified and honored with the title of ancestor, he lays down the following explanation. The mountain was first accepted as the place whence the tribe came, either because their ancestors had dwelt on its sides in caves, or because they had come by way of the mountain from some distant place beyond. The story of *coming from the mountain* came in time to be misunderstood as *being produced by the mountain as ancestor*. Forthwith the people took the mountain for their remote ancestor and gave it worship (ch. xxiv § 186).

In like manner men coming from over the sea would be spoken of by primitive people as “men of the sea.” The change from “men of the sea” to “children of the sea” is an easy one,—paralleled by like figures of speech among ourselves,—and from the name “children of the sea” the mistaken notion would soon prevail that the sea was the ancient parent of their race, an ancestor worthy of worship (Ibid. § 187).

In declaring this explanation to be puerile in the extreme, I do not think I am laying myself open to the charge of unfairness. For observe, first, metaphorical language would be less likely to deceive the savage than us, for the reason that the savage uses figurative language on nearly all occasions. He needs but an ounce of common sense to discriminate between ideas so vastly remote as coming from a lifeless mountain or sea, and being born of a living mountain or sea. The latter notion would be rejected unhesitatingly by the savage who hitherto had had no conception of nature-gods; nay, who had, according to Mr. Spencer, the firm conviction that mountain and sea, sun and moon were lifeless.

But, even supposing that, now and then, a savage might be so witless as to make a mistake of this magnitude, are we to believe that all the members of the tribe could be equally stupid? Would they all be apt to make the same blunder, and, waking up, as it were, out of a long sleep, discover in the lifeless hill or sea the ghost of an ancestor whom they had thus far neglected, and whom forthwith they began to worship? And lastly, if one tribe could have made so gross a mistake, would it be likely that hundreds of other tribes all over the world would fall into the same error? A form of worship so universal cannot be rightly ascribed to a cause so fortuitous and unlikely. Mr. Spencer seems to feel the weakness of this support to his theory, for he proceeds at once to supplement it by another kind of misinterpretation, namely, that by which renowned ancestors named after the sun, moon, and other objects of nature became identified with these objects, thus giving rise to nature-worship.

The custom prevails widely among the lower races of naming children after incidents connected with their birth, as "Falling-rain," "Sighing-wind," "Rising-sun," or after familiar objects of nature, as Thunder, Big-hill, Sun, Moon. Now, Mr. Spencer thinks that the worship of renowned ancestors called Thunder, Big-Hill, Sun and Moon led to a mistaken identification of these heroes with the objects of nature whose names they bore, and in consequence the Thunder, Mountain, Sun and Moon came to be worshipped as deities (*Ibid.* § 188-193).

This explanation is a little more plausible than the preceding, but is open to fatal objections. First of all, the custom of calling the living after objects of nature would save them from the error of confounding an ancestor with the object whose name he bore. That savage would be of amazing simplicity who would be led to discover in the majestic orb of heaven the living form of an ancestor called Sun, when, perhaps, his own chief was known by the name of Sun as well, when he himself was called Moon, and his relatives went by the names of Cloud, Rain, Thunder, and Sunshine.

The weakness of this explanation reveals itself more clearly still when we bear in mind that among primitive people the worship of ancestors as distinct individuals scarcely ever goes

back beyond the grandfather. The remote ancestors are soon forgotten, the foreground being occupied by those who have passed away within the lifetime of the worshippers. Thus the individuals who stand forth prominently in ancestral worship are those of recent memory, the very ones who would least likely be mistaken for some object of nature whose name they bore.¹

There is another consideration that adds to the improbability of mistakes like these, and that is the widespread dislike of savage peoples to mention the dead by name. Thus the Tasmanians would not pronounce the names of their dead relatives and friends for fear of offending their spirits. Similar customs, though not all based on the same motive, prevail among the Ainos, the Australians, the Ostiaks, the Indians of North America, the Fuegians, the Caribs. The Guaycurus of South America take care not to pronounce the name of a deceased chief, and the Abipones of Paraguay were formerly so scrupulous in this respect as to drop from their vocabulary all words of which the name of the deceased formed a part. Among such peoples the possibility of confounding objects of nature with the deceased ancestors bearing their names is too slight to merit consideration.²

Note, besides, that the worship of ancestors among savages is almost exclusively confined to the ghosts of men. Female ancestors scarcely ever receive religious honors. But it is always as a goddess that the earth is worshipped. She is the mother of all things. The moon has likewise received worship as a female deity from many tribes of North and South America, as for example, the Hurons, Algonquins, Ottawas, Incas, Muyscas, Chiquitos; also from the natives of the Malay Peninsula. To account for these and other female deities of nature, we need a different explanation from that given by Mr. Spencer.³

In fine, we may say of this, as of the preceding explanation, that the mistaking of the great features of nature for human

¹ Principles of Sociology, I., § 100; Tylor, Primitive Culture, II., p. 116; Ellis, Ewe-Speaking Peoples, p. 25.

² Principles of Sociology, I., § 133; Jevons, Introduction to the History of Religion, p. 61; Brinton, Religions of Primitive Peoples, p. 95.

³ Spencer, Ecclesiastical Institutions, ch. IV., § 597; Lang, Article on Mythology in Encyclopedia Britannica.

ancestors would be too fortuitous to account for a thing so general as nature-worship. The coincidences in nature-myths and nature-worship are too many and too minute. That even an individual here and there might commit so egregious a blunder is unlikely enough. But that all the members of the tribe should make the same mistake, still more, that hundreds of tribes in every part of the earth should be likewise deceived, is beyond the limits of credibility.

Mr. Spencer thinks he finds confirmation of this part of his theory in the anthropomorphic descriptions and myths of the gods, and in the traditions current among some peoples of descent from nature-deities. But anthropomorphism is too deeply rooted in the mind of man to be explained as the outcome simply of belief in ghosts and of ancestral worship. Anthropomorphic descriptions of the gods are thus no proof of their ghostly origin. In like manner the titles of father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, given sometimes to certain deities, as well as the traditions of tribal descent from nature-gods, need not imply that these gods are nothing more than deified ancestors. They are rather the expression partly of man's vanity, and partly of a deep persuasion that there is something akin between the human and the divine. Prof. Jevons has brought out this point very clearly in his recent work, the "Introduction to the History of Religion," p. 197. Of a like view is Prof. Brinton, who says in his "Religions of Primitive Peoples": "In all of them (i. e. primitive faiths) you will find the deity appealed to as great, mighty, a lord, a king, terror-inspiring, loving his followers, and by hundreds of such epithets of amplification and flattery. He is addressed as father, grandfather, not at all implying a physical relationship, as some modern writers have erroneously stated; but with reference to the loving care he is supposed to extend to his worshippers" (p. 105).

With these words we take our leave of Mr. Spencer. We have followed him carefully in his attempt to demonstrate the ghostly origin of the higher deities of nature. We have seen how signally he has failed. His capital error is his denial to man of the almost instinctive tendency to rise from the observation of the forces of nature to the conception of personality

working in and through nature. This tendency is characteristic of the human reason. There are certain axioms that are common to us and to primitive man, that commend themselves everywhere to the reasonable mind unprejudiced by the peculiar tenets of certain schools of thought. One of these is the objective existence of the world without us. Another is the principle of causality. A third, of great importance, though liable, it is true, to misapplication, is the principle that force is the outcome of intelligent volition, and hence a manifestation, mediate or immediate, of personality.¹ By the untutored mind this axiom is firmly grasped but not in its completeness. Acquainted only with personal causes, ignorant of the existence and of the unity of the physical, secondary causes by which the phenomena of nature are produced, primitive man fails to discern in the intricate and shifting scenes of nature the workings of one, supreme Will. He mistakes the various phenomena for the immediate manifestations of as many independent personalities. And so, by an almost spontaneous act of mind, he thinks he sees in sun and moon, tempest and lightning, sky, earth, and sea, the evidence of mighty personal causes, nature-gods, filling him with the sense of mystery, exciting his admiration or his fear, inviting or repelling his confidence and affection according as they promote his welfare or bring ruin in their train. And note, too, how inevitably springs up man's sense of dependence on these deities of nature. From the very first, he finds himself completely at their mercy. He cannot stay the sun and moon in their majestic course, nor ward off the destructive storm or lightning stroke. The seas, now calm, now lashed to fury, the rivers swollen at times with heavy freshets and laying waste the neighboring lands with wild impetuous flood, the earth now barren, now producing precious herbs and fruits, all these are hopelessly beyond his power to control. Feeling himself thus at the mercy of these mighty beings, he does but follow the promptings of his heart when he turns to them in self-abasement, and seeks, through prayer and offerings, to win their good will and friendship.

¹ Cf. Brinton, *op. cit.* p. 47.

In this way the forces of nature become divided up among a number of powerful deities, each one of which acts more or less on his own responsibility. But the mind of man, in obedience to its craving for unity, assigns to one of these deities, the supremacy over the rest, and in some cases pushing the principle of causality further still, sees in this supreme deity the maker of all things.

Such is the origin of religion in primitive man. It is independent of, and doubtless prior to, the conception of ghosts. While not without an admixture of error, it is based on a sound principle, the same by which behind the changes of seasons, the orderly movements of the earth and planets, the forces of gravitation and chemical affinity, growth and decay, the Christian philosopher discerns the great original Will, the all-knowing Designer, the all-powerful Ruler and Lord of creation, in whom we live and move and have our being.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

THE OLD TESTAMENT "SONG OF HANNAH."

(I Sam. 2, 1-10).

While possessing the finished, beautiful and intensely religious characteristics to be found in the many other songs of praise, thanksgiving, and of triumph in the sacred literature of the Hebrews, there are in the song in the second chapter of the First Book of Samuel a suggestiveness and picturesque beauty, a complete trustfulness in the guiding and assisting powers of Yahweh that are peculiarly its own. For Christians also, aside from the value it has of itself, it is of interest as having suggested some of the ideas and turns of phrase in the Magnificat of Mary.¹ It is true that these songs differ very much in purpose. One is a song of thanksgiving because Yahweh has cast down the mighty; the other is a song of joy because God has raised the lowly.² However, both are psalms of thanksgiving, the one of a strong national character, the other a reminiscence more beautiful than its older type, of a softer and more gentle tone,—the joyous, yet subdued cry of gladness from an humble woman's heart. The song of Mary is marked throughout by its personal qualities; everything is subordinated to the one idea of the marvelous gift that God has conferred on an individual. But the Hebrew song is different. The poet seems to represent the people. The heart of the writer is exalted, and his head raised high by Yahweh³; for, with the help of the Lord, he, standing for the people, has conquered the enemy,⁴ and therefore shouts joyously over the defeat of the national foe. In the excess of this joy the people say: Surely, there is none like Yahweh; no other God but he; no rock to which they can safely cling like their Elohim.⁵ The victory belongs, therefore, to the Yahweh of battle. Men should not be too confident in numbers and warlike powers.⁶ The foe was indeed mighty, but

¹ Luke 1, 46; 49b; 52; 53; and compare I. Sam. II, 1; 2a; 8; 5a. cf. also the canticle of Zacharia, Luke I, 68 ff.

² Luke I, 48.

³ I S. II., la.

⁴ Ib.

⁵ 2.

⁶ 3a.

Yahweh is a God of knowledge; the deeds of the bow¹ are not weighed by him. He, of Himself, is all-powerful. The strong men are broken by Him,² and the weak made strong; those possessed of everything are made poor, and the famished receive plenty; the barren becomes fruitful, and she who bore many becomes as a widow.³ Still greater things can He do. He kills and makes alive, sends down into Sheol and raises thence; makes poor and makes rich; even places the paupers upon the throne of princes, for He possesses the whole world.⁴ Surely, then, this mighty God will watch the feet of those who⁵ reverence Him, and hurl into darkness the irreligious. Strength does not make the strong man. Yahweh hurls down the mightiest who oppose Him. May He continue, then, to make our king triumphant, and raise high the head of His anointed.⁶ The position which this song occupies in the Massoretic text is not the same as that which it occupied originally, or at least at the time when the Septuagint Version was made. For it has a different place in the Massoretic text from that in which it is found in the Septuagint. In very many passages in the books of Samuel the Massoretic text is apparently unintelligible, while the Septuagint has preserved what seems to be the original text; so, in this particular instance, the half verse that precedes the introduction to the song is difficult of explanation, while the Septuagint omits it and puts what evidently is its real meaning at the end of the song. This seems to be the true position both of the song and of the half verse. It has accordingly been adopted by Semitic scholars.⁷

In accordance with the Hebrew custom, as seen in the Psalter, the song is not set down in an abrupt manner. But instead of the more usual phrase, "the song of Hannah," there is found the title, "Hannah prayed and said." An examination of the Psalter makes it evident that the title very often has no connection whatever with the contents of the song. Frequently the contents demonstrate the fact that the title set

¹ This interpretation will be explained later on.

² 3b. ³ 4, 5. ⁴ 6, 7, 8. ⁵ Hasidim.

⁶ The interpretations of Kell: Comment. on the Book of Samuel; of Clair: La Sainte Bible; and Hummelauer: Comment. in Lib., Sam., must be rejected. Volney and Cohen (Migne, Scrip. S. Cursus, IX.) tended toward the truer interpretation.

⁷ Wellhausen: Der. Text des Buches Samuel, et alii.

down is impossible.¹ Then, again, the titles in some Massoretic psalms do not agree with those of the Septuagint, or a title has been given to a psalm in the Septuagint where none has been assigned to the corresponding one of the Massoretic.² From these facts it has been inferred, and the inference is now admitted by all, that the titles are later additions. At times there is no evident reason now for some of the titles, but in most instances they have been prefixed on account of some allusion or word in the song being interpreted as referring to David or to the sons of Korah, or even Adam and Moses. It is probably "word allusions" of this latter character that induced the final Redactor of the Massoretic text of Samuel to prefix the title found at the beginning of the song in the second chapter. Dr. Hyvernât has noted three, and possibly four, such "word allusions."³ They are of such a character as to justify in the mind of the Redactor the insertion of the song after Hannah, by means of Yahweh, had obtained an answer to her prayer, and thus had been freed from the blight that hung over every childless Hebrew woman.

The song may be divided into four equal strophes of eight lines each. The first and second strophes are made up of verses of seven syllables. The third strophe begins with a verse of seven syllables, but is followed by two verses of six syllables; the remaining verses have the regular seven syllable formation. The fourth strophe departs somewhat from the arrangement of the preceding ones. It begins with a verse of seven syllables, and so it alternates down to the last two verses, which are made up of five syllables each. It is plain that this syllabic formation gives to the poem a regularity and literary finish not found frequently in Hebrew poetic compositions. It indicates that we have here a carefully studied work, well balanced, and

¹ To take one instance: Ps. 138 according to the title is by David, or of David, i.e. David's song; but all through it the fact that the Temple is built is implied; and moreover, it is implied that the Temple had been built for some time.

² Lxx. ps. 42; M. ps. 43.

³ Verse 5a may have been considered as an allusion to the eating and drinking mentioned in Chapter I., 7, 8; verse 5ba. c. to I., 2b; verse 10, *meribau* to I., 6, *sarathah*; and yarem, verse 10, may be a sound allusion to *har'imah* in I., 6a. Dr. Hyvernât is of the opinion that in Chap. I., 6, there is an example of paranomasia, the play upon the sound of *har'imah* and *rahmah*. For the subject of paranomasia, cf. *Paranomasia in the O. T.* by Dr. I. Casanowicz, Boston, 1894. In transliterating Hebrew words I have adopted the system of Zimmern, *Vergl. Grammatik d. Semit. Sprachen*, Berlin, 1898.

gradually rising until in the first half of the tenth verse a climax is reached. The alternating verses of the fourth strophe are in accordance with the more intense thought presented; the eight syllable verses seem to draw attention to the punishment that will overtake the irreligious, and the fact that the punishment will be meted out by the One who judges even the farthest parts of the earth.¹ In my translation of the song I have, of course, made no attempt to bring out the syllabic formation of the Hebrew verses. In the arrangement of the poem, however, I have endeavored to present it so that some idea may be acquired of what I believe may have been its original meaning. For that purpose I have separated the last two lines of the second strophe and the last two of the fourth strophe from the body of the song. The reasons for this latter arrangement, as well as for the omission of verse two, and of a word in verse three, will be given in the notes.

STROPHE I.

1. My heart has rejoiced in Yahweh,
2. Raised high was my horn by Yahweh;

1. "Alas" construed with b, ps. xv, 12b; ps. ix., 3a. Lxx. Ἐσπερώθη. . . . ἐν κυρίῳ. Vulg. Exultavit. . . . in Domino; cf. Syr. Prov. xi, 16. "libbi" i. e. in Hebr. that which makes the conscious individual, as Eccles. II. 1a: "I said in my heart," i. e. "I said to myself," cf. ps. iv., 5b. Similar to the use of nafshun in Arabic. The syllabic formation of the verse requires the Rabbinical reading of the tetragrammaton. A note on the pronunciation of the original word may be seen in Hebraica, vol. viii., nos. 1, 2. p. 103. Also cf. *Studia Biblica* I, pp. 1, f.

2. "Karni," keren, horn: figure taken from an animal carrying its head high and proudly conscious of its strength, Theinius: *Die Bücher Samuelis*; Driver: N. H. T. S. The use of this word is very frequent in Hebr. Probably it is a reminiscence of the time when the Hebrews were nomads wandering about with their flocks. It typified strength and power: Jer. 48, 25; Ps. 75, 11; 89, 18; etc. Yahweh in this verse is ren-

¹ For one theory, among many, of Hebr. metre cf. Bickell: *Carmina Veteris Testamenti metrice*.

3. My mouth was opened wide over my enemies.

4. For with Thy help I have pleasure.

dered by Lxx: *θεος; ἐν θεῷ μου*. Vulg. Deo. meo. Some Hebr. texts read Elohai; cf. Ginsburg's Massoretic Text. Also Ps. III., 8a.

3. Lxx: *ἐπ' ἐχθρούς μου τό στόμα μου*; hence Wellhausen would omit pi after rahab^h, and instead of ki read pi; also Klostermann and Driver. The triumph of the Israelites was so great that they could not restrain their enthusiastic joy. This joy was all the greater because it was unexpected. The modern Arabs when advancing toward an enemy shout and sing, and after having gained a victory, songs of triumph, mixed with cries of derision are given forth; cf. Loftus: *Travels in Chaldea and Susiana*. Malvenda says: *dilatate os super aliquem Hebraeis est irridere, illudere, conviciis, probris sannis incessere*: cf. Ps. xxxv., 21. Is. lvii, 4a.; cf. also Aulus Gellius, lib. ix., c. xlii.

4. "With Thy help": bishu'ateka; prep. b denoting means. Lxx. *σωτηρίᾳ σου*. Vulg. in salutari tuo. Yeshua from the root yasha seems to imply the idea of some great advantage being gained with the help of some one and the consequent result of freedom from some form or other of oppression. Is. lvi., 1; lix., 11b. Especially, however, does it denote Divine help. Ps. xlii., 6a., and elsewhere. "Have pleasure": sama^h, this word means to enjoy one self, to have gratification and pleasure from material things in a material way, cf. Eccles. II., 1a. Following this verse in the Massoretic text are the appended verses:

There is none holy like Yahweh,
For there is none beside Thee,
And there is no rock like our Elohim.

These verses do not seem to have formed part of the original song. The first two verses are made up of lines of five syllables each, and the third verse has six syllables. Lxx has the first and third verses and paraphrased slightly the second, or a predicate was added (Rom. ed.), from which fact and its position also, it might be inferred that the latter was added

5. Do not talk so exceeding proudly,
6. Let not arrogant words go forth from thy mouth
7. For Elohim is the Lord of knowledge.

later. The three verses may have been inserted later as the Hebr. "rock" has been changed into the less material "*δακρυον*"; although Lxx might have read *sad^hiq*. Kl. considers the second Massoretic verse a gloss. Wellhausen questions the position of the Lxx verse. The style and general mode of expression of the three verses are apparently not in accord with the rest of the poem. Driver is of the opinion, moreover, that they interrupt the connection and break the unity of the song.

5. It is difficult to render this verse exactly in English. I have retained, with a slight verbal modification, the translation of the R. V. The idiom is more common in Syriac than in Hebrew. An infinitive absolute with a finite verb is usual; or the construction of I., 12; Is. lv., 7. In the Hebrew the force of the negative extends over the following verse: Ps. xxxv., 19; xxxviii., 2. The word *geb^hoah*, R. V. "proudly," occurs twice in the verse. Similar repetitions of an emphatic word may be seen in Deut. II., 27; xvi., 20a; the second *geb^hoah*, however, breaks the regularity of the verse; it may have been added later to give more emphasis. The word occurs but once in the Lxx and Syr. and Bohairic Versions of the text; Vulg. renders it: *gloriantes*. Klostermann reads: *geb^hurah*, *geb^hurah*, cf. 4a.

6. Verses 5 and 6 are intended to convey an idea of the manner in which the enemy acted. They shouted with joy at the small number opposed to them, and victory seemed already theirs. "Arrogant words," *ataq*, bold, then spoken by the wicked against the religious; ps. xxxi., 19.

7. "Elohim," *el*, usually followed by some attribute, Gen. xiv., 20a; xvii., 1b., and elsewhere. For a discussion of the name Elohim, cf. Commentaries on Genesis by Delitzsch, Dillmann, etc. "Knowledge," *deoth^h*, poetic amplificative pl. (Driver). The word means knowledge innately acquired, as distinct from *hakam*, knowledge obtained from experience, cf. Eccles II., 19b.

8. And the deeds of the bow are not weighed by Him.

STROPHE II.

9. The mighty men of the bow are broken ;
10. But the weak have been girded with strength.
11. The surfeited have become hirelings for bread ;
12. But the hungry have ceased to labor.

8. I have adopted the reading of Klostermann, who retains the textual lo, "not," as against the Massoretic note, and joins the first word of the following Hebrew verse to this one. Driver renders the Hebrew text thus: "And by Him actions are tested." Keil: "To Him deeds are weighed." Lxx.: καὶ θεὸς ἐτοιμάζων ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ. Vulg, et ipsi praeparantur cogitationes. Estimator of hearts and of actions is predicated of God in Prov. xxi., 2; xxiv. 12; xvi., 2. "Deeds": 'alilot^h, external actions.

9. It is difficult to explain this verse grammatically; cf. Commentary of Malvenda. Driver makes hattim, broken, a plural by attraction to mighty men, gibborim, Lxx.: τόξον δυνατῶν ἡσθένησεν. Vulg. Arcus fortium superatus est. I have therefore adopted an emendation of the text suggested by Dr. Hyvernath. Transliterated the verse would read: Gibbore qeshet^h hattim. Gibbor, a mighty man whether in size, Gen. vi., 4b; in field sports, Gen. x., 9a; in war, as in the text, gibbor hail, I. S., ix., 1b. may mean an agreeable man, sturdy character.

10. Ps. xviii., 33; nikshalim, the weak, Lxx.: ἀσθενούντες; Vulg.: Infirmi.

11. Luke xv., 15, Lxx.: ἡλαττώθησαν. Vulg: Repleti prius pro panibus se locaverunt. Origen: Saturati panibus deducti sunt ad servitutem; cf. Luke I., 53 b.

12. Lxx: καὶ ἀσθενούντες παρήκαν γῆν. Vulg.: Et famelici sunt. I have adopted the reading of Klostermann and Budde (Polychrome Hebrew text). The syllabic formation of the M. text is deficient in the requisite numbers of syllables, and the sense is obscure. By connecting the first word of the next verse, which, as it stands, is difficult of explanation, and adding one consonant which may have dropped out, the verse becomes clear and conforms in sense to the Lxx. Weread, therefore: hadelu 'abhod^h

13. The barren has borne seven.

14. And she who had many sons has become as a widow.

COMMENT.

15. Yahweh causes to die and makes alive.

16. He sends down to Sheol and raises.

STROPHE III.

17. Yahweh makes poor and makes rich.

13. Verses 13 to 16 inclusive, can hardly have formed part of the original song. By omitting them and reading immediately the third strophe it will be plain that they are not needed for the completion of the main thought, and indeed, seem to interrupt it abruptly. But the data for a definite opinion are yet wanting. "Seven," this number was made use of to indicate any large number. Ruth iv., 15b.

14. This verse may have been suggested by Jer. xv., 9. "Widow;" Lxx. renders the Hebrew word ἡσθένησεν. Vulg. infirmata est. R. V. languisheth. But these interpretations weaken the antithesis. According to Dr. Hyvernat "umlalah" is a loan word. The root is to be found in the Arabic ramala, to be covered with sand, hence barren on account of the sand deposit. Thence is derived the Syriac armal; r and l on account of their essential similarity may be interchanged, and in Hebrew we find the word almanah, widow, in which the r becomes l, and the final l for euphonic reasons becomes n. But another change was possible also, namely, the first l of almal could be attracted toward the last l and a form amlala would result.

15, 16. These verses were probably added by a different hand from that which wrote the two preceding verses. The verses are irregular; 15 has eight syllables, and 16 seven syllables. The two verses seem to be a comment of an exclamatory character. The thought implied in the verses is late.

16. Sheol: the original meaning is clearly shown in Gen. xxxvii., 35a. Later it indicated the common dwelling place of the souls of the dead: ps. xxx., 4a. cf. Cheyne: the Bampton Lectures, 1889. Gesenius: Thesaurus.

17. I have rearranged the first part of the third strophe. This strophe seems to have been written to honor in a special

18. From the dunghill He raises the poor,
19. He brings low and also elevates ;
20. Him of humble origin He raises from the dust
21. To seat among princes,
22. And to inherit the throne of glory.

and more personal way the Israelitish hero. So there is in it an order of thought descending from the general to the particular. It is this that I have endeavored to bring out by my arrangement of the verses. The first two verses as I give them (M 7a, 8ab.) are made up of seven syllables, but the next two (M. 7b., 8a.) have only six. The style of the latter verses is rather abrupt and emphatic, but it is in keeping with the general characteristics of the style of the song. The style of the first verses of the first strophe, although the verses are longer, produces the same impression as does the style of these.

18. Ps. cxiii., 7. This beautiful song whose joyous, vigorous style seems to hurry the reader along, and makes him partake somewhat of the happy and free spirit that filled the writer, much resembles the poem I am commenting upon. Both songs possess the same general characteristics; they may have been the production of the same period, perhaps of the same writer. "Poor" Lxx.; *πτωχον*; Vulg. *pauperem*.

19. Luke I., 52.

20. Ps. cxiii., 7a. From the general statement of verse 19, to the particular, "Him of humble origin;" Lxx.; *πένητα*; Vulg. *egenum*. Hebrew, *dal*, from *dalal*, to be pendant; *dal*, one who is weak, by nature dependent; hence, from his origin poor and low, cf. Gesenius: *Thesaurus*. Ex. xxiii., 3, etc.

21. Lxx.: *μετὰ δυναστών λαών*, probably suggested by ps. cxiii., 8b.

22. "Inherit;" *yanhilem*, he will cause *them* to inherit; Lxx.; *αὐτοῖς*. Vulg. *et solium glorie teneat*. He shall possess power and influence, and his posterity shall inherit the throne which he has established, ps. cxxxv., 12. Lxx. omits the following verses (M. 8b.) and instead of M. 9a. reads what is evidently an attempt to accommodate the song to Hannah's condition (Driver); but it is not in harmony with the tenor of the song (Wellhausen).

23. For to Yahweh belong the pillars of the earth,

24. And upon them has He placed the world.

STROPHE IV.

25. The feet of His Hasidim He has guarded ;

26. But the wicked have perished in darkness.

23-24. These verses contain the reason of what was said before. They also, perhaps, contain a reminder to him who has acquired the position of eminence, that his successes have not been due to any great skill on his part, but are to be considered as favors bestowed on him by an all-powerful Lord. He is merely an instrument in the hands of God. Jer. ix., 23.

24. There is indicated here the opinion universally held in ancient times, that the earth was a great, flat mass, resting on something or other, as here on pillars, cf. Niebuhr: *The Geography of Herodotus*. "World," *tebel*, the fertile and inhabited world, as distinct from "earth," the more general term. Gen. I., 1.

25. Properly speaking, this strophe is made up of only six verses. The syllabic formation of the verses adhered to generally in the preceding verses is modified. Alternately, the verses have seven and eight syllables. The style is less rapid ; it is more dignified and solemn, and approaches almost to that of a prayer. "Hasidim" : I have retained the word in the Hebrew text. It occurs in many of the later psalms. The Hasidim (I. Mac. II., 42 ; vii., 13), were a religious, and afterwards a political party that arose within the Jewish nation just previous to the Asmonean revolt. This party was composed of those who adhered strictly to the ideal set up by the scribes. They were the "pious," as distinct from the "irreligious"—those who wished to introduce Hellenic customs and beliefs among the Jews ; cf. Schürer: *Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ* ; I., I. p. 198, etc. Verses 25 and 26 are omitted by Lxx.

26. "Wicked," *res^aa'im*, irreligious, ps. III., 8b. The word properly means those who have not the same religious beliefs as the Jews. Its use was somewhat similar to "barbarian," of the Greeks, although it might also be applied to

- 27. For it is not by strength that a man becomes mighty;
- 28. Yahweh has confounded His adversaries.
- 29. El in heaven has thundered;
- 30. Yahweh has judged the ends of the earth.

LITURGICAL.

- 31. May He give power to His king,

the Jews who did not observe the law. Here it is probably taken in the sense in which it is used in ps. III., 8b., heathen army. "Darkness," i. e., they have ceased their premature rejoicings, and have become silent in defeat and death.

27. This, as in verse 23, gives the reason, in an implied manner, of the triumph of a small number over many. "Strength," either physical or military, as here.

28. The text of this verse and the following is difficult. Lxx. reads: *Κύριος ἀσθενή ποιήσει ἀντίδικον αὐτοῦ*; cf. Thenius, Wellhausen, Klostermann, Driver. Lxx has after this verse *Κύριος ἄγιος*, which might justify Keil's interpretation.

29. Lxx. has here a long insertion from Jer. ix., 23f., evidently a marginal gloss that found its way into the text. Lxx.: *Κύριος ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανοὺς καὶ ἐβρόντησεν*. The Massoretic text is obscure; Budde reads 'alyon and yeroem. But 'ain and aleph frequently interchange in the Books of Samuel, (1 S. 1, 13a, etc.). I have therefore conjectured the reading el as in 3b. Yahweh watching from heaven His faithful ones, became angry when he saw the heathen contending against them, and, therefore, against Him.

30. This verse is a fitting termination to the song. It began with words manifesting trust and complete confidence in the Lord, it ends with words which show the reason of that confidence. Everything is known to Yahweh; He has already marked the limits beyond which even the mightiest of earth cannot go.

31. Liturgical additions, that is, doxologies and invocations, have been appended to many of the Psalms, Ps. cxxiv., 8; cxxi., 8; cxxviii., 6b, cxxxi., 3, etc. They were added for use in services of the second Temple. These verses contain a prayer for the king. It is impossible now to state the name of the king.

32. And may he raise high the horn of His anointed.

32. This verse is parallel with the preceding. Lxx: *χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ*. The king was called the anointed of the Lord, 2 S. 1, 14b., etc. This verse and the preceding have but five syllables.

.....

An examination of the contents of this song plainly indicates the motive that prompted its composition. It is evidently a song of triumph. Israel had been engaged in some contest in which numbers and military equipment were in favor of the enemy. Nothing seemed to be more probable than an overwhelming, crushing defeat. It was not a civil war, otherwise the odds would not have been as great as is suggested by the poem. But by means of the skill of the leader, who arose from a comparatively obscure station, and especially with the help of the Lord, the Israelites gained a great victory. It was in order to commemorate this victory, some have thought, that the original poem may have been written. Songs suggested by current events, were very numerous among the Hebrews, as among other peoples. In the Psalter are many poems which plainly reveal the occasions for which they were composed. To take but one example, the xlv. Psalm is evidently a wedding song.¹ The style of the song in the second chapter of the first book of Samuel indicates a time when literary productions had attained a high degree of excellence. It indicates also what I may call the artificial period. By this I do not mean that the song lacks anything of intensity and vigor, nor that it is wanting in an enthusiastic religious trustfulness; but I mean that it has been written with careful regard for manner of expression. The syllabic formation of verse has been carefully observed. The antitheses and parallelisms are studied; the arrangement of the words is in conformity with the spirit of the thought, at times rapid and vehement, then slow, dignified and stately. The covert allusion also to the possibility of pride entering the heart of him who has been merely an instrument in the hands of the Lord, the delicate manner in which it is expressed, indicates a knowledge of human nature, and a mastery of words, attained generally only after long

¹ cf. also the "Songs of the Return," pss. cxxi-cxxiv.

experience.¹ With regard to the special occasion for which this song was written, different opinions have been maintained. Budde² puts it much later than 400 B. C. The mention of the Hasidim in the song, and their being contrasted with the irreligious Jew (whether heathen or Hellenic, the essential idea is the same), seem, according to another view, to indicate at least the period after which the song was composed. Again, it appears in the poem that the victory gained was unexpected, that the weak overcame the mighty. Probably this has led to the inference that the song was composed during the year when the Hasidim were comparatively small in number. Moreover, the confidence and intense religious spirit permeating it, suggest the time when that party was in the purest and most fervent state; therefore, it has been concluded, when that party was under the direct command of one of the earlier Maccabees. Mattathias and his family came from the town of Modein; before their revolt became general, the family, at least to a great number of the Jews, was unknown; hence, a member of the family could be said to be of humble origin, to have come, poetically at least, from an obscure place. It is to be noted how the song insists upon the ideas of the poor becoming rich, the man of humble origin being placed among princes. Nicanor, the Syrian, with an immense army, after having treated the priests of Jerusalem with scorn and ridicule, advanced against the small army of Judas Maccabee, and was totally routed. Judas then stood at the head of the Jewish commonwealth.³ Cheyne⁴ is of the opinion that the song is certainly post-Deuteronomic, and probably an early post-Exilic work. Driver⁵ leans to this view, insisting also on its national, rather than individual character. Smend⁶ supposed it originally to have been spoken in the name of the people, and intended to depict Israel's triumph over the heathen. Kuenen, in a general way, places the time of its composition after the introduction of the monarchy. Ewald thought it might be ascribed to Ahijah or Jehu, and refer to the defeat

¹ Compare the very ancient fragment contained in 2 S. 1, 17-27.

² Polychrome Hebrew Text of S.

³ Schurer: Hist. of the Jews I., 1.

⁴ Bampton Lectures, 1889.

⁵ Notes on the Hebrew text of S.

⁶ ZATW 1888; referred to by Driver.

of the heathen by the Israelites. Thenius¹ held that it was written by the author of the Book of Samuel, and later was attributed to Hannah, that originally it commemorated the defeat of Goliath by David. Keil² and Delitzsch, and some other writers who follow implicitly the two former scholars, belong to the Jewish school. Early Christian commentators, as Estius, Menochius, Malvenda, have generally³ adhered to the Jewish tradition, without question; and have also interpreted the song along Jewish lines. Sarah and Hannah, both barren, but remembered at last by God, were regarded as types of Israel; the Biblical accounts of them are the New Year's Day lesson in the Synagogue.⁴ According to the Jewish tradition, based upon the title, the song was composed and sung by Hannah, after the Lord had granted her prayer and given her a son.

Aside from whatever value this song may have as an historical and literary monument, it shows in a wonderful way the deep religiousness of the writer, and may be considered as an indication of a spirit generally prevalent among the Jews. It is for this phase that it is so valuable to-day. It is the sacred record of a time when the Lord was believed to be really present among His people, and watching carefully over those who obeyed His laws, shielding them in the times of danger, and delivering them from the foes who seemed about to overwhelm and destroy them.

ENEAS B. GOODWIN.

¹ Die Bücher Samuelis.

² Commentary on the Book of Samuel; cf. also Reuss: *La Bible*.

³ Migne: *Curs. Scrip.* vol. ix.

⁴ Cheyne: *Bampton Lectures*, 1889, p. 57.

THE PRE-MOSAIC SABBATH —II.

THE SEVEN-DAY WEEK.—“Whatever controversies exist respecting the origin of the week, there can be none about the great antiquity, on particular occasions at least among the Semitic races, of measuring time by a period of seven days. . . . Its antiquity is so great, its observance so widespread that it has been very generally thrown back as far as the creation of man.”² To what must the institution of the week be attributed? Did it originate in an event or custom acting independently on different nations? Was it transmitted from one to another by international intercourse, or does it imply a common source antedating any special ethnic circumstance or natural phenomenon whence it derived its origin?³ Wherever we place its origin, the relation between the week of nations and the sabbath is a matter of the highest importance in considering the present question. The discovery of universal acquaintance with this tradition would be extremely satisfactory; yet it is unnecessary for those who ascribe the origin of the week to some remote event. For, no trace of the deluge has ever been found in Africa or Oceanica;⁴ nevertheless, the tradition is currently received. The absence of world-wide familiarity with the origin of the week can not, therefore, destroy the value of an inquiry into the position accorded the seventh day, as well as the number seven, amongst the nations of the earth.

Nearly all modern nations borrowed the week from the Romans or received it simultaneously with the propagation of Christianity⁵ The Romans themselves having had a system of Nones and Kalends, did not adopt the week much before the

¹ Humboldt, *Researches*, (new ed.) I. 283; La Place, *Exposé du Système du Monde*, p. 272.

² Smith, *Bible Dict.* IV, 3490.

³ Some hold that the week would owe its origin to a singular primitive event only in case the observance of a sabbath day could be proved among nations unable to draw their knowledge from the Bible.

⁴ Lenormant, *Beginnings of History*, I, 382.

⁵ Lotz, *op. c.*, p. 12.

advent of Christ.¹ The theory ascribing its usage among the Romans to Egyptian influence² is now antiquated.³ Riehm traces its introduction into Rome to Syria.⁴ Unlike the Romans, the Greeks divided the month into three periods of ten days each. Both nations agree in vesting the number seven with a sacred character, and dedicating a seventh day to some of the gods. Josephus writes that the earliest Greek philosophers lived according to Jewish law, and that the multitude of mankind had an inclination for a long time to follow Jewish observances: "For there is not any city of the Grecians, nor any of the barbarians, nor any nation whatsoever whither our custom of resting on the seventh day hath not come."⁵ More forcible still is the language of Philo: "After the world had been completed according to the perfect nature of the number six, the Father hallowed the day following, the seventh, praising it and calling it holy. For that day is the festival, not of one city or country, but of all the earth, a day which alone it is right to call the day of festival for all people and the birthday of the world."⁶ Clement of Alexandria declares that the seventh day is recognized as sacred, not only by the Hebrews, but also by the Greeks.⁷ Several passages of Greek and Roman literature tell how labor was suspended on feast days, but as there is no way of ascertaining whether these days occurred at regular defined periods of time, to insist on the fact would be useless.

¹ Lotz, l. c.; Tirinius, Gen. I, 3.

² Dio Cassius, XXXVII, 18, 19; Smith, Bible Dict. 2764; *Catholic Presbyterian*, March, 1881, p. 204.

³ Riehm, Handwörterbuch des Biblischen Alterthums, II, 1325; Love, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct., 1879, p. 740; Hommel, *Hebrew Traditions* (Eng. Tr.), p. 40.

⁴ Riehm, l. c.

⁵ *Contra Apion*, II, 42.

⁶ Philo, Works (Bohn Ed.) vol. I, ch. I, 80.

⁷ To confirm his assertion, Clement appeals to Hesiod where he says: "The first, the fourth, and the seventh is holy" (*Ex Operibus et Diebus* 770). The context, however, shows that Hesiod refers to the days of the month rather than of the week, because the line following the quotation, dedicates the seventh day of the month to Apollo. Despite this inaccuracy in presenting the thought of Hesiod, the sacredness of the seventh day among the Greeks is evidenced by some lines in Homeric poetry. The *Iliad* sings the sacredness of the number seven in sacrificial rites (Book IX, 122), and the *Odyssey* shows how significant events were expected to occur on the seventh day, and actually took place on it (Book XII. 399; XIV. 252; XV. 477). These particular passages are not cited by Clement, but he refers to some in which the sense is more direct. "And on the seventh there came the sacred day" "The seventh was sacred." And finally, he tells how "the elegies of Solon intensely deify the seventh day." Conf. Clement, *Stromata* V., 41, Migne, P. G. VI, 748.

Ensebius gives expression to pretty much the same line of thought as Clement. Conf. *Præpar. Evang.* XIII, 13.

The labors of specialists on this question, as far as Egypt is concerned, lead to contradictory conclusions; some find no vestiges at all of a weekly division of time in Egypt,¹ others vouch for exactly the contrary state of affairs.² The patrons of the former opinion take their position on the ground that the old monuments of that country contain no trace of any such period of time as a week. To confirm their view they interpret a passage of Dio Cassius to mean that the Egyptians received the week directly from the Jews.³ Reliable Egyptologists ignore the first reason because the monuments are posterior to the adoption of the thirty days' division of time. And as for the second, it appears to run counter to the law of ethnic influence in so far as subordinate civilizations do not, as a rule, impress their customs and institutes upon higher and more powerful ones. Moreover, the obvious sense of the lines in Cassius seems to be that the week had its origin amongst the Hebrews.⁴ But, is there any positive evidence to believe that the week was really in vogue amongst the early Egyptians? First of all, the week of seven days was recognized by them in the earliest times, though the decade afterwards superseded it.⁵ For "the division of time into decades must date after the adoption of the solar year "because the week was the approximate result of the lunar division of time which is the older of the two. Besides, they observed a seven days' feast in honor of Apis, and passed seventy days mourning for the dead, which goes to show that they were familiar with the septenary idea.⁶ Furthermore, "rest was enjoined by the Egyptians on the seventh day simply because they regarded it as dies nefastus," a day on which it would be unlucky to undertake any work. Jastrow goes farther and says that "the Hebrews themselves preserved the recollection of its (the sabbath) having been observed in Egypt." The value of the argument is magnified when placed side by side

¹ Ideler, *Chronologie der Aegypten* I, 132; R. Smith, *Encyc. Brit.* (9th ed.) XXI, 134; Richm, l. c.; Vaughan, l. c.; Laney, op. c., p. 175.

² Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians* (Birch ed.) II, 319 sq.; Proctor, *Contemporary Rev.*, March 1875, p. 610 sq., and June, 1879, p. 404 sq.; Clifford, *Dublin Rev.*, April, 1883, p. 413.

³ *Dublin Rev.*, Jan., 1883, p. 41.

⁴ *La Controverse*, Jan. 16, 1882, p. 121.

⁵ Wilkinson, op. c., p. 319; *Dublin Review*, April, 1883, p. 413; Wood, op. c., p. 26.

⁶ Wilkinson, l. c.

with what Rawlinson says in his description of the temple of Ammon built by Rameses II.: "Here is the calendar of feasts for the first five months of the Egyptian year, which shows that, on the average, more than one day in five was held to be sacred."¹ It is no longer plausible to argue that, even though Egypt possessed the week, she must have borrowed it from Babylonia, for the researches of Weigemann, Morgan, Jequier, and Lampre point to a civilization in Egypt before any appeared in Babylonia.²

According to some, the Indians divided the month into two equal parts,³ but the literature of that people reveals a week in the early days of her history, and one derived from the same source as the Egyptian week.⁴ For, "the old Hindus chose the new and full moon as days of sacrifice. The eve of the sacrifice was called Upavastha, and in Buddhism the same word has come to denote a sabbath observed on the full moon, on the day when there is no moon, and on the two days which are the eighth from the full and new moon respectively, with fasting and other religious exercises."⁵ The prayers addressed to their goddesses show that seven and the seventh day were holy amongst them. Thus, "glory to thee on the seven lunar days."⁶ Their religious monuments are so constructed as to lay stress on "the sacredness of the number seven"⁷ inasmuch as their pagodas contain seven square enclosures, one within the other.

Chinese customs indicate no little familiarity with a sacred seventh day. First of all, they possess an astronomical table whose use is general, and whose antiquity is unquestionable.⁸ The heavens are divided into twenty-eight constellations, and the charts into four parts, each containing seven constellations. The name of the center group in each of these four minor divisions, is used to signify their sabbath. In Christian almanacs in China the names of these constellations are marked as

¹ History of Ancient Egypt, II, 387-388.

² N. Y. Sun, Dec. 5, 1897.

³ Lotz, op. c., p. 12.

⁴ Zahn, Geschichte des Sonntags, p. 25; Kitto, Cyclopædia, Sabbath, p. 654.—Wood, op. c., p. 26; Catholic Presbyterian, March, 1881, pp. 203, 204.

⁵ Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.) XXI, 134.

⁶ Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1889, p. 332.

⁷ Jensen, Sunday-School Times, Jan. 16, 1892, p. 35.

⁸ Johnston, Catholic Presbyterian, March, 1881; p. 199.

days of rest.¹ It is generally admitted that this division of time was ancient in the days of Confucius. Legge traces it to the twelfth century B. C., and some of the constellations are mentioned by Yao, nearly twelve centuries earlier,² which would run as far back as the Accadian division of time.

Their Book of Diagrams³ contains a sentence favoring the idea of a sabbath as well as a septenary division of time, at an early period. "Seven days complete a revolution."⁴ This idea is confirmed by Lamy when he writes that the ancient kings of China commanded a cessation of labor on the seventh day.⁵ The Board of Rites in China publishes an annual Imperial Almanac, which applies to every seventh day a special word not in ordinary use and explained by lexicons as signifying secret or closed. While claiming no knowledge of its origin, the Chinese say that its use antedates the memory of man.⁶ Finally, when one member of a family dies, the survivors prostrate themselves every morning and evening for seven days. When three times seven days elapse, the funeral procession occurs. This ended, they continue to make oblations and prostrations for seven times seven days, thus betraying a resemblance to the Egyptians.⁷ The value of these facts is increased when the allowance is made for the rigid conservatism of the Chinese, who would never tolerate any change in the form of a calendar or their symbolism, though they adopted suggestions pertaining to errors of calculation and the like.⁸

Lamy vouches for Arabian familiarity with the week.⁹ This is all the more valuable when viewed in the light of the South Arabian inscriptions and traditions, which reveal "an entirely original method of name formation that must be placed in a class by itself owing to its peculiarly religious character."¹⁰ Nevertheless, Schrader holds that the Arabs

¹ Johnston op. c., p. 200.

² *Catholic Presbyterian*, March, 1881; p. 200.

³ The Book of Diagrams is an ancient classic edited by Confucius.

⁴ Zahn, op. c., p. 25; Lewis, op. c., p. 241; *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1879, p. 741; April, 1889, p. 334; *Catholic Presbyterian*, March, 1881, p. 200.

⁵ Lamy, Genesis, p. 175.

⁶ Johnston, op. c., pp. 201-202.

⁷ Genesis, I, 3.

⁸ Johnston, l. c. Thus far no traces of a weekly division of time have been found in Japan.

⁹ Lamy, op. c., p. 175; Kitto, l. c.

¹⁰ Hommel, op. c., p. 60.

borrowed the week from the Hebrews.¹ It is further alleged that, whilst sacred amongst the Arabs, the septenary number was accorded a less dignified position amongst them than amongst the Hebrews, because the Arabs did not derive the word signifying to swear from the root of the word seven, whereas the Hebrews did.² The very fact that details of this kind are brought forward by ancient writers goes to show that the septenary idea had more than a superficial root amongst this people.

Amongst the Persians in Zoroastrianism, whose author was a contemporary of Moses, the number seven was sacred,³ and many traces of its sacredness are to be found in modern Persian literature in which seven plays a noteworthy part.⁴ Native dictionaries enumerate about one hundred septenary groups of objects designated as seven, so and so.⁵ Its use in their religious worship is worthy of mention. They paid homage to two divinities; one, the God of light and goodness; the other, of darkness and evil. The former was surrounded by seven spirits, the latter by seven archdemons.⁶

The Phoenicians set aside one day in seven for sacred purposes.⁷ Very scant indeed are the traditions relating to the Aramaeans. Nothing can be gleaned from their literature or from the traditions of neighboring nations about the use of the number seven in that territory. Lotz, in treating another topic, intimates that the Aramaeans might have received a seven-day week from Babylonian astrologers.⁸

Schrader grants that the negroes possessed a word meaning sabbath, but he claims that Alexandrian Christians were the first to introduce the week into Africa.⁹ Nevertheless, those acquainted with this race hold that a weekly division of time was observed on the western coast of Africa at a period when the inhabitants had no intercourse with Europeans.¹⁰ It is especially striking to find that "every man dedicated one day every week to the honor of his tutelary deity."¹¹ The people

¹ Studien und Kritiken I, p. 344.

² Lotz, op. c., p. 44.

³ Love, op. c., p. 741; Hadley Essays, Philological and Critical, p. 329.

⁴ Jensen, l. c.

⁵ Hadley, l. c.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Porphyry, apud Dwight, Vol. III, p. 255.

⁸ Op. c., p. 35.

⁹ Schrader, op.; Lotz, op. c., p. 24.

¹⁰ One reason for this is that "the different days are distinguished by different names in the language of the negroes," Bell, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Apr. 1889, p. 335.

¹¹ Ibid.

of Guinea refrained from labor on the seventh day, and dedicated it to ease and worship.¹ In fine, the observance of religious and festal days, as well as the existence of the week, was general amongst the tribes of Africa south of Guinea and including it.²

It is no easy task to reach a satisfactory conclusion in this matter as far as the American continent is concerned. Authorities are divided, and their accounts are very meager. It is almost certain, however, that the ancient Mexicans did not divide time into weeks of seven days.³ In his researches, Humboldt quotes authors who believe that a cycle of seven days was in vogue with the Peruvians.⁴ For they reckoned the months by the moon, the half months by the increase and waning of the moon, and the week by its quarters.⁵ Whatever may be the value of the different views, certain it is that either the people of this continent never had the tradition, or, if they did, very feeble traces of it remain to tell the tale.

Nothing shows more clearly how deeply rooted the sacredness of the number seven was in the character of the non-Semitic, as well as the pre-Semitic civilization of Babylon, than the ancient Babylonian literature, particularly the ancient Babylonian hymns that have come down to us in the original Sumero-Accadian idiom as well as in the Assyro-Semitic translations."⁶ No doubt this paved the way for using the number seven to mark definite periods of time. Very ancient indeed is the custom, as may be seen from the following incident dating back almost three thousand years

¹ Hurd, *ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ They had months of twenty days, composed of four weeks of five days each. The last day of each week was a public market day, and was partially devoted to rest and recreation. Conf. Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico* Vol. III; Bancroft, *Native Races* II, 385; Humboldt, *Researches* I, 287.

⁴ They did not assign names for the days of the week; neither did the Hebrews.

⁵ Bailly claims that the Hindu week was known to the inhabitants of America. Conf. Humboldt, *op. c.*, p. 285.

⁶ Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscriptions* (Eng. trans.) I, 19; Pinches, *Independent*, June 30, 1892, p. 16. Seven was the number of the original divisions of the earth, which they conceived to be as many stories high piled one upon the other. For this reason the Assyrians and Babylonians built their towers seven stories high. For a like reason the infernal regions were seven-fold, one hell surrounding and enclosing another. Seven were the evil spirits, seven-headed their fabulous serpent, seven-headed their feathered monster, seven-tailed their legendary fish. The *urbs sacra* (Gen. X 10) was called the city of seven spheres. They gave seven names to one of the seven planets and were probably the first to descry seven stars in the Pleiades. Seven were the libations of Chasiastra after the deluge, seven the knots wherewith the sick were bound in order to have sickness of every kind leave them.

before Christ. Gudea, Prince of Lagash, a city near the Shatt-el-Hai Canal, having completed the temple of Ningirsu, prepared a grand festival thus described in one of Gudea's inscription: "When he had built E-ninnu, his beloved temple, he set his mind free and washed his hands; for seven days no corn was ground; the maid-servant was equal to her mistress; the man-servant walked by the side of his master; the strong man rested by the side of the weak man in my city."¹

In the Adapha legend, which originated at least fifteen hundred years before Christ,² is related how the south wind ceased to blow for seven days because Adapha broke its wings.³ The same division of time is used in the Chaldean account of the flood. Tradition even recounts how it continued seven nights and six days, ending at daybreak of the seventh day. The waters receded after seven days, and Chasiastra, having disembarked, offers seven libations to propitiate the gods.⁴

Furthermore, these early records point to a continuous count of the days of the year by sevens. That they had a week may be conjectured from the line describing the deeds of the seven evil spirits: "Dies in orbem euntes dei mali sunt," and thereby impersonating the days of the week in these seven evil spirits.⁵ Repeatedly are allusions made to the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first and twenty-eighth days of the month. The discharge of special duties is enjoined on the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-eighth and nineteenth days of the Inter-calary Elul. Evidently these instances are quite different from nearly all hitherto mentioned. And the reason is obvious because the former examples show how the days of the year were grouped into higher units of seven days each, whereas the latter indicate that a regular count from seventh to seventh day was made.

Did the Assyrians and Babylonians keep these days as sabbath days? In answering it is important to observe that the quest for a sabbath exactly like the Mosaic would prove fruitless.⁶ For, in applying the Sabbath Law, the Jews were ex-

¹ Jensen, l. c.

² The clay tablet on which it is inscribed is that old.

³ Jensen l. c.

⁴ Smith, Chaldean Account of Genesis (Revised ed.), p. 279, sq.

⁵ Lotz, op. c., p. 37.

⁶ Jastrow, *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1898, p. 313, sq.

tremists, emphasizing its negative element, and almost completely ignoring the positive, whereas the spirit of a sabbath institution excludes excess in either direction, and calls for a harmonious blending of the two elements. Neither is it necessary for our present purpose to find these elements strongly marked and fully developed. The writers who refuse to admit any sabbath in the absence of a complete parallelism or the want of practices embodying a perfection of detail in sabbath observance, lose sight of the people's condition as well as the nature of the sabbatic tradition. To find in the inscription signs of such observance, in those times, as bespeaks the practical realization of the positive and negative element of true sabbath keeping, is all that is absolutely required. That such was the case amongst the Babylonians and Assyrians, will be evident from an examination of the data advanced by Assyriologists.

The fifth tablet of the creation legend has been rendered thus :

On the seventh he appointed a holy day
(And) to cease from all business he commanded.¹

This translation of the second line appeared in the Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archæology,² but, as its value is questioned, no strong argument can be thereon based.³ All admit the rendering of the first line. It records the observance of a sabbath, and one too on which the Babylonians were wont to rest, for the Assyrian word—*umu nuh libbi-shab-batu*,⁴—means day of rest of the heart.⁵ Much comment has been created about the true signification of this word. Jastrow holds that it refers to the pacification of the deity, and hence signifies a day of rest for the heart of the gods.⁶ Jensen coincides with this view, but adds that in that case the Babylonian “*shabbatu*” would be a day of prayer and repentance.⁷ This is certainly to the point inasmuch as it is naught but the positive element of sabbath observance. Moreover, the same author notes how Noe offers a sacrifice on the seventh day

¹ Fox, ap. Records of the Past, IX 118.

² Vol. II, 427.

³ Smith, op. c., i., 65; Johnston, *Catholic Presbyterian*, Jan., 1881, p. 37.

⁴ Some write *Shappatu*. Jastrow refutes the reason for this rendering, op. c., p. 317, 318.

⁵ Boscawen, *Presbyterian Review*, Jan., 1882, p. 689; Richm, op. c. II, 1326.

⁶ Haupt subscribes to this view.

⁷ Jensen, l. c.

after a seventh day distinguished from others by its restfulness.¹ Whatever may have been his intention, Jensen points out a mingling of the positive and negative features of sabbath keeping.²

The notion of a sabbath amongst these peoples is made clearer still by another document whose discovery is thus described by the finder. "In 1869 I discovered amongst other things a curious religious calendar of the Assyrians, in which every month is divided into four weeks, and the seventh days or sabbaths are marked out days, on which no work should be undertaken."³

The injunctions specified in the Intercalary Calendar apply not only to the seventh, but also to the fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-eighth, and nineteenth days of the month. The hemerology traces a distinct line of difference between the directions given for these days and the prescriptions to be fulfilled on other days, inasmuch as the former are far more detailed and quite unique. Besides, the tablet intimates that business of a national character was suspended; for "regaliter loqui" probably signifies the admission of citizens to an assembly in which councils were held, and this, according to the tablet, was forbidden on that day. And then the king is ordered to sacrifice and offer libations "in the presence of the god or gods to whom the day was consecrated and to raise his hands at the high place of the god."⁴ This implies a signal difference between these five days and other days as

¹ Ibid.

² Robertson Smith asserts that the rendering *shabbatu* is an emendation made by Delitzsch. Were this true the conclusions grounded on this legend would be valueless. Sayce, however, maintains that Smith is mistaken. The reading is that of the original tablet, and the published text was corrected by Sayce long before Delitzsch re-examined the original. Moreover, Sayce says, "it is interpreted in the Bilingual tablet as signifying a day of peace or completion of labors." This would mean a noteworthy similarity; the Hebrew word for sabbath has at its root the idea of rest, completeness; the same idea is at the root of the word in the inscription and is translated sabbath or feast day. Conf. Ency. Brit. XXI, 135; Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, p. 76; Records of the Past, VII, 57.

³ This tablet lithograph in cuneiform has been translated thus: The seventh day of Merodach and Tir-panitu. The Shepherd of many people, the flesh of birds (and) cooked fruit eats not; the garments of his body he changes not; White robes he puts not on; the King (in) his chariot rides not; In royal fashion he legislates not; a place of garrison the general by word of mouth appoints not; to make a sacred spot it is suitable; in the night, in the presence of Merodach and Ietar, the king his offering makes; sacrifices he offers. Cuneiform Insc. of W. Asia IV, 32, 33. Conf. Smith, Assyrian Discoveries, p. 12. Records of Past, VII, 157.

⁴ The sacrifice was usually offered at night.

far as religious observance is concerned.¹ Some have tried to destroy the value of the argument by saying that "this 'Day of Grace' or 'favor' is evidently one with which only the king and wise men are concerned."² This, however, is to mistake the sense of the document, because, according to Assyriologists, the day is favorable for the people at large and wrathful for the king, who must therefore propitiate the deity in the manner prescribed.³ Again, "since the life of the king, as well as that of the priests, does not differ so much from that of the citizens, it is reasonable to presume that similar prescriptions were given to both, though it is likely that kings and priests were obliged to carry out some precepts other than those enjoined the citizens."⁴

Why should the nineteenth day be circumscribed by conditions similar to the seventh, fourteenth, etc., days? Some consider it inexplicable;⁵ others dismiss it summarily.⁶ Several eminent scholars say that it is the date of a seventh or great sabbath, which occurred on the forty-ninth day.⁷ Moreover, there is, on the part of some, a tendency to regard hul....gal, which Sayce translates sabbatu,⁸ as a term whose meaning is still doubtful,⁹ whilst others hold that it signifies evil or unlawful day.¹⁰ The fact that the septenary number was sacred, and that the day was looked upon as favorable for the masses,¹¹ would restrict any semblance of truth that might lie in this latter opinion to the king himself. Neither will it avail the advocates of that theory to rest an argument on the component parts of the word,¹² because when two cuneiform signs are blended into a compound word, their common signification is frequently obliterated.¹³

¹Contrary to this is the statement of Durand, who says that "they (the five days specified) have nothing characteristic, because all the days of the month are under the special protection of some god."—*Etudes Religieuses*, June, 1895, p. 217. This statement is no basis for such a conclusion.

²Hessey, op. c., p. XXIV.

³Jensen, op. c., p. 36.

⁴Lotz, op. c., p. 56.

⁵*Etudes Religieuses*, l. c.

⁶Lotz, op. c., p. 56.

⁷Haupt endorses this position. Also Proctor, *Contemporary Review*, March, 1875. Prof. Brown says: "There is no more difficulty in the classification of the nineteenth with the seventh day than in the use of the Hebrew sabbath to denote a day whose observance is to be similar to that of the sabbath, vid. Leviticus XXIII, 32, where the additional modifier sabbathon does not affect the pertinence of the illustration."—*Presbyterian Review*, October, 1882, p. 692. Jastrow has a somewhat similar explanation to that of Haupt. *Conf.*, op. c., p. 321.

⁸Records of the Past, VII, 160.

⁹*Etudes*, l. c.

¹⁰Wellhausen, *Prophets of Israel*, p. 384; *Records of the Past*, VII, 160.

¹¹Jensen, op. c., p. 36.

¹²Lotz, op. c., p. 57.

¹³*Ibid.*

Nevertheless, it is urged that "this theory could only stand as long as the Calendar, for the Intercalary Elul was the only one supposed to exist. It collapses as soon as the fact is brought to light that calendars for other months exist which do not have their sabbaths accommodated to the overtime of Intercalary Elul or of each other, but invariably note the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth."¹ However well taken this point may be, it does not present an insuperable difficulty, because there are two ways in which the division of the month into four weeks might have been arranged. According to the first, the month could have been used as a fixed measure of time, and four weeks of seven days each so arranged in every month that the extra day and a half, or nearly three days in two months, could be intercalated. In the second method, granting that the lunar month does not contain an exact number of days, men would see the impracticability of attempting to use any subdivision of the month, month by month, and would simply take the seven-day week as the nearest approximation to a convenient subdivision of a quarter-month, and suffer that period to go on continually, unconcerned about the fact that each new month would begin on a different day of the week.²

Another fact presents itself in Amos V. 26, to confirm what has been said, a fact inexplicable unless the existence of a week throughout the year be admitted. Some commentators believe that Amos accuses the Israelites of having worshipped Moloch and a star in the desert; others, that the prophet predicts their worship by the Israelites.³ Two solutions suggest themselves. The first that the Jews adored the true God from time imme-

¹Hessey, op. c., p. XXVII; *Presbyterian Review*, October, 1882, pp. 689, 693; *Etudes*, June, 1895, p. 218.

²That they really did not preoccupy themselves about it is clear from a statement made by Theodore Pinches. He contends that many lines of the tablet lithographed in the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia (IV R., 32, 33) were mutilated. Smith, however, restored them by comparing them with the tablets of other months having feasts. His examination led him to conclude that the same days in all of the months were feasts, and were characterized by the same prescriptions. Whereupon Pinches infers that the same days were hula...gal in every month.—Conf. Pinches, op. Lotz, op. c., p. 59.

³At all events the passage leaves little doubt about the possibility of such worship in the days of Amos. For, among the Babylonians, saccurt was the name of a god to whom the planet Saturn was sacred. The planet Saturn was called Kaiwan or Chiun (conf. Schrader, *Studien und Kritiken* I., 324). Later, Saturn was considered as the ruler of the seventh day of the week. Hence it is more than a matter of chance that Amos mentions the worship of Moloch and a star.

morial, and subsequently paid idolatrous worship to Saturn because the seventh day of the week was sacred to him as well as to Jehovah. The second that, in olden times, previous to Amos, the Jews worshipped Saturn, and hence the sabbath would be a holy day only because on it they paid homage to Saturn, ruler of that day. Both explanations imply the existence of a week amongst the Babylonians at the time of Amos, if that prophet's reproach had any real foundation in the conduct of Israel. For if the Jews had any knowledge of the association of different days of the week with the planets, it must have been generally current in the Western Orient.¹

Before drawing any conclusion from the premises so far outlined, it may not be amiss to add a word about the existence of sacrifices amongst primitive peoples. History tells that prayers, oblations, sacrifices and religious ceremonies played a leading role in the life of all nations. The idea, crude and imperfect in certain conditions, was evolved and perfected according to the development of religious ritual amongst men. And the true idea of prayer and sacrifice grew dim and obscure in proportion as man's wretchedness and degradation led him more and more away from the true God.

The fundamental notion of sacrifice rests on a sense of insufficiency and dependence naturally welling up in the human soul, and the necessity of giving external expression to it. But, despite the fact that the dominant note of sacrificial worship consists in this, its origin has been bitterly disputed.²

¹ This second explanation is the vestige of a theory long since exploded. It is as old as the days of Guilielmus Parisiensis, because he deals it several blows. (*De Legibus* IV, XX.) More than six decades have passed since Baur revived the idea, drawing the bulk of his matter from the well-known fable of the Greeks and Romans concerning the golden age of rest and equality under Saturn, and a custom therewith connected of giving slaves a holiday at saturnalia. But the Semitic nations had no notion of the fable at the root of this theory, nor had the Egyptians, who were nearer to the Jews than the Indo Germans. In a word, "so fine spun is the theory that it falls to pieces at the first touch." (*Brittmann, Mythology* I, 44.) And then it is not necessary to adopt Baur's theory to admit what was likely the case, though fortuitous, that the day which was observed as a sabbath by the Jews was dedicated by astrologers to Saturn. Von Bohlen espoused the cause of Baur and tried to fortify his position by an appeal to the text of Amos already cited. No doubt when the Hebrews proved faithless to their God, they betook themselves to the service of idols—a fact in which there is little to form the basis of a theory whose purport is to strengthen the position of Baur. Conf. Ewald, who scornfully rejects the theory of Baur and Von Bohlen. Wellhausen, *History of Israel*, p. 112.

² Some ascribe their origin to the devil's influence, others to the light of human reason alone, whilst a third class attributes it to Divine institution or revelation. The Bible does not explicitly refer the institution of the first sacrifices to God; still

Nevertheless, theologians assert that God is their author inasmuch as they are a testimony of His absolute sway and man's utter helplessness. At the same time the determination of the matter of sacrifices, as well as the accompanying rites, may fall within the sphere of human legislation. While there is much room for harmony in the opinions upon the origin of sacrifices, their universality amid primitive nations has provoked little controversy. Since then nearly all ancient peoples had their sacrificial worship, since they followed rituals and ceremonies in their sacrifices,¹ since they had sacred places², it is a matter of course to conclude that they must have had a sacred time, fixed and regularly recurring. This is rendered necessary owing to the very nature of civil and domestic society.³ And when these considerations are weighed collectively in conjunction with the existence of a weekly period of time, and the all but universal sacredness of the septenary number, it is by no means rash to infer that the regularly recurring period of time must have been the seventh day.

But what led so many nations to divide time into weeks, and set aside a sacred seventh day? Some reply that the phases of the moon suggested the division as also the dedication of four days a month to that planet. True, the moon's quarters might have prompted a corresponding division of the month, but, at the same time, only the new and full moon would attract sufficient attention to lead to the institution of sacred days. Moreover, the moon is not visible on the twenty-eighth day, and hence the sacredness of that day could hardly be ascribed to that planet. Could not primitive peoples have forgotten that the ease characterizing these four days belonged at first to the worship of the moon? This seems likely inasmuch as the worship of the moon was at its highest in those times, whereas many other planets subsequently shared the homage paid the moon, and, therefore, either on account of the sacredness of the number seven, or for other reasons, the order of

it strongly insinuates their divine origin. The fathers have taught that the sacrifices of animals were types of a future sublime immolation. All sacrifices, however, did not originate in the patriarchal tradition. (Vid Bouquillon, *De Origine Sacrificii*. Robertson Smith, op. c., pp. 214, 215, 265, 266).

¹ Robertson Smith, op. c., p. 206.

² Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchs*; Smith, op. c., 207.

³ Tappern, op. c., p. 254.

days set aside for rest was gradually changed. Nevertheless, it would be extraordinary to find nations substituting the twenty-eighth for the first day as observed in their early history unless moved by more weighty reasons than those alleged. The moon itself could not suggest such a change. Neither could the sacredness of the number seven; for no matter how much that number figured in disposing the order of the sabbath, it alone could never have been a factor potent enough to determine the institution of a resting day. Finally, Wellhausen asserts that the worship of the sun, moon and stars does not appear to have been very much in vogue amongst the earliest Semites.¹

Others are equally strong in maintaining that the origin of the week can be traced to the seven planets. Certain notions about the science of astronomy in Babylonia and Assyria have paved the way to this position. Two points, however, considerably weaken the plausibility of the theory. First, the knowledge of astrology was almost entirely confined to soothsayers and priests, and the astrological week which was only in private use, did not have the same disposition of the planets as the week in general use.² Secondly, the Babylonians themselves must have borrowed the week from some nation antedating the history of Babylonia.³ For, though the calendars already examined are written in Syrian, many Accadian expressions and technical terms are therein to be found indicating their non-Semitic origin as well as the fact that they must have been borrowed prior to the seventeenth century before Christ, "when the Accadian language seems to have been extinct."⁴

Where then can be found the idea underlying this almost universal observance of a sabbath in some shape or form, if not in the Written Word declaring that septenary time was instituted as the last act in the drama of creation? God labored six days; He rested on the seventh, hallowed and sanctified it. Such is the biblical reason for a division of time into

¹ Wellhausen, ap. Robt. Smith, op. c., p. 116.

² Lotz, op. c., pp. 35, 36, 37, 106.

³ This counteracts the force of any argument against the antiquity of the sabbath drawn from the fact that Abraham came from Ur of the Chaldeans.

⁴ Records of the Past, VII, pp. 157, 158, 2d note, p. 160.

seven days. In assigning it to the creation, it is simply relegated to the same category as other traditions of that time.¹ The history of nations proves that the sabbath rightly belongs to that class. For, its existence has been traced amongst nations widely separated in time and place, and independent of each other's influence. Under such circumstances a sabbath institution whose fundamental principle is the same must be admitted to have its root in some common source whence all peoples could imbibe the idea. The only record which appears to verify the various conditions required, is the Inspired Word of God Himself.

This prepares us for a summary consideration of the *a priori* arguments for a pre-Mosaic sabbath. Every one familiar with the principles of historical investigation knows that the institutions of a people are the natural outgrowth of its character and environment.² An institution common to many nations, and standing the test of time, implies like conditions amongst them. The wider its prevalence the greater the presumption that a common need called it into existence. And when all but universal in time and place, the institution is most probably rooted in natural law. History teaches that the seventh day rest is almost universal in our day, and as a consequence it must be imbedded in the laws of nature. To some extent, it is a positive institution, but positive precept is frequently necessary to lend effectiveness and definitiveness to moral principles. The vast sacrifice which seventh day rest entails in worldly interests is enough to show that arbitrary measures could never have been its parent, else long since would it have been buried amid the ruins of time. That it still stands forth in bold relief among living institutions is an index of its root in natural law. More clearly does this appear when the necessities which it meets in the individual, the family and civil society are carefully weighed.

As an individual man is a rational animal—a prosy definition and yet it embodies all that the poet says when he sings:

¹ As examples of such traditions may be cited the creation, the fall and the flood which prevailed so extensively in remote ages, and which may be still clearly traced in the traditions and literature of Eastern peoples.

² Bouquillon, *Theol. Fundamentalis*, p. 267.

How wonderful is man !
 From different natures marvellously mixed,
 Connection exquisite of distant worlds ;
 Distinguished link in being's endless chain,
 Midway from nothing to the Deity.

Man, therefore, leads a material and a spiritual life, and it behooves him to develop both according to reason. This implies the use of necessary means, among which rest is indispensable. Man seeks rest in nightly repose, but physiologists and political economists are one in declaring that this is not enough to restore man to his normal condition, and keep him in the highest state of efficiency. And experience itself goes to show that man can give better results when he labors six days and rests on the seventh than when he works every day.¹ The reason is obvious. Man craves variety. He cannot help it ; it is the natural law, and hence he is unable to continue in the same course of action without intermission. Physical exhaustion is certain owing to the very delicacy of his bodily tissues. The seventh day rest remedies this tension. By refreshing, enlarging, and enriching the faculties, it neutralizes the baneful effects of the monotony attending labor. It is no mistake, therefore, to say that the efficiency of productive power depends on periodic repose which maintains the physical and mental elasticity of the laborer. And finally, nature is inclined to seek a certain proportion between the time allotted to work and rest,² a proportion best obtained by a seventh day rest.

Weekly rest also helps to satisfy the necessities of man's higher nature. For, says Montalembert, there is no religion without worship and no worship without a sabbath. Man is

¹ Proudhon taught that the sabbath had hygiene, domestic, and economic value which nothing else could yield. Chevalier writes: "Let us observe Sunday in the name of hygiene if not in the name of religion." Conf. Wood, Sabbath Essays, p. 28, sq.

² The close of the last century saw a practical illustration of the principle; for the revolution ended, France decided to improve her condition by recurring to the decimal system to fix the proportion between the period of rest and labor. The experiment failed, so much so that even whilst the new law was in vogue those who could afford it rested on the seventh as well as on the tenth day. The writings of English and German physiologists shows that they are convinced of the necessity for seventh day rest. German scholars discuss the question at great length. They take their position from a study of the human organism, an analysis of the various organs, their functions, the forces called into play by labor, the effect of exercise and rest upon them, the necessity of weekly rest and the inadequacy of aught else to meet the impending need.

endowed with intellect and will which must be evolved, trained, and perfected. Just as the powers of the body are nourished and strengthened by wholesome food, so the faculties of the soul are sustained and ennobled by directing these towards their proper objects. Man's spiritual nature yearns for what alone can satisfy these powers. "Fecisti nos ad te Domine et irrequietum cor nostrum donec requiescat in te." Material progress, health, wealth, honor, preferments, natural gifts, whether taken separately or collectively, are not the end of man. They are simply means to perfect the higher life within him. To adopt these means to this end requires some respite from worldly cares and avocations. And this lull in the hurry and bustle of material concerns is his when the period of weekly repose comes around.

Moreover, as a moral being, man knows the difference between right and wrong almost instinctively, and thence flows the knowledge of the general principles which are the very basis of the moral order. What avails this moral order, its notions of good and evil, the various corollaries thence arising unless the humane agent in the scheme is enabled thereby to reach the Author and End of all order? All this implies a knowledge of law as well as a conscience trained to reverence law. This is facilitated by seventh day rest, inasmuch as it leads man to commune with his God, and thus begets in him a likeness which in turn raises, refines, and ennobles him. This is one of the blessings of seventh day rest. It is the recurrent assertion of the nobility and worth of our nature as beings that would be "ruined having less than God." It acts as a powerful brake checking the tide of material progress and enabling us to move

Upward along a Godward way
Where love and knowledge still increase,
And clouds and darkness yield to growing day,
Is more than wealth or fame or peace.

The need of a periodically recurring day of rest is greatly amplified as soon as we cross the threshold of domestic society. The reason is patent; it is rooted in the very nature of that society. The marriage contract, which is the foundation of this society, launches two individuals into a condition gov-

erned by mutual rights and duties. Consequently, while individual necessities do not cease, new relations give rise to needs other than those of the individual man. New rights to be respected, new duties to be discharged, new virtues to be cherished, new vices to be avoided,—such is the logical outcome of this state of things. The harmonious blending of these elements would not fall short of an ideal condition in domestic society; the real approaches this ideal only in proportion as there is a proper correlation of the various members of the family together with subordination of all to the central authority in the family circle. Natural affection chastened, ennobled, supernaturalized by God's grace is the magnet which must draw the minds and hearts together in conjugal and filial love, and thus seal anew a union, which, begun on earth, should find its consummation in heaven. Failure to realize the necessity of strengthening and sanctifying these vital relations is calculated to defeat the very end and purpose of the matrimonial union.

Not only is matrimony a means to propagate the human species, but also to tenant the earth with "a chosen generation, a kingly nation, a purchased people, a royal priesthood." This is the key to that vast power and immense influence wielded by the family on the world at large. No wonder it has been said that the hand that rocks the cradle is the hand that moves the world. If these ideas were engrafted in the heart of family life and unity of action therein centered, the disorders originating in the home circle would be far less common than they are to-day. Religion is the mainspring which is capable of setting the complex machinery of domestic society in motion and keeping it running at the proper speed. This in turn implies not only internal but external worship, which supposes fixed times for its manifestation. Here precisely is where the influence of a seventh-day rest is felt. For it brings with it an opportunity to cultivate a religious spirit in the home, as well as to learn the relations of the family to God and to each other. The members of the family are naturally brought into more easy and intimate communication on that day. Parental rights and duties are more clearly exemplified, the minds and hearts of the children are more easily impressed, the seeds of virtue more readily sown and nurtured. Not only is the source

of morality indicated, not only are moral laws, virtues, vices, rewards and punishments theoretically unfolded, but the fruit of theory is brought forth in its practical effects upon those who gather around the domestic hearth.

The mission of the family, in the economy of Divine Providence, is accomplished only when these results, if not actually achieved, are, at least, the object of well-directed efforts. The family itself is a divine institution, and, as there is ever a certain correlation in the Creator's works, it is not at all unlikely that the sabbath is a means to assist man in realizing the designs of his Maker.

Laws or institutions that exert a wholesome influence on the individual, and in turn on the family, are the harbinger of salutary results in that larger and more complex organization of which the family is but the germ, namely, the state or civil society. Here again morality must be the principle of vitality. The more deeply imbedded, the more widely respected, are the principles of morality in any civil society the more lasting and solid the moral body. And this is entirely in keeping with the nature and end of civil society, whose mission is to promote temporal peace and prosperity as a means to attain happiness everlasting. To achieve this result, civil society is vested with authority whereby its laws are enacted and enforced. This, however, is not due to any arbitrary policy on the part of man himself, but is rather a term to which his own nature leads. For, despite the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and their followers, man is a social being, destined to live in communication with his fellow-creatures. Consequently, without specifying the form of social regime or designating the organ of authority, God Himself wishes social intercourse and organization amongst men. Naturally social rights and duties are the result of such an institution, so that there is a juridical order as a distinct though not independent element in the moral order. The welfare of this order of things can be successfully attained only by the faithful observance of the laws governing social rights and duties. What will it profit society to be vested with authority to legislate if its decrees are disrespected by the citizens? And what will contribute so largely to foster a profound reverence for this authority as public conscience? But public conscience will be silenced and its healthy influence par-

alyzed unless it be quickened by forces stimulating its proper action, unless it be directed in channels harmonizing with its nature and lofty purpose.

Now, of the avenues leading to this blessed result, none leads more directly and securely than does seventh-day rest, with all that it implies. For once the cares attending labor are laid aside; man naturally possesses an opportunity to study the relations between his fellow-man and himself. He realizes that, though ultimately depending on God, he is immediately dependent on his fellow-man for much that is necessary to promote his physical, moral, and intellectual well-being. He has, moreover, time to realize that God is the fountain-head of all authority, and consequently that the leaders of every society are only the representatives of God and not self-constituted rulers of the people. This reflection will lead to the all important conclusion that might never makes right, that man has duties towards society as a moral unit and towards his fellow-men as its members, and that his own welfare as well as theirs demands a faithful discharge of his duties. Did civil rulers thus meet with the hearty co-operation of citizens, the peace and prosperity of the body corporate would be a foregone conclusion. Undoubtedly, then, whatever conduces so largely to this end as a sacred day of rest, must be deemed of the highest advantage to social life and its prosperity. For—

What constitutes a state?
Not cities wide and broad-armed ports,
Not starred and spangled courts,
No, men, high-minded men.

And as a sacred day of rest is a potent factor in the formation of such men, it is the forerunner of a sterling social organization amongst them.

Since, then, sabbath observance is so far-reaching in its results, since its influence in this threefold sphere would lead wise law-givers to decree its institution, since the sum of human nature is ever and always the same, and since what would call the sabbath into existence to-day would have conspired to do so ages ago, it follows that there must have been a sabbath prior to the Sinaitic legislation.

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THE WORLD-COPY—ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS.¹

The impulse which prompts us to honor Aquinas, saint and philosopher, springs from the heart of religion. The same spirit that fashions our ideals and seeks their realization is quick to recognize those concrete examples which, in holiness and knowledge, have anticipated our highest conceptions, have made actual the things for which we hope, have turned into living facts what for us are possibilities and aims. To this spirit the Church appeals when she holds up to our view the heroes of sanctity in all ages. To this spirit the Apostle speaks when he tells us: "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ." And Christ Himself, clothed in our humanity, is the supreme appeal of divine love and wisdom to this fundamental instinct of our nature, this spirit of imitation.

Religion means more than the dream of perfection or the mere tending towards an abstraction; it means that the reality of our lives shall conform to those other realities which are the lives of just men, and that even our ideals shall be measured upon those patterns as a test of their worth and an incentive to closer imitation. As the supernatural works through the natural, reaches our souls by things that are seen and heard, so its transforming effects are shown forth in the visible actions of the righteous, in those sacramental deeds which are outward signs of inward grace.

The imitation which religion prescribes is not an artifice nor an after-thought borrowed from speculation. It does not impose upon the will and conduct of men a principle foreign to human relations. Models of some sort we are bound to have, and religion selects among many the highest and best. The very fact of our social being means that we are influenced in numberless ways by the behavior of our fellows. By a natural impulse the child copies in action and speech the

¹An address delivered before the University on the Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas.

movements that it sees and the sounds that it hears. By a similar impulse, more fully developed, more carefully controlled, we copy, we follow the suggestions of custom, convention and accepted opinion, we cling to the old, yet are eager to adopt what is new. Wholesome or unwholesome, the contagion of example affects our mental and moral constitution, and the symptom that tells the result is our imitation.

This plastic influence which enters so largely into all our social relations, is exerted through impressions and ideas which analysis shows to be highly complex. Indeed, we may say that an apparently simple act of conscious imitation is the outcome of a development which involves every activity of mind,—sense and imagination, understanding, desire and volition. Let us unravel from this skein a single process,—one that, for the sake of its priority at least, we may regard as an element,—and let us see whether it be not also a sort of imitation. The ideas through which we conceive reality, whether they lead to action or not, are surely the result of experience. We do not bring them, ready-made, into the world; we do not evolve them in hidden recesses of a windowless soul. They are our own activities, but activities in response to an external stimulation from which they derive their specific character and endless variety. In some way they are representations, more than mere symbols, yet less than line-for-line tracings of physical agents. They may or may not be true; but when we say they are true, we mean that they are, in the ideal order, faithful copies of the objective world. To render them more and more faithful, to refine them more thoroughly from the admixture of subjective elements, the shortcomings of sense and the oversights of inference, is the aim of all our keen observation and rigorous tests. Whatever, in a word, we attempt or accomplish by our science is a closer conformity of our thoughts to things, to their qualities and mutual relations, their changes and the laws which determine the time and direction and extent of each change. Nature is the original; our knowledge, the imitation.

But is nature the absolute original? Are we conscious beings the only imitators, or is that which we copy likewise an imitation, wrought upon a higher, invisible pattern?

We may certainly conceive of a time, or rather we are bound to conceive of a time, in the world's history, when no living thing was there adjusting its organic activities to environing relations—when there was neither eye to see nor ear to hear, neither nerve to thrill nor brain to respond. And in such a time, no human mind was there to bring forth an ideal representation, much less a purposeful imitation, of a world that was slowly taking shape. Yet, the world itself was there, with myriad forms and forces, with energies and potencies and orderly change, leading out of a nebulous past to far-off events of life and mind. Was there, in any intelligence, an idea of that which had come to be, and of that which was yet to be? This is the problem that meets us, go back in thought as we will—the horizon that widens a little as we climb to higher heights, but only to hint at something beyond. “The great question,” says a modern teacher, “which is writ above all natural history records, is—when put in the phraseology of imitation—what is the final World-Copy, and how did it get itself set?”¹

For answer, at least for suggestion, we may turn again to the world as it now exists and is the object of our knowledge. Closer scrutiny shows that not everything offered to sense is nature's exclusive doing. There are forms which nature unaided does not produce, though she may far surpass them in beauty. There are modifications of her fairest products, in which she yields somewhat to the conceit of man. Not alone in that highest order of art which we call creative, is this power of interference asserted. Every device which realizes an idea, turning, confining, uniting, dividing matter and its forces, and so compelling them to the service of man, bears witness to his imaginative power. The very obedience whereby we triumph over elemental energies that in sheer might so far outdo us, would be impossible but for the craft that, within limits, fashions the real to forms that are modelled on thought. Our minds are mirrors for nature; but they are more; they are springs of purpose, and purpose is the setting of the copy that finds its imitation in fact.

Now these two sorts of imitation,—that which is implied in knowing and that which, through knowledge, sets its stamp

¹ Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*. New York, 1897. p. 488.

and direction on the world—are stepping-stones to a broader view. In the first place, we must remember that our minds also are portions of the real world. However they may be superior or antithetic to other things, they, in the last analysis, are things. They belong, after all, to nature; their thoughts and emotions and strivings are processes, no less than the stresses and strains with which matter throbs. Consciousness, proud parent of what we call subject, is itself in the domain of reality, an object. But if this is true, our problem evidently widens out. We have to ask not merely how nature came to be set as a copy for our imitation, but also whether we ourselves, and all nature besides, are not imitations, whether the world as a whole and in each of its parts, be not fashioned, in its beginning and in its enduring, upon some greater original being.

What, we may further inquire, are the limitations of our art, and why should it know any limit? It is not creative in the absolute sense; it adds nothing to the sum of existences; it supposes, it borrows, it appeals to nature in overcoming nature, and for all its cunning contrivance, the universe of matter and force, in amount, is ever the same. We cannot, by taking thought, add the weight of an atom to the bulk of the world, nor the swing of an atom to its motion.

The reason is plain. Whatever is limited in being is thereby limited in action. Its own existence is a loan which cannot be shared or transferred. Its life, if it live, is a tenure which cannot be lengthened at will. Its thought, if perchance it think, is less substantial still—a change, a passing phase, a conditioning of that which, by the very terms of its nature and essence, is already conditioned. Hence, to the boldest of its own fancies, to the very concept of absolute origin, our mind can only say: That, indeed, is possible, but the possibility is not of me; my power to act is even less than my power of thought and desire.

On the other hand, if these limitations are removed, if in some transcendent mind the ultimate reason of all possibility abide—an abiding thought with co-equal power, a power and a thought which is one with the thinker, a thinker who possesses, or, rather who is, the fullness of being,—this mind is

the original that we seek, the source of all existence, the prototype for the world's imitation. Now such, says St. Thomas,¹ is the mind of God.

"Divine intellect," "divine intelligence and will," are expressions which reflect, in a measure, the knowledge we have of ourselves. They fall short—how far, we cannot say—of the sovereign Reality; and this acknowledgment alone prevents them from becoming radically untrue. And yet, they are our highest concepts—imperfect, not because they rest on nothing, not because our mind, their origin and hither term, is unreal, but because they fail to span the abyss—they point to the Infinite, and in pointing they shrink, leaving a new marvel to thought.

Still, thought is not altogether lost nor its progress entirely checked. Forever beyond our comprehension as the Infinite must be, this much at least is manifest: the only adequate object of God's contemplation is God Himself. His being alone meets, with boundless reality, the boundless sweep and insight of His mind. All else that is or may be is, to His intellect, as a mote in the sunbeam to the undivided splendor of the sun. From the finite He cannot receive the faintest suggestion, the slightest possibility of thought. To the finite He cannot owe the debt that the object exacts from our limited minds. God, understanding Himself, is His own original—or rather, let us say, His understanding, identical with His being, is the original, the origin of all origins.

Nevertheless, it is clear that God, in some way, must know things other than Himself. Not in vague outlines but in perfect definition, not simply in totality but down to its finest details, the universe must be present to His mind. Every item of the material world, every pulsation of its energies, is seen and foreseen by Him. The very depths of our minds, so dimly discerned by ourselves, are transparent to His knowledge, which reaches the innermost core of our being, yea, even to the division of the soul and the spirit.

Here, then, we seem to have barred our path with a problem, perhaps with a contradiction. On the one hand we have said that God's intellect does not draw its object from without,

¹ *Summa Theol.* I, xv; *Cont. Gent.* I, 29, 54, and II, 45; *De Veritate*, III.

does not even look abroad ; on the other, we are compelled to affirm that He has knowledge, infinitely perfect comprehension of all things. Both truths are the teaching of St. Thomas, and it is in that teaching also that we shall seek their reconciliation.

God, says the Angelic Doctor, in the very act and moment of knowing Himself, knows everything else. In His own being He beholds whatever is actual or possible, great or small, spirit or matter, perfection or imperfection, shadow or substance or form. He beholds them, not by reflections caught from an outer existence or cast upon His mind by other reality, but as so many possible reflections of which He is the source. In a word, God knowing His own being, knows it both as absolutely His and as an original which may be imitated, a copy eternally set. He does not discover the finite, and say : behold my image and likeness ; but, contemplating Himself, he says, before time or creation began : there may be and shall be an image and likeness of Me.

Imitability, an attribute of the divine essence, declares itself in divine ideas. The Infinite is one, the finite is manifold, and the ideas upon which the finite is shaped must be many. For the truth that His being is imitable is likewise the knowledge that no finite imitation can be perfect. To express even our ideas we must multiply words, and our words are at best poor counterfeits of thought. It is the defect of our language, not the transcendent character of our ideas, that so often they fail of expression or falter. With God it is different. The same absolute excellence that makes His being imitable is also the bar to an adequate imitation. The copy is perfect and its setting ; in the copying comes imperfection, and with it the more and the less.

Out of these two concepts—imitation and imperfection—springs a third. The shortcomings of the finite may be in a measure offset and made up ; where equality perforce is lacking, variety may bring compensation. Thus, instead of a vast monotony, creation will exhibit a manifold of existences, rank upon rank of quality, grade after grade of activity, interaction of forces, transformation unceasing, evolution and system and

plan. The very failure of the finite is wrought to a new success; out of imperfect imitation emerges the perfection of order.

Each individual thing holds its place in the scale of being by a positive determination and a negative. Whatever it contains of reality, of property, of function or efficiency, is positive, and is therefore, in its degree, the semblance of God. But, inasmuch as it is wanting in the fulness of being and limited in the range of its powers, its value is marked by a negative sign. This co-ordination, with endless varying proportions, is present to the mind of God. He sees, in the multitude of possible imitations, the exact locus of each and its worth with respect to Himself. The lowest elements of the world are made in His likeness, but the likeness goes not beyond existence and action. Higher up in the curve, life appears—an inward abiding energy like His own—but, in its lower forms, unconscious. Consciousness itself, a distant reflection of His knowledge, lacks, in the realm of mere sentient beings, the crowning value of intelligence and will. Human reason, closer approximation still to the original Mind, is circumscribed by organic conditions and fettered in the bonds of sense. Throughout the universe, imitation and limitation are variables—the one is the function of the other. But as forethought by God, they are moments, the balancing of which constitutes the divine idea of each possible creature, the prototype of its nature and fitness.

We come then at length, in view of that which we set out to find. What, we had asked, is the final World-Copy? And the answer, writ large by the genius of St. Thomas, is this: God's being, understood by His intellect, not as absolute, but with the connotation of the countless proportions which other things, in their several degrees of likeness and unlikeness, bear to Him. And the setting of this copy is God's eternal self-thinking. The expression of this thought is the world, including ourselves; and if no single thing in the world is the adequate utterance of God, the multitude of things is His magnificent diction, with phrase of variety and lordly period of purpose, and the flowing grace of order—a metaphor of the Infinite.

From this plane of speculation to which Aquinas has led us, we may look upon imitation as an ultimate fact in the constitution of the universe. It is the supreme law by which the world is related to God. It is a concept which foreshadows, if it does not openly declare, the fundamental unity to which the real is bound. But may it not be that this whole fact and process of imitation is modelled upon something higher? Creation is an imperfect reflection of God; is there not a perfect and in all ways adequate expression of His being?

The teaching of faith is our answer, and this too we may interpret in terms of imitation. There is one Idea which is truly and fully the meaning of God. Thinking Himself eternally, He eternally begets a concept which is His perfect image, nay more, which is, in the plenitude of deity, the self-same with Him. "*In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.*" In this primordial generation there is no short-coming, no inequality. Imitation is identity of nature; the Word, like its origin, infinite. Thus remotely, at least, so far as the weakness of our vision and our faltering language permit, we may discern the source and the ground of all imitation and essay an ultimate formula. The imitation whereby the finite is brought into being has for its exemplar, immeasurably transcendent, the intellectual begetting in God of that Word which is the figure of His substance.

Since, again, the Word of God is the absolutely perfect expression of His intellect, it must contain the whole thought of God. Both the nature of God Himself and the whole range of His ideas must enter into this supreme concept. All those various proportions and relations by which the finite is determined, are pronounced in and through the only-begotten Word. This, therefore, the center of all prototypes, is pre-eminently the archetype and exemplar. "*All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing.*"

Thus we are led to recognize in imitation a universal principle upon which various orders and spheres of reality are founded. It links the subjective and the objective in our thought; it binds the whole creation harmoniously to God;

in God Himself, it is the mode of eternal activity, the source and the motive to which the universe of creatures owes its being.

There remain to be pointed out certain consequences of this teaching, in the light of which the more familiar forms of imitation take on a deeper significance. When it is said that our knowledge of the world is an imitation of reality, the saying is true. But the whole truth appears when we remember that the real world itself is an imitation. For then it is manifest that to think correctly of nature is to rethink, as best we may, the thought of God. And all our questioning and scrutiny is, in the final interpretation, an effort to make our ideas correspond more thoroughly with the original ideas of His mind. Herein lies the dignity of science, its noblest aim and its surest hope of advance. Hence, conversely, arises its difficulty. For though the objects of the outer world are, in their measure, true to their pattern, and though our minds, as real beings, are likewise and of necessity true, the conformity of thought and things is not inevitably established. The possibility of error is always there, not as a warning to desist from the search, but rather as a spur to keener surmise and further investigation.

Is there a term to this quest, or is humanity destined to approximate forever though never fully attaining? We look back upon the development of science with pity or surprise at conceptions once cherished, now almost forgotten,—at the wreckage of theories and conjectures that for a day have startled the world or have thrived for a whole generation. We have reason to believe that those who come after us will write us down in their histories as earnest, but no less short-sighted. Where, then, is the final test, the supreme criterion which the minds of all men will accept, and in accepting lay hold on the truth? Only, we may say, in the presence of the final World-Copy, when the medium of imitation gives way to the original, which is God. For then the comparison will be, not between rival opinions or views, nor yet between thought and created things, but directly between our concepts and the eternal idea. Then, too, shall we discern in retrospect the genuine worth of those who, like Aquinas, by splendid synthetic grasp have achieved the unification of knowledge, and

of those as well who, in patience and labor, have wrested from nature her secrets. And doubtless we shall then realize that in spite of error and misunderstanding, through all vicissitudes of theory and system, human science has grown, now quickly now slowly, toward a better imitation of its pattern.

To such an issue, imitation, as an all-pervading principle, seems directed. For imitation, in any degree, involves purpose, and in the highest degree it involves such attainment of that purpose as may, in the nature of things, be possible. If God has set His image upon creation, He must intend thereby to manifest Himself; and the natural consequence of such manifestation is the attraction to Himself of intelligent beings who are able to read His meaning and free to follow its lesson. In the multiplicity, variety and orderly course of the world, His wisdom finds a remedy for imperfect imitation. But the remedy itself occasions more serious defect if the cravings which it awakens are vain, if the wisdom that bids us to copy forbids us a nearer vision of the Original.

It is here, however, as reason begins to waver, that Religion offers its hand. A greater thing, says Christian Faith, has come to pass than any revelation that human intelligence could conceive or the heart of man desire. Not only has the divine Original been shown to a created mind, it has united such a mind to Itself in the unity of Person. The Word of God has drawn up into its subsistence our human nature, which thus becomes its organ and instrument. The Incarnation, merging the intellect of man in the individuality of Godhead, completes the cycle of imitation.

A union so intimate and perfect between the infinite Original and the finite created copy, exists in no other being; there is no second Incarnate Word. But the Incarnation itself, as an accomplished fact in God's dealings with the human mind, is a guarantee that, according to the measure of our limited capacity, we also are destined to a clearer vision and a deeper insight, when "we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord" (II Cor., III, 18).

EDWARD A. PAGE.

SOME WORDS ABOUT CHAUCER.

Everything concerning the most cheerful, most natural, and most sympathetic of all English poets, Chaucer, has come to be of interest. Whether his name had originally anything to do with shoes or not, or whether it was derived from some small office about the court will perhaps soon be decided by Mr. Atkinson; but there is no question that, even in this apparently unimportant matter of philology, the public testifies more than usual concern. The interest in Chaucer is no doubt due to his incomparable charm as a story-teller, the human quality in his poems, and the increase of respect for the English language among English-speaking people.

Chaucer has been examined by the analysts of speech from every point of view, and what the English have left undone the Germans have minutely completed; but there is one thing which most interpreters of Chaucer have failed to grasp, and that is the impossibility of judging the standards of the fourteenth century by those of the nineteenth. As an axiom they are willing to admit that it is illogical to judge the ethical point of view of one age considered from the changed attitude of another. Every expositor of literary history, from Dryden to Lounsbury, from Voltaire to Taine, admits this; but only in the abstract. When it comes to application, both knowledge and intuition seem to fail. This is especially true of nearly all writers who look at history either through the telescope supplied by traditional Protestantism or the microscope of "modernity," and more especially true of even the cleverest interpreters of Chaucer, of Montaigne, of Pascal, of even Sir Thomas More.

In the case of these great men, it is, as a rule, due not to prejudice, but to that incapacity for projection which no mind but the synthetically imaginative possesses and to the hallucination which leads so many writers to believe that the Catholic in all ages is a slave to some hidden power, and that his spir-

itual life,—of which every detail is supposed to be dogmatic,—is like a great picture, without shadow, softness, or perspective. In Mr. Seeborn's "Oxford Reformers," the strictures of Sir Thomas More on the superstition of a certain friar are used to show that he was travelling fast towards Lutheranism. "There was at Coventry a Franciscan of the unreformed sort," Sir Thomas More writes; "this man preached in the city, the suburbs of the neighborhood, and the village about, that whosoever should say daily the Psalter of the Blessed Virgin could never be lost. The people listened greedily to this easy way of getting to heaven. The pastor there, an excellent and learned man, though he thought the saying very foolish, said nothing for a time, thinking that no harm could come from it, since the people would become more devout to God from greater devotion to the Blessed Virgin. But at last he found his flock infected with such a disease that the very worst were especially devoted to the rosary for no other reason than that they promised themselves impunity in everything; for how could they doubt of heaven, when it was promised to them with such assurance by so good a man, a friar direct from Heaven?"

This letter¹ was written in 1519, and Sir Thomas goes on to tell of his meeting with the friar, and to repeat his argument against him:

"For, though you may easily find a king ready to pardon something in an enemy at the prayers of his mother, yet there is nowhere one so great a fool as to promulgate a law by which to encourage the audacity of his subjects against himself, by a promise of impunity to traitors, on condition of their paying a certain homage to his mother. Much was said on both sides, but I only succeeded in getting laughed at, while he was extolled."

Sir Thomas adds that he does not intend to impute crime to any body of religious, "since the same ground produces herbs both wholesome and poisonous; nor do I wish to find fault with those who salute Our Lady, than which nothing can be more beneficial; but because some trust so much in their devotions that they draw from them boldness to sin. May I be held a liar if there are not religious in certain places

¹ Life of Sir Thomas More. By the Rev. T. E. Bridgett, U. S. A.

who observe silence so obstinately that at no price could you get them to whisper in their corridors ; but, draw them one foot outside, and they will not hesitate to storm at whoever offends them. There are some who would fear lest the devil should carry them off alive if they made any change in their dress, and who have no fear of heaping up money, of opposing and deposing their abbot. Are there not many who, if they omitted a verse of their office, would think it a crime to be expiated with many tears, and who have not the least scruple to take part in calumnious gossip longer than their longest prayers."

No man, familiar with Catholic doctrine and practice, will imagine that Sir Thomas showed a tendency towards the opinions of Luther because of these words or of several similar passages in his defence of his friend Erasmus. And no man, knowing the freedom of Faith, will set down Geoffrey Chaucer either as a Wickliffite or an agnostic because he jests at many things which ought to have an odor of sanctity. One would fancy that authors who assume to write with scientific accuracy might analyze the effects of the teachings of the Catholic Church upon the minds of the people,—and, first, examine as a preparation for this the distinction which the Church makes between the essential and the non-essential. As it is, the doctrines of the Church and the effect of these doctrines on the minds that accept them are the most important, but least understood of all things in modern history.

Sir Thomas More's sympathy was with the parish priest at Coventry, in the sixteenth century ; Geoffrey Chaucer's was with the parish priest in general, in the fourteenth century ; but even the mistaken "unreformed" friar would not have accused the former of heresy for that only, nor would the Wickliffite have claimed Chaucer as a follower because of his jokes,—coarse to our taste, but merely virile fun from his point of view,—at the expense of the friar ;—

"A wanton and a merry,
A limiter, a full solemné man."

No educated man now believes that Chaucer was a leader in that Wickliffite revolt which preceded the breaking away

of England from union with Rome. And few men, who have examined the evidence, hold that he was even a follower of Wickliffe. As to Professor Lounsbury's¹ elaborate *apologia* for the scepticism of Chaucer, it proves nothing to the man who can read Chaucer with a subtler understanding. Lovers of the poet are under deep obligation to Professor Lounsbury. To the present time there has been no better book on Chaucer; and its author has further added to his service by putting the testimony as to Chaucer's scepticism at its very strongest point. And this testimony, at its strongest point, is the weakest thing in the book.

As a rule, there is not very much gained by trying to settle the personal relations of any human being to God. The real question lies between God and the soul. And the controversies as to whether Shakespere was a practical Catholic or not, or whether Wordsworth had belief in the Immaculate Conception, or whether Rossetti's splendid "Ave" brought him the grace of conversion, seem to be, as Charles Reade puts it, "like the cooking of stale cabbage over farthing candles." It is quite as inutile, and often as malodorous. Beside the illumination of God's mercy, our light is but as a farthing candle. The essence of the poet must be left finally to his Creator. But this is true: "In the very greatest poets, the standard of human law has been absolute sanctity. The keynote of this their theme is usually sounded by them with the utmost reserve and delicacy, especially by Shakespere, but it is there; and every poet—the natural faculties of the poet being pre-supposed—will be great in proportion to the strictness with which, in his moral ideal he follows the counsels of perfection."² This is the standard by which the poet must be judged; and judged by their standard, Chaucer is a poet of a very high type. But we logically look into the works of a poet, to form an ultimate opinion, not into his life, on which no man,—not even a judge and jury, with crowds of expert witnesses—can give the final verdict.

¹ Studies in Chaucer, by Thomas R. Lounsbury, Professor of English in the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale University. New York: Harper & Brothers, Vol. III, p. 499.

² Religio Poetarum: Coventry Patmore. London: George Bell & Sons; p. 84.

It was natural that the Puritans should claim the first of English poets ; it seemed to strengthen their case to have as the precursor of their revolt one of the keenest intellects of the fourteenth century,—a learned man, a sane-minded man, a man whom all England esteemed. It was illogical, however, since the whole spirit and expression of Geoffrey Chaucer,—and the spirit and expression with him is one,—denies all the fundamentals in which the Puritans prided themselves. The gaiety of heart, the love of the natural, the tolerance for the ailties of humanity, the abounding charity, the delight in the world as a place of sunshine, and, if not the best of all possible worlds, a very good one,—were antagonistic to every tenet of Puritanism. And these qualities are characteristic of Chaucer. He leaves the great questions to be answered by God. Even when the Pagan Arcite dies, Chaucer says,—

“ His spirit changed house, and wente there,
As I came never, I can not tellen where,
Therefore I stent¹ I am no divinister,
Of soules find I not in this register,
Ne me list² not opinions to tell
Of them, though that they writen where³ they dwell.
Arcite is cold, then Mars his soule gle⁴

On these lines Professor Lounsbury puts the question : “Can modern agnosticism point to a denial more emphatic than that made in the fourteenth century of the belief that there exists for us any assurance of the life that is lived beyond the grave?” To which we might reply : Could one believe that modern agnosticism should twist such a passage in favor of itself, if human inconsistency had not already gone as far by making the wife of Bath a sort of Protestant Madonna? Theseus, in his discourse, near the end of “The Knight’s Tale,” asks :

“ Why grutchen we? Why have we heaviness,
That good Arcite, of chivalry the flow’r,
Departed is with duty and honour,
Out of this foule prison of this life.
Why grutchen here his cousin and his wife
Of his welfare, that loven him so well?
Can he them thank? nay, God wot, never a deal.
That both his soul and they themselves offend,
And yet they mow⁵ their lustes⁶ not amend.”

¹Stop.
⁵Can.

²Is not my pleasure.
⁶Feelings.

³Where.

⁴Gle—Guide.

Theseus is a Pagan Greek, but his funeral sermon, paraphrased, is not unknown in pulpits which would shake with horror at the suspicion of agnosticism.

All the world loves a poet; and all the world loves to seek him in his work, to find the man whose song delights and uplifts. It sometimes happens that if we chase the meadow lark we miss the song, and too much seeking for the man causes us to lose some of the glamour of the bard. But in his work and only in his work should we seek him;—for life-histories, the surface-stories of existence,—are like the crowing of the cock to Oberon and Puck,—the signal of chill and grayness and the vanishing of fantasy.

Since the test of the poet is his allegiance, at his best, to high beauty and truth, and he should be valued "in proportion to the strictness with which, in his moral ideal, he follows the counsels of perfection," it is a duty to examine the insinuations which presume that he cannot bear this test.

To us the Church is the spouse of the highest Truth and Beauty. If, therefore, Chaucer had contemned her, we should feel that he had proved himself unworthy of our full regard. If we were obliged to take him as we take Spenser, with regret that he should be forced to be self-consciously Protestant, we would lose the full enjoyment of that *naïveté* which distinguishes him among the other great poets. The Protestantism,—political and politic as it is,—of Spenser is artificial and self-conscious. When he turns Our Lady's face into "a lady's face" in the blazon of a knight's armor, we find that all the magnificence of his crimson vert and azure tapestry will not atone for it. And when Elizabeth is enamelled with allegorical paste, we see at once how impossible Protestantism is from the æsthetic point of view. The Huguenots and the Covenanters may be made to seem heroic by accenting their human qualities, the attributes they have in common with all men of strong will that resist superior force; but their tenets offer no chance for careless gaiety or joy in life.

The more Puritanical Reformers based their claims to Chaucer on works attributed to him which were not his. Charles Cowden Clarke tells us that "the venerable heretic, John Fox, after alluding to the industry of the Popish clergy

in quenching and stamping into the earth those treatises which tended to overthrow the fabric of their hierarchy, considers the presentation of the above works of our poet in the light of an especial providence." The "above" works were "Jack Upland," "The Plowman's Tale," and "The Testament of Love," which are not Chaucer's,—so that, even if "The Romance of the Rose" be admitted, John Fox's "special Providence" disappears.

No doubt it would be a pleasant thing, if we could show that Geoffrey Chaucer had spent his life in arguing against the Lollards and that he was a determined enemy of Wickliffe; but, unless we invent certain works for him after the manner of Chatterton, and a "special Providence" after the manner of John Fox, we must be content with the pleasanter thing of accepting him only as a poet and the most intuitive and sympathetic delineator of life the English world of letters possesses, next to Shakspeare. On the other hand, those persons who like to think of him as a heretic, must give up their case, since, on examination we find that he was little either of a polemist or a politician. He occupied positions of trust and filled them well, but we do not discern that he pandered to any political party in order to enjoy either his positions or his pensions. If he did, there is no evidence of it in his works, or in any other written record yet discovered. The prose "Parson's Tale" is essentially sound in doctrine, whether it be entirely the composition of Chaucer or not. It seems to have been added to make amends for those "endytynge of vanities" which have so much endeared him to the world, but which he retracts towards the end of his life in a manner which is anything but sceptical. At the same time, it must be admitted that, as literature, neither the "Parson's Tale" nor the "Retraccioun" has any interest whatever. The "Parson's Tale" may be a good sermon, from the point of view of moral theology on the seven deadly sins and the "Retraccioun" is the expression of a devout mind which fears the effect of scandal and no doubt regrets the "gyltes" for which it is so contrite. And the "Reeve's" and "Miller's Tale" ought indeed to be followed by some beating of the breast.¹

¹ See Lounsbury, Vol II, p. 4.

If the advocates for Chaucer's "Lollardism" will drop their contention and the pleaders for his scepticism admit that a man may be averse to superstition and yet be a good Catholic, I, for my part, am quite willing to let Chaucer be judged as a poet, not as an apostle or preacher of any sort. It would give me a great pang to have to regard Chaucer as a Wickliffite, but it would be even more painful if all his works had been as unexceptionable and dull as the "Parson's Tale," which is utterly lacking in poetical value, and yet which might have been preached by the best of regulars or seculars. As a political writer, on either side, he would have ceased to be poetical. Let us have him as he is,—a son of the Church, amused rather than shocked by laxities in discipline; not loth to point them out, inclined to take part against the friars and to use the stock jokes on his side; broad in his speech, not vexed by modern ideas of purity, given to a jesting license, but never intrinsically licentious. He called a spade a spade; and, if the spade was muddy, he made no attempt to pretend that it was clean.

Nobody, except a purblind special pleader here and there, has ever denied that Sir Thomas More,—not so long ago pronounced blessed,—was a most devout Catholic. And yet he did not hesitate to denounce superstition when he thought he saw it or to find fault with abuses similar to some of them which Chaucer rather cheerfully chronicles. Not that Chaucer ever apologizes for evil or blurs the line that divides right from wrong. He is too safe in faith and the morality that flows from faith for that; he is so safe, in fact, that he can afford to take liberties. More would have been the first to admit that Erasmus' "Praise of Folly," which seemed innocuous when men were united in the essentials of belief, had become dangerous when a thousand attacks on these essentials were made; and, in 1532, More did admit this in a letter to Erasmus. Similarly Chaucer must be judged in the light of his times. The reader who would condemn his poems because of his jests at abuses, which certainly did exist, but which were no more general than that all Irishmen have pug noses or that all mothers-in-law are tyrants, is as narrow-minded as that other, who, because Chaucer jeered at the friars and smiled at

the worldly caprices of the charming Lady Abbess, holds that he was as iconoclastic as Wickliffe, and denied the spiritual power of the Church. The stock Irishman and the stock mother-in-law of the "comic" papers hold to-day the place which the gluttonous friar, the avaricious monk, and the betrayed husband have in the vulgar annals of the fourteenth century. If Chaucer lived to-day,—if Walter Savage Landor¹ or Marion Crawford² were real magicians and could have brought him into our century,—he would no doubt be astonished to find himself assumed by pious Catholics as a defender of the Church, claimed by the Protestant as a splendid heretic and by the agnostic as a sceptic. Alive, he would find it as hard to understand the nineteenth century point of view as we find it to tolerate a century which outraged many of those conventionalities that we have accepted as principles. A satirical turn of mind, like a renown for repartee, may carry a man too far. But because Chaucer gave his characters every opportunity for laughing at false relics, it does not follow that he had no reverence for the true. England, as he pictures it, with all its merriment,—not always an ideal or innocent merriment, by any means,—was evidently in training for the woe to come in the time of Henry VIII. The evil lay in him who purveyed falsehood and traded in the perfumes of sanctity, not in him whose wit flashed upon such treachery. Chaucer evidently felt that the human side of the Church was fair material for him; but no writer has ever shown a finer conception of the spiritual side of our priesthood than he, in the famous description of the parish priest, in the prologue to the "Canterbury Tales":

"A better priest, I trowe, that nowhere noon is."³

"The Wife of Bath's Tale" is held up as one of the poet's attacks on what some commentators seem to believe to be a dogma of the Church,—the celibacy of the clergy. Professor Lounsbury says:—"There can be no question as to the poet's position in this matter."⁴ His contempt for the doctrine, and the reasons advanced in its favor, is scarcely ever disguised. The

¹ Imaginary Conversations.

² With the Immortals.

³ Skeat: Complete Edition. Macmillan.

⁴ Studies in Chaucer, Vol. II, p. 525.

confounding of celibacy with chastity excites his scorn. It is hardly necessary to observe that at such a period the expression of sentiments of this kind is not made the ostensible, or even prominent, motive for producing the work. Nor would these sentiments be put forth by Chaucer in his own person or in that of any serious character. It was not accident that led to the selection of the speaker. It was no fondness for coarseness for coarseness' sake that dictated the tone which is frequently found in the poem. It is in the mouth of one like the sensual, shrewd, and worldly wife of Bath, who boasts that she has already had five husbands, and is ready to welcome the sixth whenever he presents himself that an attack upon celibacy could be safely placed."

Now the plain-spoken wife of Bath is not a person whom one would like to meet in a modern drawing-room, at an afternoon tea, unless one was sure that she were unaccompanied by an interpreter of Middle English; for she is certainly very frank, but her talk is much less intrinsically coarse than a great deal of modern after-dinner conversation, founded on many French and some English novels. It is surprising that Professor Lounsbury should tell us that Chaucer did not make her "coarse" for the sake of "coarseness." He might just as well apologize for St. James or St. Augustine or St. Chrysostom, whose utterances, if made in a pulpit to-day, to any well-dressed congregation within the bounds of the English speech, would be received with amazement. "If we go back," says Coventry Patmore, "to those first ages of Christianity—which modern good people who know nothing about them, regard with such reverence—we shall find that the greatest and purest of the 'Fathers of the Church' were in the practice of addressing their flocks with an outspokenness which is not surpassed even by the ancient expounders of the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries, or, for that matter, by the Bible itself.¹ St. Augustine, for example, in the *City of God* and elsewhere, says things fit to throw decent people into convulsions; and nowhere, in ancient Christian writings, do we find ignorance regarded as even a part, much less the whole of innocence." The wife of Bath was of her time; Chaucer did not make her; she

¹ *Religio Poetae*, p. 102.

existed, and he drew her as she was, with a humor, a knowledge of character, and a delight in his picture which distinguishes him as an artist. In Chaucer's eyes she was a very respectable woman; she had a "past" and a bad temper; the first, Chaucer, like a gentleman, treats delicately; the second, he illustrates,—

¹ "In all the parish, wife ne there was none,
That to the off'ring before her sholdè gone,
And, if there did, certain so wroth was she
That she was out of allè charity.
Her coverchiefs weren full fine of ground;
I durstè swear they weigheden a pound
That on the Sunday were upon her head:
Her hosen weren of fine scarlet red,
Full strait y tied and shoes full moist and new;
Bold was her face, and fair and red of hew."

She had made pilgrimages; she knew the world; and, in the "Prologue" ² to her story, she remarks:

"Experience, though noon auctoritee
Were in this world, were right y-nough to me,
To speak of wo that is in mariage;
For, lordinges, since I twelf yeer was of age,
Thonked be God that is eterne on lyve,
Husbands at churchè-dore I have had five;
For I so oftè have y-wedded be,
And alle were worthy men in hir degree."

She has heard the Scriptures preached, and a scruple—very slight—has been raised by the assertion,

"That sith Crist ne wentè never but onis
To wedding in the Cane of Gallilee,
That by the same ensample taught he me
That I ne sholdè wedded be but once."

She admits, not with contempt, as Professor Lounsbury suggests, but with entire simplicity, that—

—a lord in his household,
He hath nat every vessel al of gold;
Somme been of tree, and doon hir lord servyse,
God clepeth folk to Him in sondry wyse,
And everich hath of God a propre yiftè,
Som this, som that—as Him lyketh shifte.
Virginitee is great perfeccoun,
And continence eek with devocioun."

¹ Riches of Chaucer: Charles Cowden Clarke (Expurgated edition).

² Skeat.

If Chaucer, in the second half of the thirteenth century, had taken upon himself the mission of combating St. Paul, St. Jerome, and the general voice of the Church on this counsel of perfection, the "Wife of Bath's Tale" might have been of greater comfort to Henry VIII., who, in his own showing, had certain scruples, too; but it would not be the recital of a man of genius, who was consequently a man of insight,—of a storyteller who drew life and character as he saw it, with humor and pathos. And these, joined with moral perception, make that quality which, in Montaigne and Thackeray, some call "cynicism."

A man, bred in Protestantism, cannot, unless he has almost miraculous perception, understand the point of view of the Catholic of the fourteenth century; and, I admit, it is very difficult for a Catholic, tinged with the false asceticism of Protestantism,—as we all are, more or less,—to condone that old-time plain-speaking which goes to the root of things without concealment. And yet Chaucer had a certain reserve and modesty by which moderns might profit. His persons accept the eternal verities; there is no question of the spiritual authority of the Church, no doubt as to the Trinity; the Godhead of Christ and His attributes are lovingly spoken of,—there are no sneers at the Sacrament of Penance and the Eucharist. In Chaucer's time, or even in Sir Thomas More's, if a man could not distinguish the precious wine of God from the earthen vessel that held it, he was accounted a fool. This distinction was often made with a vengeance. Whether it was expedient or not is not now the question. Whether the earthen vessel could be roughly touched without injury to the treasure it held, is another question. The Continental and English peoples thought it could,—the Irish were of a different opinion or of a different temperament.

The "merry words of the host to the monk" in the "Monk's Prologue" are quoted frequently in support of Chaucer's "reforming" proclivities. This wise, humorous, keen and sympathetic observer of humanity, it is said, was ahead of his time; he foresaw that, if the best men entered the Church and bound themselves to celibacy, the English race, indeed all the races of the earth, must dwindle into feeble folk. It was not

only the lessening of the physique he feared, but the lessening of the intellect of the future. If the Church,—the pestilant cormorant of John Fox and Bunyon,—seized the most comely, the wisest, surely the heretics were benefactors of the world, when they declared that all vows of celibacy were cursed of God! It is this view that many serious-minded persons, determined to make the poet polemical, have read into the "Monk's Prologue." The "tale of Melibee" is finished, and the host, whose language is "plain," cries out that he wishes he had a patient wife.

"I had lever than a barel of ale
That goode lief my wyf hadde herd this tale!
For she nis nothing of swich pacience
As was this Melibeus wfe Prudence."

According to his further account, the lady of his thoughts is a rather difficult person. It becomes evident that, supposing the monasteries have assumed nearly all the strong-limbed and strong-minded men, the convents have not succeeded in securing all the valiant women. If, for instance, as the host proclaims, a neighbor jostles his wife at church or does not salute her, she

—"cryeth false coward, wreak thy wyf.
By *corpus bones!* I wol have thy knyf,
And thou shalt have my distaff and go spinne!
Fro day to night right thus she wol beginne;—
'Allas,' she saith, 'that ever I was shape,
To wed a milksop or a coward ape,
That will be overlad with every wight.
Though darst not stonden by thy wyves right!'"

The host prophesies that he will be forced to murder by this belligerent wife of his, and then turns to the monk, audibly regretting that such a fine man of religion is not married. After his description of the woes of married life, there is an ironical humor in this regret which the serious-minded polemist can not see. It is logical enough that, reflecting on the masterful strength of the lady hostess, he sighs to consider the brawn and sinew of the monk, who might have withstood her, "so big in armes." It is not logical, under the circumstances, that he should commend marriage to the guest, "but," he says:—

—and I were pope
 That only thou but every mighty man,
 Thogh he were shorn ful hie upon the pan
 Should have a wyf ; for all the world is lorn
 Religioun hath take up al the corn
 Oftreding, and we borel men ben shrimpes !
 Of feble trees their comen wretched imps.' "

The host here makes a compliment perhaps unconsciously to the strictness with which the monks kept their vows,—a compliment which is generally overlooked by interpreters who would turn the lark-like poems of Chaucer into "problem" essays. The host suddenly drops into a tone of banter quite in his own manner, for which he apologizes, as well he might,—

" But be not wrooth, my Lord, for that I pleye;
 Ful oft in game a sooth I have herd seye.
 ' This worthy monk took al in pacience.' "

This monk, "worthy," as Chaucer names him, was a "manly man," given to hunting and not to study; not a recluse or a hard worker, or a strict follower of the rule of St. Benedict, but a believer in the newer and more worldly ways, in which Chaucer seems to sympathize with him. He was a "fair prelate," splendid in the adornments of himself and his hounds, his fur-brimmed sleeves and his berry-brown palfrey, his well-colored face and his curious gold pin give Chaucer as much pleasure as the tints in a cardinal's robe give Vibert or the rain drops on a soldier's helmet, Detaille. There is a place for this dignified and splendid monk in the pleasant world as for the hard-working parson and the clerk of Oxenford. Even the friar, who would have been declared accursed by St. Francis d' Assissi, finds ironical tolerance with Chaucer,

"And in his harping, when that he had sung,
 His eyen twinkled in his head aright
 As do the starres on a frosty night."

He makes a picture; he will tell his story in the soft April weather, by the Thames. It is no time or place for denunciation,—God will give every man his desert in good time. And Geoffrey Chaucer is not Hamlet, born to set the world right.

Let us take him as he was, and let us not ask that he be other than he was. He was not Dante, eagle-like, but bitter and brooding. He did not hate both the sin and the sinner,

after the manner of the great Florentine. He did not penetrate to Hell or soar to Heaven. Earth,—the daisied earth, where the little birds sang, and gay voices joined with them,—was beloved of him. Nothing natural was alien to him; he was a humanist, but not a Hedonist,—in love with life, but not an Epicurean. That beneath him was the sure rock of eternal truth he never seems to have doubted. Safe and sure, like Sir Thomas More, his later brother, with whose humor he had so much in common, he could let his fancy play with no thought of danger. His geniality, his acuteness in knowledge of the foibles of humanity, his optimism, his power of picturing, his grace and immortal freshness make him beloved of the world. He borrowed his stories as Shakspeare did; he was the first to English them, and they are his, whether Dante or Petrarch or Boccaccio or old folks by the fire told them before or not. On the verdant ground of the spring time of a nation he planted a garden of perennial beauty. On the gray walls of a gloomy palace,—half-Saxon mead hall, half-feudal castle,—he hung a tapestry, filled with the crimson of love and the azure of hope. He waved his wand, and henceforth England was called “merrie.” His gaiety had the *naïveté* of a child,—of a child who does not doubt and who does not fear. It came from a heart that knew the beauty of Truth. All those high human qualities, which Christianity illuminates but does not create, were beloved of him. As in the cathedral carvings of his time, we find in his work strange things which modern taste, more delicate, rejects. Like all men of genius, he was of his time, but not of the worst of it. That he hated the faith that conserved beauty in England we may as soon believe as that Shakspeare would have torn the door from the tabernacle of his own church at Stratford, or blotted the “requiescat” from a neighbor’s tomb. Polemist he was not; crusader he was not; but what he was, in heart, we can guess from his prayer—

“Glorious mayde and moder, which that never¹
 Were bitter, neither in erthe nor in see,
 But ful of swetnesse and of mercy ever,
 Help that my fader be not wroth with me.”

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

¹A. B. C. Skeat.

THE STUDY OF CHURCH HISTORY—II.

X.

When Alexander, after many hardships, had crossed the Libyan desert and reached the oracle of Ammon, his curiosity went no farther than his own future and the measure of vengeance due to the murderers of his father, Philip. Whereupon old Maximus of Tyre observes that it was a pity he did not inquire about the sources of the Nile. What the youth of unequalled genius neglected modern science has accomplished, after the lapse of twenty-two centuries. Henceforth the immemorial mystery of the equatorial sources of the mighty river lies as open and intelligible to the veriest children as the headwaters of the Rhine or the St. Lawrence. We know now that it is a great, steady-flowing stream, fed by the rains of the tropics, deriving the original volume of its more than three thousand miles of flow from the vast inland reservoir of Victoria Nyanza; that its course is now broken by falls, now hemmed by forbidding cliffs, now expended in a network of channels, now swallowed in sands and vegetable flotsam, now swollen by deep affluents, until at last it reaches the region of cataracts and passes finally within the ken and control of civilized man. In the meantime it has drained almost endless tracts of "Dark Africa," and played thereby the chief rôle in the lives of countless tribes lost from all antiquity to the white man's culture, interests and influence.

In all this there is a certain analogy with the long and arduous process by which the Sources of Church History have been explored within the last three hundred years, from province to province of that wonderful land, from desert to desert, from one confluence to another, until we feel that to-day we stand not far from the last great secrets of the beneficent spiritual current that for nineteen centuries has gladdened the life of man.

When from some coign of vantage we look out on the map of the Church's life, and descry the infinite mental phenomena

that enliven it,—its currents, tendencies, movements, cataclysms, shallows and quicksands, breakers and cliffs, its ideals, policies and hypotheses, its finished and unfinished creations,—we are tempted to despair, as though in all this splendid confusion of things great and little, worthy and mean, there were no unity of scope or motion or life, no sufficient significance that a philosophic mind might hope to disengage therefrom. There are not a few, indeed, who turn away from the dread vision, struck with cynicism, as men were fabled to grow blind before the strong gaze of the Gorgon. The world of things ecclesiastical seems like the veriest “dancing-field of Mars,” where men meet but for conflict and mutual violence, where compulsion yields to rebellion, and rebellion to dissolution and anarchy, where nothing ends in unity and harmony, and all is forever the beginning of disruption and decay,—the analogon in spirituals to the restless flow of ocean.

Like Faustinian in the *Recognitions* of Clement, we ask what is the genesis of the miscellaneous past, how did it all come about? Is it a growth, and if so, is anything in it old, identical, permanent? Or is it all like a fugitive stream?

“*Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.*”

Are there deep, nourishing, vitalizing roots whence spring all the vigor of the trunk, all the branchage and foliage that shelter infinite life and glorify the landscape? Is there somewhere an attainable fountain-head, some spiritual Nyanza whence all flows, and which suffices to explain the million phenomena of history? Are there original laws, like those of the tides and currents of the sea, some divine astronomy, of precession and nutation, that govern the apparent fluctuation of all things and execute a cosmic justice in what appears the “Kingdom of Misrule,” an empire of shadows and phantasms?

XI.

The solution of such questions would bring us to the creation of philosophic history and eventually, perhaps, to a philosophy of history. But it can only come after the currents themselves have been recognized and numbered, after their affluents and feeders are located, after we have mapped out,

as far as human strength and ingenuity permit, the minute network of human causality, at least in its principal lines and sections. In other words, we must first construct a general chart of the Sources of History, in a manner analogous to that which is followed by the working geographer. We shall not at once have solved even the most pressing problems, but we shall know in what direction to labor, what paths and channels have been followed in vain, what mental equipment is needed to work successfully in others, what landmarks to keep in sight, what roads are at once shortest and safest between two points, what treasures may be looked for in given places, what useful observations are yet wanting, what junctions are yet to be made before the province can be declared open.

In the history of mankind there are many periods that need little or no exploration, if we prescind from the minor and secondary interests of history; but there are others that resemble a Nilotic morass where the true current is hard to seize. Then, too, there are places and times when commanding figures loom out giving sense and unity to the affairs of men, and there are others of wearisome flatness that have importance without charm or interest. There are great cataclysms, like those which produced the cataracts of the Nile, revolutions that give forever a new trend to history, and there are mighty confluences which have been drawing nearer for long centuries, until that hour of awe when the slow-gathering waters commingle at last, and the tiny streams of far-distant watersheds, born high up among the snows and the clouds, flow lovingly together through lands of verdure and sunshine in the splendid enormous volume of some Nile, Amazon or Mississippi. In any case, it is the duty of the historical student to seek out the original sources of each period, no matter how grudgingly they may flow, or how unattractive the story they convey.

What are the Sources of History? In general they are the known or attainable human testimony to the doings of past ages. And they are original or at first hand when they represent contemporary evidence, or what comes nearest to it. The object of history is the activity of man in the past in so far as it may be known. Now, the divine oracles aside, we have

no other way of knowing the past than by transmitted evidence. In this the rude Alaskan or Eskimo who scratches on horn or ivory a bear or walrus hunt does not differ essentially from Xenophon reciting the Retreat of the Ten Thousand or Thucydides repeating the Oration of Pericles over the fallen Athenians. The arts of style and criticism may heighten the tale, but it is equally in both cases a tale of human tradition. Insight, analogy, hypothesis, philosophy, are potent aids in rendering the truth,—but the first and most important thing is the objective truth of history itself. Until that is ascertained, until the kernel of real fact be secured, all the arts of narrative and embellishment are rather to be feared and mistrusted as tending to confound the personal and the subjective with the unchangeable essence of events that can no longer be undone.

XII.

The evidences of the past reach us by *Tradition and Monuments*, the former being usually oral or written. And first as regards Tradition. In embryonic society the human voice binds past, present and future. Whatever the head or heart suggested as worthy of transmission to posterity out of the *Erlebnisse* or experiences of men, be it matter of joy or woe, battle or adventure, ingenuity or wonder, came down from mouth to mouth, as torch kindled torch in the old Greek games. Necessity, ever the parent of invention, taught men how to fasten certain valuable traditions while *in transitu*, so that they might not be modified by that tongue which is as quick to alter as it is to transmit. They locked their traditions in the bonds of a rude metre, or they fixed some note of tone or accent on their recitation, or they prescribed time, place, ritual for the same. The saw, the proverb, the Welsh triad, the Teutonic Weisthümer, the Anglo-Saxon doom, were fixed in verse, so that any tampering with the original might be detected with ease by the interested listener. At times religion intervened, and by the use of archaic language and formulæ kept alive traditions considered vital for the common weal. In this manner opens the story of every family of mankind. Away back in the times of foundation are heard the voices of ancestors, more or less faint, more or less numerous

and intelligent. Like Dante before the shade of Cacciaguida, we learn from them a few elemental facts, and then they vanish beyond recall. Even the Jews had their pre-Mosaic traditions. The tribes of Africa, the American Indians, the various members of the great Aryan family of nations, have all in some degree preserved some primitive tradition come down by word of mouth alone. We know now, from the science of folk-lore that even in the most cultured nations there is a respectable code of prehistoric belief and custom which has crossed the ages without the aid of writing, maintained in the popular consciousness by the archaic oral agency of tale, song, fable or allegory.

Nevertheless, there comes a time when the limitations of the human voice and memory as sole sources of tradition are keenly felt. Already rude monuments supply their defects,—the monuments of the dead, cairn, barrow, tumulus; monuments of religious cult, the amorphous block of wood or stone, the painted pole or post, the gigantic menhir and cromlech, the deified objects of nature; political and social monuments like the seats of organized life, the fortified pass or hill-top, the ford or bridge, the centers of gathering or distribution. But these, though sources of history, are largely so through the medium of human tradition, without which they are as dumb as the sea or the clouds.

Here we meet with the second great channel of tradition,—the use of signs, natural or conventional, for the fixation of such data as seem important to human society. This is the beginning of writing, and its invention marks, generally speaking, the passage from barbarism to civilization.¹ There is a subtle popular justice in the old Greek idea, borrowed from the Egyptians, that the Cadmean art was owing to the intervention of the gods. Even in modern times religion has been the benefactress who brought the knowledge or use of letters to the Irish, the Teutons, the Slavs, and other barbarous or

¹ It is time that educated people should realize distinctly what is perhaps the most important result of recent Oriental research. This is the vast antiquity of literature and the use of writing in the ancient Oriental world. Long before the days of Moses, or even Abraham, the Egyptians and Babylonians were people devoted to reading and writing; books and schools were multiplied among them, and libraries existed filled with the literary treasures of the past. Sayce, "The Archæological Witness to the Literary Activity of the Mosaic Age," in *Lex Mosaicæ*, p. 9, London, 1894. Cf. Iwan Müller, *Handbuch der Alterthumswissenschaften*, I. 497.

semi-civilized peoples. But the uses of writing were not always so easily acquired. The materials were long unknown or gotten with difficulty. And it took time to create a systematic language.¹ The inscribed rock, the graffiti on the wall of the cave-dwelling, archaic attempts at rune or ogham, mark, perhaps, the first steps in this direction. Later on, materials less durable but more handy and accessible, came into vogue. Bone, horn, ivory, stone, slate marble, plates of bronze, gold, silver, blocks of wood or waxed surfaces, baked clay, the leaves and bark of trees, pulpous fruit, roots, stalks,—whatever would hold the sign-language of man,—were used for the transmission of written tradition.²

Of all these materials of tradition, clay, papyrus and parchment or the prepared skin of beasts, have been the real carriers of the world's history. Of the clay tablets that have revealed to us in the nineteenth century the mysteries of Oriental war and peace, science and administration, we shall say nothing; it is a field of knowledge just broken into, and the inventory of our inheritance is scarcely completed; indeed, each year brings bewildering news of fresh finds.³

The Nilotic reed, triangular and tapering, known as papyrus or *βύβλος* (the *Cyperus Papyrus* of Linnaeus), was at some very remote date adapted to the purposes of writing. It would seem from Theophrastus that, like the cocoa-palm, it was a kind of minor providence for the Copts,—furnishing not only food for the poor, but various materials needed by a riverain population,—ropes for rigging, tow for caulking, and

¹ Taught as we are to read and write in early childhood, we hardly realize the place this wondrous art fills in civilized life, till we see how it strikes the barbarian who has not even a notion that such a thing can be. . . . The invention of writing was the great movement by which mankind rose from barbarism to civilization. How vast its effect was may be measured by looking at the low condition of tribes still living without it, dependent on memory for their traditions and rules of life, and unable to amass knowledge or order by keeping record of events and storing up new observations for the use of future generations. Thus it is no doubt right to draw the line between barbarism and civilization where the art of writing comes in, for this gives permanence to history, law and science. Tylor, *Anthropology. An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization*, pp. 179-180. New York, 1896.

² *The Beginnings of Writing* (Appleton), New York, 1895 by Walter J. Hoffman, M. D., and *Prehistoric Art, or the Origin of Art as manifested in the works of prehistoric man*, by Thomas Wilson, Washington, 1898. Also, Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*. New York, 1897, p. 220.

³ Peters, *Nippur, or Explorations and Adventures on the Euphrates*, New York, (Putnam) 1899, Vol. I, pp. 137-140, and Sayce, *The Ancient Empires of the East*. New York (Scribner) 1894, pp. 164-176.

the like. It seems to have been indigenous along the Middle Nile, in Nubia, and to have been found also in Syria to some extent, whence, under the Arabs, it made its way to Sicily. By cutting the stem longitudinally into strips, laying the same across one another very closely at right angles, covering the mass with some glutinous paste, pressing and drying it in the sun, and polishing it with some very smooth instrument like ivory, the Egyptian obtained a durable surface to which he could commit the thoughts he desired to transmit to posterity.

Very old, too, is the use of parchment, or the skins of animals dressed, died, stretched on frames, cleaned carefully with fleshing knife and pumice stone, until a perfectly even surface is obtained. A new method of preparing it is attributed to a king of Pergamos, in the second century before Christ,—hence the name of *περγαμηνή* or paper of Pergamos, though its use is of course many centuries older.¹

XIII.

For the purpose of complete enumeration we may say that Tradition is *oral*, *plastic* or *written*, according as its content has reached us principally by word of mouth, on monuments, or by writing. Again, the objects of tradition may reach us by more than one of these channels, even by all three at the same time.

By oral tradition is understood, not only certain reliable knowledge transmitted from person to person, but also the content of popular tales, sagas, anecdotes, proverbs, historical or religious chants, legends, myths,—in a word, a great *corpus* of narrations or records more or less reliable, which owe their preservation to an unbroken personal interest in their retention and transmission. This interest may be a public or a private one; it may be religious, literary, political, or merely human-social,—nevertheless to it is owing the salvage of a

¹ On the invention and earliest use of papyrus and parchment see Birt, *Das Antike Buchwesen*, Berlin, 1882; ch. II, p. 46-54, and Wattenbach, *Das Schriftwesen im Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1875 pp. 91-123. That parchment (*membranae*, *δερβίραι*) was used in very ancient times in the Orient is proved by the reference of Diodorus Siculus (II, 31) to the royal parchments of the Persians,—their sacred writings alone being confided to twelve hundred ox skins. In the *Revue Archéologique* (XV, 1 sqq.) M. Chabas describes what he calls the "oldest book in the world, the Egyptian Papyrus Priso," said to date from 2000 B. C., and containing in eighteen finely written pages miscellaneous material, notably one tract of fourteen pages which declares itself to be only a perfect copy of an older book.

multitude of human *dicta et acta* that in its absence or impotency would never have reached us in any manner. Given certain conditions of civilization, the popular memory is both retentive and affectionate; it embalms the essence of lives, situations, great deeds, great joys, great sorrows, and later gives up these same memories stripped, perhaps, of all that was local, transitory, insignificant. The popular mind is not unlike the bed of ocean with its fabled property of transmutation by which nothing in it—

“ But doth suffer a sea change
Into something rich and strange.”

Who would believe, until it was done, that a whole national epic, the Wainamöinen of the Finns, could be collected from the mouths of the people? Who imagined that there was yet so much genuine interest in their remotest past among the peasantry of Ireland until some Douglas Hyde began to make his way among them, ere the chilling science of these last days shall kill outright the delicate romantic feeling of an ancient folk? One may now put some trust, at least in the color and the spirit of the cycles of Cuchullin and Finn, since we are aware of the influence they exercised upon the course of Irish literature since it fell into the hands of Christians.¹

By Monuments we usually understand any original remnants of historical events that may have reached our own time. They differ from Tradition which represents these events themselves, in so far as they have been apprehended by the human intellect and handed down from mind to mind as

¹ I have tried on another occasion, to give some idea of what must have been the content of ancient oral tradition at a time when men trusted to it alone for the uses of history. “No doubt there was (among the ancient Kelts) a large popular literature of battle-songs, the raw material of some glorious future epic, splendid tales and chants of rude but grand sublimity, chapters of history in which fact and legend were intertwined like the rugged headlands and their enshrouding mists on the wintry coasts of Kerry,—just such a *rudis indigestaque moles* of literature as a warlike, ardent, sensitive and poetic race produces amid the scenes of untutored nature and during the hard training of war and wandering. The want of an alphabet and a fixed political régime has prevented all this from reaching us. Strange tales there surely were of the long journeys across the border lands of Asia and Europe; of the old Aryan fatherland; of battles, feuds and forays; of love and death and stirring adventure; of the sack of Rome and the forcing of Thermopylae, of the overthrow of kings of Pergamos and descendants of Alexander. What would we not give for some undeniable echoes of that tender, flexible, lyric tongue of the Kelts, while there was yet a vast though loose political unity among them, when they went wildly conquering on the Danube and the Ebro, in the happy climes of Spain and Italy, or on the classic soil of Greece and the islands of the Midland Sea, perhaps with great Carthage herself, who was wont to hire their bands as mercenary soldiers?” “Ancient Keltic Literature,” in *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, July, 1894, pp. 469-470.

through a channel. The distinction is by no means a hard and fast one; not unfrequently the traditional and monumental elements are to be found imbedded in the same object; nevertheless, it seems to differentiate roughly the enormous mass of historical materials, and to bring order and method into the collection of original sources, as well as into such comment and application as they may later on receive.

XIV.

In the attempt to secure firm ground for the study of history it may not be amiss to look more closely into the nature of the two sources described as Tradition and Monuments. Tradition, we have seen, suffers a division into plastic, oral, and written, according as the conscious transmission of facts and happenings is done by the use of essentially artistic material, by word of mouth, or by writing on surfaces at once specially prepared and portable. Thus, under the rubric of *plastic tradition* we may classify paintings, sculptured work, engraved surfaces, coins, plaques,—whatever hard and durable materials have been used, intentionally or not, to preserve for posterity the knowledge of the past. The painted halls of Egyptian temples, Etruscan tombs, and Pompeian villas, the sculptured marvels of Persepolis and the rock-temples of Ellora, the primitive Doric money, the cuneiform tablets of Niniveh, the waxed or leaden “diploma” of the Roman soldier,—all such are examples of ancient and reliable use of the raw material of the arts for purposes of history. By *oral tradition* we understand the entire cycle of historical materials which have survived chiefly by transition from mouth to mouth, without any extrinsic material aid. In this manner there has come down an incalculable quantity of tales, sagas, anecdotes, proverbs, popular chants of every description, legend, myth, fable, and all that scholars to-day range within the limits of the new science of folk-lore. Naturally, the quantity of such tradition is greater in pre-historic times, among peoples rude or semi-cultured, while among the civilized peoples the tendency is even stronger to entrust the events of history to the custody of writing. So we reach the province of *written tradition*, whose boundaries are very wide. To it belong all surfaces inscribed with the intent of transmission to posterity, all

genealogies or accounts of family descent, the calendars or time-indexes prepared for religious or legal purposes, the annals or records of events from year to year, the chronicles, which are only annals made continuous, enriched with abundant materials, and like the annals usually attached to some institution,—king, emperor, pope, bishop, abbot or order. Here, too, belong all biographies, profane or religious, all memoirs and notes of happenings,—in a word, all written forms of history from the rudest archaic historical epigraph to the labors of Bollandist and Benedictine.

When the ancients left us the names of the Seven Wise Men of Greece and the Seven Wonders of the World they may have been vaguely moved by the ideas of Tradition and Monuments, incorporating in the former the useful knowledge handed down from man to man, and in the latter the supremest material efforts of man's labor and genius. In any case man has dealt so mightily with nature and time that to some extent he has risen above them and forced them to cry out ceaselessly his manifold greatness. In this brittle and delicate shell of the body there energizes a celestial spirit that throws out forever shadows of itself endowed with vitality enough to challenge time and change and accident. So the solemn thought of Egypt dominates the ages from the tops of obelisk and pyramid. So Greece lifts up forever from among the ruins of the Acropolis her plastic, symbolizing hand. So the iron will, the selfish heart, the cruel earthiness of Rome, look down unceasingly from the broken arches of the Colosseum. In his monumental works man somehow escapes, if not death, at least the ignominy of silence, the last shame of oblivion. They are the impregnable fortress of the genius of his race, and it was not without a subtle instinct that the mediæval fancy ascribed the great cathedrals to demoniac or angelic impulses,—so supramundane seemed the labors of an Erwin von Steinbach or an Arnolfo di Lapo. Even nature itself must become the monument of man, whether for purposes of vanity or commerce or war, it matters little. The leveled mountain, the mighty mound, the deflected river, the valley dammed up and made an inland sea, the rifled veins and arteries of the mines, the white rifts in the marble hill-side, the terraced mountain exchanging golden wine for pebbles and torrents, the irrigated

plain blossoming into richest harvests,—all these are nameless monuments of the thought of man in its varied flights of grandeur or folly. What resistance is there in nature when a Stocrates could promise Alexander that he would turn Mount Athos into a statue of the conqueror, with a city of ten thousand inhabitants in his left hand and a swift-flowing river in his right!

XV.

As the result of unequalled labors and good fortune we are enabled to-day to divide the Monuments of human activity in the past into *Remains* (*Reliquiae*, *Avanzi*, *Ueberreste*) and *Memorials*. To be more particular, the historian means by *Remains* whatever survives of the individual man himself, his sepulchre with its ornaments, his skeleton, his barrows and middings, his dwellings in cliff and cave and lake. Piety, interest, fear, chance, have saved an incredible amount of knowledge concerning man in antiquity or outside civilization, largely gathered from the mysterious precincts of the grave, that borderland between the realm of history and a holier realm where there is no history, because there is no change, only the absolute fixity of an eternal Yea. Among such relics of the past must also be counted the forms of human speech, the tongues of all mankind, cultured and savage. Indeed, the modern sciences of philology, anthropology, and ethnology have for the first time revealed what a world of history clings everywhere to the poor handful of dust that we call man.

For the historian human society is like a vast forest whose floor is formed by infinite mold-layers of previous vegetation, each bearing witness to the features of earth in its own day; like a great ocean in whose numberless bays and inlets the jetsam and flotsam of life is piled up, the gold with the scoria, the precious with the refuse; like a huge Mykenae where one civilization acts as tombstone to another, hiding and embalming, but also transmitting and sanctifying. Among the principal relics that society thus enshrines and transmits from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture, are certain general conditions of human life,—manners and customs, those *mores* ever old and ever new, the feasts or public rejoicings of peoples, their games, their memorial solemnities, their institutions of public or domestic life, their laws, political constitutions and the

like. Then, too, society in a general way protects the product of the physical and mental labor of the race,—books, which shelter the arts and the sciences; coins, or the means of commercial life; weapons, or the means of self-preservation; the works of architecture, in which human genius rises to all the varied fulness of its powers. There is an innate social impulse to preserve the memory of great political meetings of men,—councils, parliaments, diets,—together with discourses, relations, reports, pamphlets, letters, the “accepta et expensa” of administration. Some unselfish piety or affection toward posterity is accountable for this constant selection and transmission of the principal pages of our own story as we journey along the great way of the centuries, grateful for a similar legacy to us from those failing hands whose burden we have been called to take up.

These various kinds of human remains have all a monumental character, because they are themselves original fragments, survivals of the events they commemorate, and because they fulfil an historical function in the unconscious revelation of the past that emanates from them, singly or collectively, visible to all or only to the practised eye of the critic and the student. But there is another class of historical remains which have reached us, bearing the avowed intention of warning, instruction, edification. These are *Monuments* in the strictest sense of the word, being set up in a durable manner for the express purpose of conveying information to posterity. Such are all charters, diplomas, privileges, all official documentary papers of a juridical character and value, meant to secure rights and concessions against the ignorance or bad will of later comers. They are the “*Monumenta Priorum*,” that every society recognizes and venerates, whether they be kept in the tabularium of the *Praefectus Urbis*, or the muniment-room of some mediæval abbey, or the registry of deeds and titles of some brand-new city that rises over the mines of Butte or Kimberley. Akin to these, only, as a rule, of a more public character, are *Historical Inscriptions* set up with the intention of informing or edifying posterity. They may be of world-wide importance like the *Monumentum Ancyranum*, or they may merely chronicle the infamy of peculators in the public corn-funds like those bronze tablets that once stared the visitor

in the palace of the Doges,—their object is an historical one, and they are among the most prized sources of history, since they are public, free from collusion, and beyond suspicion of forgery or tampering,—brief but sure and authoritative voices, green oases in the desert of pyrrhonism. Finally, there are those public remains which the popular sense with great justice reckons as the principal monuments of history, great architectural works raised by men *ad aeternam rei memoriam*, whether it be the stone set up by Jacob or that “glorious heap of funeral” which mocked the Thracian billows and proclaimed the virtues of Patroclus. The memorial cairn is as old as mankind, which dearly loves to mark the last resting place of its great or dear ones by some imperishable sign. No man knows where lie the bones of Moses, and those of Alaric rest forever beneath the flow of Busento. But these are exceptions. The Mausoleum of Hadrian, the Taje Mehal of Shah Jehan, the sky-piercing Shaft of Washington, represent better the usual attitude of the human mind, that delights in preaching to posterity from cairn, shaft, mound, tower, or dome, and, with some Babel-like perversity, is forever willing to exhaust its resources in monuments that promise defiance to time and ignorance.

XVI.

Where shall the student find the historical materials thus classified? Or rather, in what great collections have they been brought together? In some departments, that of written tradition, there is now little or no reason for complaint. Public and private enterprise have brought together since the Renaissance nearly all that is of value to our modern world, and made these treasures accessible and serviceable from nearly every point of view. The mass of oral tradition is being slowly laid up, studied and sifted. Out of these labors has come the science of folk-lore with its numerous votaries, its societies at home and abroad. The time seems far distant when its students shall feel that they have ransacked sufficiently the conscience of humanity in its remotest and least visited recesses. Learned and observant travel, the establishment of museums, applied ethnology, anthropology, geography, the intelligent curiosity and devotion of public servants, swell yearly the fund of oral traditions that remain to humanity, and cause men to

hope seriously for a scientific and accurate history of all pre-historic times, freed from prejudice and interest or any pre-occupation alien to the facts and the evidences.¹

Similarly, the subject-matter of plastic tradition is far from being all collected and easily accessible. We have histories of painting, according to schools and nations and times and tendencies, catalogues of all galleries and all areas of excavation, countless attempts to bring together the work of the engraver, endless volumes of coins, ancient, mediæval, modern, imperial, national, papal. But nothing like a unity of plan has yet been evolved, whereby the whole material of plastic tradition can be easily got at by the student of history.

It is different, however, when we approach the written materials that Tradition and the Monuments furnish us. Inscriptions, histories, annals, chronicles, biographies, memoirs; acts of councils, diets, parliaments; correspondence of popes, emperors, kings and republics; reports of nuncios and ambassadors; accounts of customs, revenues, tax-rolls; laws, rescripts, decrees; constitutions of states and cities, rules of religious orders; the literary labors of every nation and corporation,—in a word, every form of written tradition has submitted to analysis and synthesis, and to-day finds its material recognized and classified,—more or less completely,—nevertheless, assigned its place and office in the vast archive of historical materials that the last three centuries have created.

On another occasion we shall attempt to describe, in a general way, how far the science of Church History has profited by this progress. The Church has her own peculiar life, spirit, action, scope,—hence we shall expect to find the Sources of Church History a field of study quite distinct from anything else in the history of humankind. We shall see at the same time that it is impossible to pursue it without steady reference to political and institutional history,—indeed, to every interest that has substantially affected man or society.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

¹ The publications and transactions of the English and American folk lore societies furnish a good starting point for the study of the *mare magnum* of existing oral tradition.

MORAL THEOLOGY AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

In writing under this broad title, we do not propose to treat all the questions which might naturally suggest themselves to the reader. Such a work would take us far beyond the limits of a simple article, for it would necessitate a review of systems, principles and methods now in vogue; detailed examination of the condition of the science in seminaries and universities, and of its relation to the problems of modern life. That in turn would imply a critical review of the history of some centuries for the purpose of tracing out with accuracy the thousand converging lines of cause and condition which have produced the actual status of Moral Theology.

Inviting as is that field of investigation, we confine ourselves to narrower limits. We wish merely to call attention to the place which the science actually holds in the group of sciences to which it belongs, to indicate the faults therein, to explain the causes and conditions which have produced them, and to hint at the methods to be employed in order to re-instate Moral Theology in the place to which its dignity and character entitle it.¹

I.—PRESENT CONDITION OF MORAL THEOLOGY.

In order to fix the reader's attention at once, we may begin with the statement that the present condition of Moral Theology is in strange contradiction with its intrinsic character and with the spirit of the day. When we consider the time and talent devoted to the study of the moral sciences in our day, the efforts made to improve methods and to awaken the public to a sense of their importance, we must regretfully admit that Moral Theology has failed to keep pace with the times.

Ten years ago Cardinal d'Annibale wrote: "*Eloquar? Sensim sine sensu prope consenesCIMUS; nam . . . quasi viribus*

¹ We have treated these matters in various publications. See especially *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, pp. 1-139.

deficientes, compendiariis lucubrationibus contenti sumus, et ea quae veteres Theologi longe lateque versarunt, attingimus vix summis digitis, et praesertim ea quae ad justitiam pertinent. Aliud hujus aetatis incommodum esse videtur, quod, indulgentiores facti, quasi assentari humanae imbecillitati vide-mur"¹ Soon after that, a writer in the *Civiltà Cattolica* commented on the Cardinal's words as follows: "It is a fact, deplorable but too true and evident to any one who has carefully followed the development of the study of Moral Theology for the past forty years. With few exceptions, we have a mass of compendiums made and fashioned with a somnolency almost senile, without a trace of profound study or exact criticism. If one happen to find some proof of diligence, it has been used merely in collecting and copying the sayings of others. That is the view which greets one. In speaking thus, we do not by any means disapprove of compendiums; on the contrary, we recognize their necessity for the student. What we do condemn, however, is the carelessness with which they are made; the habit of representing as different, opinions which are identical; of citing authorities which have little or no bearing on a question, without having read them; of repeating with unparalleled *naïveté*, sophisms and arguments which have been examined, discussed, refuted countless times. In a word, we condemn the lack of precision, of erudition, of a critical habit in moral science. This reprinting, or more exactly, this collecting of different opinions is well described by the *consenes-cimus* and *vix attingimus summis digitis* of Cardinal d'Annibale."² Much in the same spirit Father Berthier, O. P., said recently, in speaking of manuals of Dogmatic and Moral Theology, "The literature of modern manuals must be considered as one of the plagues of theological science."³

Such being the case, it is not strange that Moral Theology has lost its place among the sciences of life. Instead of reigning among them as a queen, it is hardly recognized as an equal;

¹ *Summula Theol. Moralis* III Ed., Vol. 1, p. 12, proemium. Regarding the excessive tendency to which the Cardinal's "indulgentiores" points; cf. Mgr. Isoard, bishop of Annecy: *Le système du moins possible et demain dans la société chrétienne*. Paris, 1896; C. 10-14, App. 6.

² *Civiltà Cattolica*, ser XIV, Vol. 6, p. 443.

³ Maitre Thomas et St. Ignace Réplique au R. P. Brucker, S. J. Louvain, 1896, p. 31, note 3. Cf. Gayrand, Questions du jour, XI.

instead of being consulted by those who direct human activity in its different spheres, its very existence is all but ignored. Though this condition is due in a measure to the decadence of the Christian spirit, still that does not explain all. The science has failed to put itself in touch with new currents of thought; failed to anticipate problems of life and to win consideration for the solutions which it offers. Modern civilization has forced to the foreground serious problems which properly belong to the domain of Moral Theology, but the world has not asked that science for guidance in meeting them. Even the clergy seem to be satisfied with the narrow professional side, for when important questions arise, such as those of wages, property in land, education; they as a rule seek solutions not in a profound study of the principles of Moral Theology, but elsewhere.

Still more, the very method followed in the teaching of Moral Theology is sometimes a source of doubt and difficulty to many. Though we might enumerate instances taken from the average seminary life, we prefer to mention but one case, striking and typical. It is that of the celebrated Ausonio Franchi, whose conversion was such a source of joy to the Church. His biographer says of him: "The comparison of doctrines learned from seminary manuals with those taught by other authors, the divergence of opinion among moralists on a majority of questions and the practice of the confessional, awakened grave doubts in the conscience of the young priest and caused a serious unrest in his mind. To instruct himself and bring peace to his soul, he undertook the study of the theological principles whence opinions on moral questions are derived, and though he was dealing with controversies legitimately discussed in the Church and differently settled by theologians, he came to the conclusion (wrongly as he later admitted) that his seminary studies had not been directed in a spirit of truth, but rather with a sectarian bias, and that, when he thought he had finished he found it necessary to commence again."¹

Nor is that the worst feature of the case. The nature and object of Moral Theology are being entirely forgotten or

¹ Ausonio Franchi, by Angelo Angelini, p. 16. Cf. *Ultima Critica*, p. 1, c. 2, § 3, n. 116.

misrepresented. Proof is seen in a recent book which has been widely read and much praised for its stimulating character and suggestive views: "Our Seminaries," by Rev. J. Talbot Smith. We find there stated the following: "Moral Theology may have the *fifth* place without dispute (after holy scripture, philosophy, dogmatic theology, literature) but it should never be higher in the most limited and starved curriculum. Of its very nature it must rank second to the preceding studies. It is in one sense simply a *method of applying certain principles* to human conditions, and whatever the genius employed in its development and expression, it ranks only with the science of law. It must shift its interpretations with the shifting circumstances of races and nations. . . . It is a noble science, and the writer has no disposition to speak of it with indifference, or to diminish its claims to respect. But it must keep its place, and avoid pretensions. It cannot rank with the study of the Scriptures, which is the study of Christ; nor with the study of philosophy, which is the study of man; nor with dogma, which is the mind of the Church; nor yet with literature, which is the mind of the people, expressed in all ages and under innumerable conditions. It is next to these, because it is the immediate instrument of the priest in his ministry to the people; without which his service would lack efficiency, and might easily lapse into raggedness. It can hold the fifth place with ease, for it is a facile science in its elements, practical and therefore dear to the hard-headed student with more vocation than brains, indispensable forevermore, and attractive to geniuses whose talents have legal bent, a twist toward the work of making statutes and renewing them to fit the uneasy nature of man."¹ When one reads that page for the first time, one thinks of an Aristotle, a St. Augustine, a St. Thomas, a Suarez, whose transcendent genius never appeared to better advantage than in their writings on the principles of moral science; one recalls the great Franciscus Victoria, who called theology the first of sciences, to which nothing was foreign,

¹ P. 270. Our purpose is not to refute the views here expressed. It is to call attention to a view of the nature and method of Moral Theology, which is unfortunately too widely shared. We make the citation with some embarrassment, for in the context from which the extract is taken, the author of the work pays an unmerited tribute to the writer of this article.

and who believed that this explained why there were so few really great theologians; or again, one understands how, in the seventeenth century, a subtle and original writer could have bitterly complained about those who tried to write on Moral Theology without sufficient preparation in metaphysics, logic and the sciences, unaided save by a dose of common sense.¹ One is forced, in a word, to the melancholy conclusion that Moral Theology, the science of those principles which should direct man towards the supreme end of his existence, is in our day fallen exceedingly low, since even its friends scarcely recognize it and then manage to make room for it below philosophy and after literature!

Such is the situation. Moral Theology is all but an outcast. It is no longer recognized as possessing the dignity and rank it once had when genius loved to spend itself in elucidating its principles. Dwarfed beyond recognition, it is an adjunct, a mere technical necessity for the priest. Before attempting to examine the condition in detail and explain the causes which have led to it, we wish to sketch ever so briefly the essential conditions of all theology, in particular of moral; to show its place in that order which alone corresponds to reality.²

II.—THE PLACE AND THE CHARACTER OF MORAL THEOLOGY.

I. As in the objective order all things are related to one another, forming a vast system whose crowning point is the Supreme Being to whom all is subject, so all sciences are related, and they form a system whose climax is the science of the Supreme Being.³ Though it is beyond the powers of any individual to master all sciences, no matter how remarkable his genius or patient his industry, yet the ensemble of the sciences

¹ Caramuel. *Theol. Mor. Fund.* Francf. 1652, p. 27.

² We speak of course of Catholic Moral Theology alone. Moral Theology was never seriously and methodically studied by non-Catholics. It scarcely finds place in their curricula of studies; possibly a couple of hours a week for a semester. President Harper of Chicago does not even mention it in his recent article in the *American Journal of Theology* where he reviews the entire theological curriculum and suggests some reforms. Phillip Schaff said that "English and American literature is very poor in works of Christian ethics." So dire, indeed, is this poverty that Hurst, in a painful effort to lengthen the list of *Christian* moralists, adds to it the names of Kant, Spencer, Spinoza, even of Marcus Aurelius and Seneca. *Literature of Theology*, p. 482.

³ Cf. M. Billia, *L'unità dello scibile e la filosofia della morale*. Turin, 1898.

has been a favorite subject of study from time immemorial. The wish to construct the hierarchy of sciences has given rise to much interesting speculation. The efforts of Aristotle and St. Thomas, collective encyclopedias, classifications of sciences now much more numerous than ever,¹ universities where in all sciences are taught or are supposed to be taught—all such are results of man's insatiable longing to reach final unity in knowledge. If the sciences, then, are closely related to one another, the understanding of those relations is essential if one wish to master a science. Hence it is that man's ability to master any science is in direct proportion to the breadth of his knowledge beyond its field. It is strange that a truth so trite as this should be so often ignored. The separation of Theology from the other sciences does violence to it and to them. No university centre can be complete without it. True enough, some have denied that Theology is a science; they have refused to accord it a place among the sciences and its chairs have been excluded from scientific centers. Those who maintain this position justify it by appealing to the *autonomy of human reason* and the need of *unity in the positive method*. Others, to justify its admission to a place among the sciences, have thought fit to mutilate it or circumscribe its limits.² But

¹One of the latest attempts in this line is *L'essai sur la classification des sciences*, Edmond-Goblot, Paris, 1898.

²It is a well-known fact that the French universities, as now organized, have no faculty of Catholic theology, though there are some faculties of Protestant theology. How this anomalous situation is to be explained, and especially how it harmonizes with "equal rights to all religions," is not at present our concern. We wish, however, to note that it is not the Catholics who begrudge Protestant theology its place in the university, but rather the free-thinkers and the secularizers. In answer to their objections, M. A. Sabatier has published, in the *Revue internationale de l'enseignement supérieur* (Nov., 1898), an article entitled: *Les facultés de théologie protestantes et les études scientifiques dans les Universités*. Some of its passages are suggestive. Here, for instance, is an objection as he presents it: "On pourrait d'abord soulever une sorte de question préalable. Ce qui constitue, l'unité de la science, et, par suite, une université moderne, c'est l'unité de méthode. Cette unité repose sur l'autonomie interne de la raison, c'est-à-dire sur l'incbranlable certitude qu'a l'esprit moderne de posséder en soi la norme souveraine de ses idées et de ses actes. L'évidence rationnelle, l'expérience positive, la critique libre,—tels sont les principes ou les conditions premières de tout travail scientifique digne de ce nom; tel est le lien qui rattache en un faisceau puissant et homogène toutes les branches de la science. Une faculté de théologie peut-elle pratiquer cette méthode et entrer loyalement dans la solidarité intime de cet organisme?"

And here is M. Sabatier's reply: "On comprend à la rigueur qu'une telle objection soit élevée à propos des facultés de théologie Catholiques, qu'on suppose, à tort suivant moi, réglées par la méthode d'autorité. En fait, la méthode autoritative, c'est-à-dire, la méthode proprement scolastique, ne règne souverainement pour les Catholiques que dans une seule discipline, dans l'étude du dogme. Mais on ne voit pas que dans les autres, dans l'archéologie, dans la critique des textes par exemple,

such errors are mere accidents, quite contrary to the deeper tendencies of the human mind ; a natural reaction will in time deliver us from them.¹

II. The truths of religion, which form the object of theology, combine, in turn, into one system whose parts are intimately related.² The genius of the theologian is shown by his power to bring out this unity ; to so analyze, subordinate and coör-

sauf quelques points réservés, un savant Catholique manque de liberté, au point de ne pouvoir rien faire de scientifique. La réalité dément ici une logique trop prompte. Il y a des facultés Catholiques nationales dans les universités allemandes, et elles y rendent d'incontestables services. Croit-on que des hommes tels que l'abbé Duchesne, le père Denifle, l'abbé Batifol, l'abbé Bouquet et d'autres encore, ne tiendraient pas bien leur place dans une université. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut reconnaître que si l'objection a quelque chose de spécieux pour les catholiques, elle n'a aucune raison d'être à l'égard des facultés protestantes. Dans le protestantisme, il n'y a ni autorité fixe, ni tribunal dogmatique infallible, et, dès lors, le travail scientifique n'y saurait être arrêté ou bridé par aucun pouvoir." . . . Details aside, we would simply observe that this answer, taken as a whole, involves a pitiable equivocation. If real university methods require the autonomy, the absolute independence of human reason, and if, on the other hand, Protestant theology takes divine revelation for its basis, then evidently there is no more room in a university for Protestant theology than for Catholic. Brought face to face with the Word of God, the Protestant must accept it ; his scientific research is *arrêté, bridé*.

Under like pressure, Jean Réville, a colleague of M. Sabatier, chose as the subject of his opening discourse, in October, 1858: La théologie partie intégrante du cycle universitaire et fondement indispensable de la réformation. He endeavors to show that theological studies must have a strictly scientific character in order to hold a place in the university, and that university teaching cannot neglect the investigation of religious phenomena without self-mutilation. Now, let us see what his notion of theology is : " La théologie moderne n'est autre chose que la science de la religion. Elle a pour objet les faits et les phénomènes de la vie religieuse dans le passé et dans le présent, sans aucune restriction de race, de temps, de confession ecclésiastique. . . . C'est d'abord une science historique, parce qu'elle se propose de connaître et de vérifier les faits et les textes religieux du passé au moyen de la méthode critique. C'est ensuite une science psychologique. En effet, après avoir étudié la religion dans ses innombrables manifestations du passé, elle étudie le phénomène religieux dans l'homme vivant de nos jours ; elle observe, recueille, et analyse les sentiments religieux, la nature propre de la foi, les expériences religieuses, dont l'étude contemporaine jette le plus souvent un jour si précieux sur la vie du passé. Elle scrute les rapports de la religion avec la vie morale individuelle ou sociale ; elle cherche les relations qui existent entre le développement religieux et le développement intellectuel bref elle fait une analyse aussi complète que possible des facultés religieuses de l'homme. Enfin c'est une science philosophique ou dogmatique ; car après avoir réuni tous les matériaux que l'histoire et la psychologie religieuse peuvent lui fournir, elle s'efforce de les co-ordonner en une construction d'ensemble." *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, November-December, 1898.

¹ Signs of such a reaction are not wanting. Such, among others, are the letters on "Scientific Instruction among the Catholic Clergy," by Mgr. Baunard, Rector of the Catholic University of Lille, the "Report" on the same subject presented by Professor Senderens at the last national congress in Paris, and, from a non-Catholic source, President Harper's reflection on the curriculum (*American Journal of Theology*, III, 1).

² They are naturally divided into three groups, *theoretical, practical, social or political*. The division is suggested by the Symbol, the Decalogue, and the Sacrament ; it corresponds to the threefold character of Christ as Teacher, Priest and King ; and to the threefold power of the Church, *magisterium, ministerium, imperium*. *Euntes docete . . . baptizantes . . . servare quaecumque mandavi*. Cfr. Franzelin, *De Traditione*, th. XII, sch. 1, pr. 2.

dinate the whole field of religious truth that the nature of the parts and their relations to one another and to the whole may be clearly seen. It is a task reserved for genius of the highest order. Such a genius was St. Thomas; such a work is admirably done in his *Summa*. Therein theology is represented as it should be, as a harmonious whole, a living organism. The attempt to study one portion of the field of theology, therefore, to the neglect or exclusion of any other, must be fatal. The separation of the practical truths, which are the subject-matter of moral science, from the theoretical and social, can be fraught only with evil consequences. Father Kleutgen, S. J., who has done so much to revive interest in scholasticism, has expressed the thought in this manner: "*Moralis doctrina cum dogmatica multis in locis, ita cognata et concreta est ut divelli nisi violenter non possit; ut in quaestionibus de sacramentis, de gratia, justificatione et merito, de fine hominis etc. Sed ea quoque quae separari non incommode queunt, altera ab alteris illustrantur; quare praestat secundum veterum morem, utramque in unum doctrinae corpus redigere.*"¹ It is no surprise, consequently, to find that those who have attained eminence in one field of Theology should have been authorities also in the others, as Palavicini remarked in speaking of Lugo: "*Neque fuit in contemplatrici theologia subtilior quam in morali prudentior; quamvis ego hujus postremae conjunctionis decus non tanquam singulare aliquid suspexerim. Rarum hoc esse atque insociabile dictitant homunciones nonnulli, quibus expediret, ipsam unius doctrinae vacuitatem alterius esse probabilem conjecturam; perinde ac si vera omnia, atque adeo scientiae omnes, cognato foedere, non coirent; perinde ac si quaecumque rata conclusio in rerum agendarum quaestionibus, ex meditantis philosophiae initiis, non emergeret; perinde ac si metaphysica non esset disciplinarum omnium praeceptrix ac parens. Quid enim? Annon, quem modo laudavi, Aristoteles inter ethnicos, Aristotelique proximus Aquinas inter Christianos, denique inter sodales nostros Toletus, Vasquius, Suarius, Molina, in utroque dicendi genere praecipui sunt? ita ut potius admirabile sit, quempiam in solis moralibus praestare?*"²

¹ Inst. Theol., Tom. I, n. 37.

² Vita Lugonis—Beginning of *Responsa Moralia*.

III. Coming to the field of Moral Theology alone, we find it made up of one system of truths, capable of division and subdivision indefinitely. Naturally, one may study the ensemble of the science or any portion of it. If one take the latter course, one must keep well in mind the relations of the part to the whole, and vice versa, just as the physiologist would do in studying eye, ear or lungs. Whichever method be followed, the subject of study must be viewed as a whole and in all its relations.

1. We have first of all the *positive* side ; the study of the sources of religious truth or its demonstration by suitable arguments drawn from revelation or reason. This process is of fundamental importance to the practical truths of revelation as well as to the theoretical. Yet what a difference! The literature of the latter is varied, abundant, and able (see for instance Petavius and Thomassinus), while that of the former is meagre and insignificant. Everything remains to be done. Some writers now seem to favor the habit of treating moral principles along the lines of special sources instead of studying them in all their sources at once. Thus we have Rational, Biblical, Symbolic, Conciliar, Liturgical, Patristic Theology. While this method has its advantages, it must be admitted that there is danger of incomplete and inexact views, probability of error and superficiality. In fact, works published by Protestant writers under such titles as, "Ethics of the Old or the New Testament;" "Ethics of St. Paul," etc., show considerable defects, due in part to the methods employed.

2. Next, we have the *strictly dogmatic* point of view from which truths are examined in their relation to the definitions of the Church, their degree of certainty and the latitude consistent therewith. Here again we find the literature of the theoretical truths of revelation far in advance of that of the practical, though of equal importance for the latter.¹

3. The *speculative* side is next in order. It includes explanation, exposition, consequences, comparisons of truths. The condition is more encouraging here. The *chef d'œuvre* of

¹We use the phrase *strictly dogmatic*, since the word dogmatic is ordinarily confined to theoretical truths. The practical or moral truths are also dogmatic.

St. Thomas is probably the *Secunda* of the *Summa*, and Suarez is certainly at his best in his treatise *De Legibus*,—both works being largely devoted to the speculative side of moral truths.

4. Finally, we have the point of view which may be called polemic, apologetic, irenic. Error is exposed, truth defended, conditions of reconciliation stated. In polemics and apologetics, much more has been done by the great controversial works for the theoretical truths of revelation than for truths of a practical and moral nature.

Any study of theological truth which aims to be complete must include those points of view. Of course it is natural, even necessary, that one at times confine one's study to a particular aspect; we have real masterpieces of this kind in the literature of theology. We merely insist on the fact, that the point of view is incomplete. The great scholastics of the middle ages and those who came after the Council of Trent, realized this thoroughly. This alone explains how it is that the study of their works is so valuable in giving a broad and solid theological training. Those who are acquainted with the *Summa* of St. Thomas, *De Legibus* and *De Religione* of Suarez, *De Justitia* of Molina, *De Poenitentia* of Lugo, *De Matrimonio* of Sanchez, will readily appreciate the force of this observation.

IV. Theology is a science which must be applied. This is done in teaching and directing the Christian people. Thus we have in teaching, catechetics and homiletics; in direction, casuistry and pastoral theology. Under these forms theology has always been carefully studied, even from the days in which St. Paul gave us true models in his letters. Probably casuistry has fared best. Requiring, as it does, a profound grasp of principles, exact knowledge of conditions, and of the human heart, and so much tact, it is not strange that it should have received great attention. The literature of casuistry is one of the glories of Catholic Theology. It excels by far in dignity, character and sobriety, every other form of casuistry, whether that of the Talmud, the Stoics, or the Pandects.¹

¹ Cfr. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, Vol. II., p. 375. Also, Raymond Thamin *Un problème moral dans l'antiquité, étude sur la casuistique stoïcienne*. Brunière, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Jan. 1, 1885.

V. Moral Theology is clearly distinguished from the other moral (or normative) sciences by its object, sources and method. There are five such sciences—viz., Ethics, Sociology, Politics, Economics, Law. It is, however, so closely allied with them that they may not for a moment be neglected. All concern man's free activity and the laws which should govern it. But Moral Theology has to do with all human activity, which it directs to man's supreme destiny—the absolute good. The other moral sciences, however, are confined to particular spheres of human action and its direction to a proximate contingent good. Their relations to Moral Theology are intimate, for its laws are also laws for them, and they in turn furnish valuable data for the investigation of the truths of the moral order. A word as to each.

1. Ethics is to Moral Theology about what the natural law is to the supernatural law; natural religion to supernatural religion; in a word, what the whole natural order is to the supernatural order. It is not strange then that ethics should have entered so largely into Moral Theology, where, in reality, it reached its highest stage of development. To find the best exposition of its bearings on Moral Theology we must again recur to the *Summa*. There is scarcely a question in all ethics that is not treated in the *Secunda*, yet its true theological character is never lost for a moment. Only the passions of schools could deny that the *Summa* is a theological work, moral as well as speculative, and only the superficial character of our own time could claim to see in it a half pagan ethics, a compromise between religion and the world, because Aristotle and Cicero are used by St. Thomas as auxiliaries in his work.

2. Sociology has not yet succeeded in clearly delimiting its field. It found many of its elements in other sciences, notably in Moral Theology, from which it has taken the conception of the social organism. If its various conflicting schools do not hinder its normal development, it will become a valuable ally of Moral Theology. There is in fact a supernatural as well as a natural sociology. The Catholic religion is essentially social, fitting admirably the social nature of man. Faith, worship, sacrifice, sacraments have a distinctly social character. In the communion of saints, in the sharing of indul-

gences, prayers, satisfaction and merit we have a perfect and beautiful supernatural solidarity. The instinct of association asserts itself in the varied forms found in the Church, from simple conference to religious order, from parish to universal Church.

3. Economics, for so many centuries a part of Moral Theology and the object of much careful discussion,¹ became a separate science a century ago. During the first period of its existence its writers, with some noble exceptions, represented it as not only distinct but even separated from ethics. They professed merely to aim to discover the laws of production and exchange. Such were the so-called orthodox or liberal economists of the Manchester school. Soon, however, writers began to study the relations of economics and moral science. A reaction then set in, becoming much stronger during the second half of this century. To-day most economists not only recognize that men must obey moral law in the production, distribution and consumption of wealth, but they also hold that moral science must penetrate economics, permeate it, and that the science must be constructed in the spirit of moral principles; in a word that economics must be ethical.² It is not unreasonable to hope that the day is not far distant when even theological data will be accepted in the study of economics. The services that each may render the other are admirably sketched in the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII.

4. Natural and civil law are so intimately connected with moral science that they really seem like subdivisions of it. This is particularly the case with justice. Theologians have shown great depth of thought and breadth of view in their writings on law. The sixty-three questions of St. Thomas, the *Septipertitum Opus* of Conrad de Sumenhart, the ten books of Dominicus Soto, the works of Lessius, Peter of Arragon, Malderus, de Lugo, and the six folio volumes of Molina—remain the pride of the literature of theology and the wonder and admiration of the jurisconsult.

5. In the relations of Canon Law to Moral Theology, we find still closer union. In fact, we can hardly indicate the

¹ Cf. Brants, Ashley, Cunningham.

² Cf. Maurice Block, *Les Progrès de la Science Economique depuis Adam Smith*, Introd. 5.

lines of separation. Cardinal d'Annibale repeats what Melchior Cano said when he condemned as folly the study of Moral Theology without the assistance of canon law. The practical summas of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whether methodical or alphabetical, have a decided canonico-moral character. In fact, it is this very feature which constitutes the chief merit of such works as the *Enchiridion* of Navarrus, the *De Matrimonio* of Sanchez, the *Theology of Layman*.

6. Finally, the field of national and international politics must be considered as not foreign to Moral Theology. Works of splendid merit, viewed merely as studies in political science, have come from the pens of theologians; St. Thomas de Regimine, principum; Suarez, de Legibus and de Bello; Francis of Victoria, de Indis. As to the last named, a recent writer, unsuspected of any theological bias, says there is nothing else in the history of law to compare with it.¹

III—GRADUAL DEVIATION.

The brief description which we have given of the character of Moral Theology, of its relations to the other religious, moral, and social sciences, and the partial enumeration of the masterpieces in theological literature, in which this character and the relations of our science appear, will serve to show that, at one time, Moral Theology held a place which comported in every way with its true nature and dignity. We have now to trace the successive steps in the process which led up to present conditions.

I. With the movement toward political secularization, there has existed a parallel movement of secularization in the world of science. Commencing about the end of the thirteenth century, the double movement developed in strength rapidly during Reformation times, reaching its greatest proportions during the Revolution and the period since then. At first, church and state separate; in the Reformation the church herself is divided; in the Revolution it is Christianity against Rationalism. When theology was expelled from the political world it began to lose contact with the other sciences. Finally

¹ *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*. Tom. XV., pp. 195-199.

it was driven from the universities and relegated to the seminaries and sacristies. In a country as solidly Catholic as Belgium, the too exact application of the principle of separation of church and state excludes theology from every one of the state universities. Louvain alone—supported by the Catholics—can lay claim to the honor of fully representing the entire field of human knowledge. The same condition is found in France, with this anomaly added, however, that, having no faculty of Catholic theology, two or three universities have Protestant faculties.¹ Italy and Spain are in like condition, with the one difference, that there is no freedom of teaching, and hence no free Catholic university. It is hard to see how the sciences gained anything by this. Certain it is that theology has suffered. The Holy Father has frequently reverted to these conditions in the encyclicals, *Aeterni Patris*, *Sapientiae Christianae*; in his discourse of March 7, 1880, to the pilgrimage of savants at Rome, and in the encyclical to the Bishops of Spain, October 25, 1893. In the last named he says: “In iis rerum publicarum fluctibus, qui superiore atque hoc ipso volvente saeculo, totam perturbaverunt Europam; quasi procelloso impetu dejecta atque stirpitibus divulsa sunt instituta quibus ad fidei doctrinaeque incrementa condendis, regia simul et ecclesiastica potestas curas opesque contulerant. *Sublatis ita catholicis studiorum universitatibus earumque collegiis, ipsamet seminaria clericorum exaruerunt, sensim ea deficiente doctrinae copia quae ex magnis gymnasiis effluebat.*” As to Italy itself, theological schools are not lacking, particularly in Rome. But they are deprived of much of their power by the conditions which surround them. An eminent Catholic, Godefroid Kurth, uttered the following remarkable words at the Freiburg Congress: “Where is the Catholic science of Italy, where its higher schools, its institutes, its publications? Is Italy at the head of the Catholic scientific movement? Instead of teaching others, is she not obliged to learn from other nations how to defend the civil and social rights of Catholicity?”²

¹ There are, however, five free Catholic universities in France wherein Catholic faculties of theology exist.

² *Rivista Internazionale*. Art. by M. A. Ratti, Dec., 1898; vol. xv., pp. 494-496. The Italian scholars present, hard as they found those words, admitted that there was some justification for them, that universities were needed, and that young men should be sought out and sent to study in foreign Catholic universities.

II. While theology in general was thus cut off from the other sciences, Moral Theology suffered further by being separated from theoretical or dogmatic theology. This stroke destroyed the organic unity between them, which is shown so admirably by St. Thomas. Solid grasp of the fundamental relations between the theoretical and the practical truths of revelation became difficult to obtain. The latter, detached from their real source and foundation, lost energy; the former, robbed of their legitimate fruit, lost vitality and influence. It is universally true that the progress of both sciences is in direct relation. The social and moral power of the priesthood is never greater than when the clergy has a solid dogmatic formation.¹ Logic and history clearly show that moral separated from dogma quickly becomes moral independent of dogma, and that this paves the way for moral without dogma and a religion purely ethical. It is a little surprising that some Catholics seem to ignore the dangers of separation, not alone for the sciences themselves, but as well for the formation of the clergy.²

III. Deprived of the influence which close association with dogma should exert, Moral Theology next saw inroads made into its own peculiar field. The laws of Christian perfection were taken over by ascetical theology; those of the religious life, largely by liturgical science; moral laws governing public life were given over to the science of law. The result was that certain modern errors were less clearly understood and hence less effectively opposed. We have an example in the error—I might almost say heresy—that political life is not to be regulated by Christian moral law, as is the life of the individual.³

IV. Moral Theology was consequently forced to confine itself to the laws of *private* life alone. Still the encroachments

¹ Non-Catholic writers do not seem to admit the close relation between ethics and dogma. In fact, the separation of the two is looked upon by some as a distinct advance. "The separation of theological ethics from theological dogmatics, made early in Reformation days, was one great step toward the constitution of our (moral) science; for a science of *agenda* is not a science of *credenda*." Alfred Cave, *Introduction to Theology and its Literature*, p. 562.

² Aubry, *Les Grands Séminaires*, C. XIII. Suggestive points of view are found in this work, though it is marked by some exaggeration and it shows a defective historico-literary knowledge.

³ Cf., Leo XIII, *Enc. Immortale Dei*.

continued. Writers began to pass lightly over *principles*; they cared chiefly for *conclusions* and *applications*, or even opinions. The speculative and apologetical points of view had been forgotten. On the positive side many moralists of the last century attempted to study the tradition and evolution of the revealed truths underlying moral life, but the taint of Jansenism, which was discerned in their writings, materially injured them. The test of scholarship to-day seems to be the ability to collect opinions of the theologians of the last three centuries. Equal zeal is not shown, even for the decisions of synods or councils. The result is that while Moral Theology furnishes to the priest sufficient knowledge to administer the sacrament of penance, it is of little assistance to him in preaching.¹

V. One might think that the end had been reached. Not yet, however. The development of pastoral theology and casuistry forced Moral Theology to a point where it is possible to present it in a handy volume of five hundred pages. Pastoral Theology has a respectable literature, especially in German, though by no means any abler than that of former times. Casuistry has become a lifeless form, intended principally for teaching; by no means as living and actual as are the Responses of Diana, de Lugo and so many others.

VI. This process has so far affected the teaching of Theology, that the different points of view of a question are treated in different courses and even by different professors. Thus the essential unity of science is destroyed, comprehensive views of questions are not obtained, a grasp of the whole field simply unthought of. Useless repetitions and unpardonable

¹ Mgr. Isoard, in his recent publication, *Si vous connaissiez le don de Dieu*, cites these words of an eminent writer (probably Taine): "J'ai voulu me rendre compte de ce qu'est aujourd'hui la religion, avant de me décider à faire élever mes enfants dans le Catholicisme. Dans ce but, j'ai écouté attentivement une vingtaine des sermons dans telle église (une des principales églises paroissiales de Paris); j'ai assurément entendu de bonnes choses, de bons conseils, mais rien qui fasse connaître la religion. On donnait des observations morales empruntées un peu partout, et même à votre serviteur. Mais du fond de la religion, des grands dogmes de la Bible, rien, absolument rien."

Whereupon the Bishop declares: "Nous tenons pour bien fondé son jugement sur l'enseignement donné habituellement dans nos églises. Le dogme n'est pas exposé; les vérités primordiales de la religion n'apparaissent qu'à de rares époques; ce qui est ordinaire, c'est de donner les conséquences morales de principes que l'on paraît supposer connus, mais qui, en fait, sont ou mal compris, ou méconnus ou tout à fait ignorés." P. 47-49.

omissions occur. Not unfrequently, a professor will fail to treat a question which he wishes to avoid, referring his students to a colleague who is supposed to discuss it.¹ The writer of these pages studied the Sacraments in Dogmatic and Moral Theology, in Canon Law, Liturgy and Archæology. A course in Pastoral Theology was lacking to complete the list. He had previously studied them according to the method of St. Thomas and Suarez in one course and under one professor. Though abler men conducted the divided courses, much more profit was obtained in the latter.

VII. We referred above to the intimate relations between Moral Theology and the other social or normative sciences. These latter, originally contained in the former, have been differentiated from it gradually since the Reformation, and they have practically lost contact with the Gospel. Ethics was the first to be separated; natural law, economics and sociology followed in rapid succession.² Moralists soon lost the habit of studying questions belonging to those sciences, seeing no need of so doing, or fearing to encroach. At any rate, Moral Theology lost much of its influence and practical value by the process.

VIII. It may now serve our purpose to cast a glance over the recent literature of Moral Theology, and ascertain how far facts bear us out. Taking the logical order, we have, first, the general or fundamental part, corresponding to the *Prima Secundae* of St. Thomas.

The treatise on the destiny of man, which is the foundation of the science, is met only in exceptional cases. Yet, the pagan Cicero was keen-sighted enough to have seen the place of such a treatise in any system of morals. "*Fine in morali-bus constituto, constituta sunt omnia.*" The study of human acts, despoiled of its ontological, psychological and supernatural portion, is so incomplete that many moral questions remain in perpetual obscurity. Hence the welcome we gave the

¹ Suarez has remarked this. In writing on Faith, wishing to speak of the *dona* and *gratiae intellectuales*, he says: "*Tractavit de hisce donis sanctus Thomas, secunda secundae variis in locis; sed operae pretium est de omnibus junctim agere, tum brevitate ac perspicuitate causa, tum quia dum ad alia loca remittuntur, prorsus omittuntur; adeo ut praeter Divum Thomam, nihil fere de his tractatum sit a Theologis, cum haec scribimus.*" De Fide. Disp. VIII. Intr.

² Cf., Theod. Meyer, *Inst. Juris Nat. Proem.*

work of Father Frins, S. J., in which he seeks to remedy some of the evils of this condition.¹ The treatise on the passions, to which St. Thomas gives twenty-seven questions in the Summa, never appears. Reference is made to them in the article on Concupiscence. Nothing is written on habits. In the treatise on Laws, the essential theological portion regarding the Law of God is very often neglected. The external canonical character is most insisted upon, while the obligation of civil law is studied in a superficial manner. The study of conscience is reduced to a minimum and then literally absorbed into the question of probabilism or aequiprobabilism. Finally the virtues, vices and sin are incompletely studied. As far as studied, they are superficially treated or reduced to pure casuistry. It is to be hoped that the recent letter of the Holy Father will call attention to this neglect of the study of the virtues, and bring about a more thorough manner of treating them.

That portion of our literature which corresponds to the *Secunda Secundae* of St. Thomas is not any more satisfactory. The treatise on the theological virtues is without doubt the most difficult and important in the science. They are the alpha and omega of Christian life. Only in their exercise does man strike his true attitude to God, who is his destiny, and to Christ, who is the way. Intellectual perfection is reached in faith, moral perfection attained in hope and charity. Thus the theological virtues give to Christian ethics its distinctive character and its mark of superiority over every other system of moral science. This has been recognized. The literature of the theological virtues is characterized by the abundance of masterly treatises which have appeared. And yet, in our manuals the whole field is covered in fifty pages; twenty given to Faith, two or three to Hope, and the rest to Charity. The more difficult questions, if not entirely omitted, are but indicated. It may be objected that those questions are treated elsewhere. Granted, they are not in their proper place and this is a serious error. But again, are they suf-

¹ *De actibus humanis, ontologicis, psychologicis consideratis seu disquisitiones psychologicae theologiae de voluntate in ordine ad mores.*

ficiently studied? Where, for instance, do we find Faith discussed in its true character as the door to the whole edifice of Theology? Theology is, after all, but the science of Faith. We do not find it represented as the centre of apologetics—its guiding star—as the bond uniting into one system of thought and demonstration, the *Præambula Fidei*, the argument of Faith, the Church and its magisterium, tradition, Scripture, and inspiration. It seems that the utter failure of many attempts at so-called modern apologetics is due to the absence of a thorough and profound understanding of the rôle of Faith. The same may be observed with regard to Charity. Its real character as the source and queen of virtues, as the fulfilling of the law, as central in justification and reconciliation, merit and good works, is not by any means properly brought out.

A first glance seems to show that the cardinal virtues have fared better. Yet inspection reveals that Prudence and Fortitude have little place in our literature. We know of but one work wherein they are treated with any care. It is from the pen of the learned Bishop of Bruges.¹ Temperance is studied piecemeal. Justice has fared better. We have extensive treatises on it by Carriere and Crolly, and some special works of a high order by Marres, Waffelaert, Schwane. The sections devoted to Justice in our manuals is proportionately large—maybe three hundred pages. Yet, strange to say, it is about the treatise on justice that Cardinal d'Annibale complained in the citation made a moment ago. As to the higher virtues, and the evangelical counsels, while not entirely neglected, the studies made in them have been canonical rather than theological. None of them approach the last twenty questions of the *Secunda Secundæ*. This may account for the indifference to religious life which we so frequently find.

Some of the sacraments have a rich and comprehensive literature, particularly the Eucharist, Penance, Matrimony. The other sacraments are neglected, in particular, Baptism and Orders—both of which enter directly into the essential idea of the Church.

¹ De prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia.

IV.—CAUSES AND REMEDIES.

The causes which have led to this condition are varied and complex. To state them adequately would require a summary of some centuries of history. They are political, social and religious, literary and academic, general and particular, universal and local. Nearly all, if not all, have been hinted at in the preceding pages. If we enumerate them here, it is merely to bring them out more clearly and to so grasp them that their character may be more correctly appreciated.

1. The vicissitudes to which the Church has been subjected during the last two centuries; revolutions and uprisings in France, Spain, Portugal and Italy; persecutions in Switzerland, Germany and Russia; the suppression or secularization of universities, confiscation of ecclesiastical properties and benefices which had enabled so many priests to devote themselves to study, whereas nowadays they are forced into a busy ministry in order to obtain means of life; suppression and expulsion of religious orders; destruction and scattering of libraries. No one can measure the influence that such a course of events had on the development of Christian Catholic science.

2. The weakening, if not decadence, of certain nations which formerly stood at the front in Catholic science. In saying this, we think of Spain, which in the Middle Ages led nearly all nations in juridico-moral studies,¹ and in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, certainly led the world in Catholic science. From the close of the Council of Trent to 1663 Spain produced nearly four hundred theologians, historians and canonists (mystic theologians not included), of whom fifty were of the highest order. During the succeeding century, 1663 to 1763, we find only two hundred and fifty, of whom but twelve are of the first class; from 1764 to 1869 we find but ninety, and only three or four are really eminent. The condition is equally striking in Portugal. The contributions of Ireland, England and Scotland to theology have been very limited, for reasons which every one knows; Poland and Hungary are equally destitute of a theological literature. During the last century and the first half of this one, Belgium showed

¹ Cf. E. Nys, *Les origines du droit international*. Bruxelles, 1894.

but little vitality. In the seventeenth century, the intellectual supremacy of Spain passed over to France. The remarkable fecundity of France, particularly in works of erudition and in eloquence, is well known. Yet she never produced a school of great thinkers in juridical or moral science. Italy showed some vigor up to a century ago, but since then she has done but little. To-day, Germany is in the lead, particularly in philological, exegetical, historical and critical studies, though probably less has been done there for Christian ethics than in France. Spain's once proud place has not yet been filled. *Resurgat.*¹

3. The Reformation, Jansenism and Rationalism caused the creation of forms of polemical literature which broke the unity and harmony of theological science. New treatises bearing on points of controversy appeared; older studies were recast to meet new issues; general questions were treated in part as the exigencies of the case required. Viewed in itself, this work was admirably done—superb treatises were produced. But the perspective of theological science was disturbed; secondary questions received undue prominence; parts replaced the whole. The synthesis had been destroyed and proportion, order and balance among the parts of theological science has not even yet been restored. Moral Theology was a victim of these circumstances. Attention was turned from it; it appeared to be merely a secondary division of theology, just as to-day dogmatic, speculative and moral theology are outranked by historical sciences and theological exegesis is being replaced by purely critical studies.

4. The gradual neglect of the *Summa* of St. Thomas has harmed Moral Theology. After the sixteenth century, two or three professors were occupied in expounding the *Summa* in the chief centres of learning. When there were three, each took a part of the *Summa*, to which four years were devoted; if there were but two, the *Secunda Secundæ* was divided between them. By this arrangement, students had an incomparable text-book, and a careful complete exposition of the portion devoted to Moral Theology as well as of the other parts.

¹ Comparative tables of greatest interest may be found in Hurter's *Nomenclator*.

At the same time, a practical course on cases of conscience was given, which lasted two years at least. When later, independent treatises were substituted for the text of St. Thomas, the second part of the Summa was replaced by the course on cases of conscience, excepting the questions of the Prima Secundae on grace and some questions of the Secunda Secundae regarding the rule of faith. Hence the manuals of Moral Theology, of which Busenbaum's Medulla is the type, differ so much in amplitude and erudition from the works of Franzelin and Palmieri, or of Sardagna and Perrone. The University of Louvain is probably the only university which has retained the Summa of St. Thomas as the text-book in Moral Theology.

5. The separation of Moral Theology from dogma, and the exodus of the various portions of our science which followed upon the surrender of the Summa of St. Thomas where all is unity, caused a further weakening. The French writer whom we have cited, attributes this to Gallicanism and Jansenism. But an honest view of the teaching, literature and doctrines of Theology effectually disposes of that theory. The same movement is to be found in Spain and Italy, possibly more marked than in the countries where Gallicanism and Jansenism had their strongholds. Then again, the writer in question seems to be in error in his statements bearing on the French writers of the seventeenth century. He attributes to them the doctrinal separation of Moral from Dogma, no less than the pedagogic and academic separation. He finds in the works of Berulle, Condren, Olier, Tronson and Fénelon, and even in Bossuet, a vague, indefinite moral founded on *sentiment* rather than *dogma*. He even goes so far as to think one can find in many modern works the very formulas of the propositions of Molinos asserting the independence of moral and devotion from the principles of Theology and the direction of the Church.¹

¹ Aubry, Les grands séminaires, Essai sur la methode des études ecclésiastiques en France, pp. 357 ff. Another recent writer, whom no one will suspect of anti-gallican exaggeration, declares: "Je me charge de trouver, dans beaucoup d'ouvrages de piété modernes, des erreurs condamnées par l'Eglise. Je dis cela même de ceux écrits par des prêtres, mais surtout de ceux (et ils abondent) écrits par des femmes. Et que dire des entretiens spirituels de supérieurs de communautés, qui tirent toute leur théologie d'écrivains protestants." *Bossuet et le Jansénisme; notes historiques; publiées par A. M. P. Ingold.*

6. The tendency to separate principles from their application is well expressed in the familiar proverb, *Praxis differt a speculatione*. Taken to imply the need of prudence and tact in applying principles, the statement is perfectly correct. But when it is made to mean that correct theory may be inapplicable, that a practice may be lawful without regard to theory, that practice is opposed to theory, or that the study of principles is good for science and useless for practice, nothing could be more absurd in itself or more harmful to science. If practice differs from principle, the latter is false or the former is wrong—there is no escape. We merely wish to say, apropos of this point, that too many theologians have been so narrow in the exposition of principles that a reasonable application has often been out of the question.¹ In a similar way many writers are broad in questions of faith and tendency in doctrine, yet extremely narrow, not in the first principles of moral science but in their secondary applications.

7. The intense controversies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did incalculable harm to Moral Theology. There were two great tendencies which struggled for mastery; one broad or lax, the other narrow or more rigorous. We would call them minimalist and maximist nowadays. They existed before Jansenism, which was in reality only a form of one of them. Naturally the two tendencies expressed themselves in the literature of Moral Theology and Devotion to which they gave rise, and they called forth a double series of propositions condemned by the Holy See. The controversy caused more obscurity, gave birth to a lassitude and distaste for Moral Theology which have had an enduring effect.²

8. The principle of probabilism—perfectly true in itself when rightly understood—has been a source of injury to our science. Taking it for granted that it is licit to follow a solidly probable opinion, and that a law merely probable cannot be strictly enforced, theologians have seemed to busy themselves

¹See the dissertation of the Bishop of Bruges, *De dubio solvendo in re morali*, p. 203.

²Concina in his *Historia Probabilismi*, and Döllinger and Reusch in their *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten*, give some account of these controversies; an impartial history of them has yet to be written.

about the probability of opinions rather than about the search for truth. Hence the number of problems whose scientific solutions are not considered of much importance or sought with much zeal, since contradictory probable opinions are accepted. We could give an almost endless list of problems, in the solution of which there has been no advance for two centuries, and no attempt at anything new is being made. One would almost think that we had fallen into skepticism or that we are afraid of the truth. This is particularly the case where an opinion is recognized as probable by a high authority.¹

9. The abuse of an essentially Catholic practice has caused damage to Moral Theology. It is that of recurring to the Roman Congregations for decisions when there is no necessity whatever for so doing. Fortunately enough, the Congregations seem to appreciate the situation justly when their replies are in the familiar form, "Consulat probatos auctores." But when the reply is "non sunt inquietandi," not only are the petitioners satisfied, but further research in the cause of truth is deemed unnecessary. We have not had a single new and profound study of usury in half a century, notwithstanding the prominence into which the socialists have drawn the question.²

It has been well said that a science may not be stationary. It must develop or suffer gradual extinction. Moral Theology must obey that law or undergo the penalty. Many think, with Cardinal d'Aunibale, that it is in a state of stagnation or even torpidity. But it can be re-established where it belongs. Many agencies must contribute, however, before that can be done. By the philosophy of St. Thomas the law of morals, as well as of faith, to use St. Augustine's words, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. A more intimate union with the theoretical truths of revelation is necessary, so that the laws of right living may be seen to spring from the very heart of dogma. Critical study and extended research into the development of

¹ Mgr. Isoard in *Le système du moins possible* ascribes the minimizing tendency of the day to the influence of Probabilism. This view we are unable to accept.

² In his *Nouveau dire sur le système du moins possible* (Paris, 1898), Mgr. Isoard also, though from a different point of view, criticises the practice of perpetual interrogation. See p. 60.

the fundamental ideas and principles of moral life and their application, not alone in Christian times, but in Old Testament times as well and back to the beginning of humanity, must be made. The intelligent application of these principles to the problems of modern individual, social, religious and civil life is essential to the re-establishment which we seek, as is also a more constant contact with the other social sciences from which, rightly understood, only good can come. There is reason to hope that the coming century will see this done, for the impetus has already been given in the admirable encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.

TH. BOUQUILLON.

BOOK REVIEWS.

SCRIPTURE.

Nouvelles Etudes sur la Restauration Juive Après l'Exile de Babylone. A. Van Hoonacker ; pp. 312 ; 1896.

This is a remarkably original and thoroughly critical work by the Professor of Exegesis at the University of Louvain. Like all else that has come from his pen, this last volume is characterized by extensive learning and careful personal research. It has already attracted much attention by the novelty of the thesis, by the solidity of the position taken, by the scientific method followed, and by the author's critical acumen.

It is no exaggeration to say that we have in this volume one of the most fruitful results of higher biblical criticism that has appeared for some time. Whatever else criticism does, it at least arouses interest, and sometimes even a little controversy ; but anything is better than stagnation. Dr. Van Hoonacker has chosen as the field of his special study and as the theme of his numerous dissertations the period of the Restoration of the Jewish Commonwealth after the return of the exiles from the Babylonian Captivity. Chiefly through his writings this has become one of the most interesting epochs in the Old Testament history.

It has long been felt that something should be done to co-ordinate the facts related in the two books of Esdras and Nehemias and to harmonize them with the history of some of the neighboring contemporary nations, especially the Persians. However, no one has ever made the attempt without soon feeling obliged, in the midst of his labors, to regret the present condition of the sacred text of these books, the meagerness of the historical data, the absence of chronological sequence, the important lacunae, the sudden breaks, the unexpected transitions, and the many passages "that have been inverted, truncated, transposed, mutilated, or entirely omitted." This is true especially of the first six chapters of Esdras, where the uncertainty is so perplexing that, for some critics, the Artaxerxes of Esdras and Nehemias is Artaxerxes I ; for others it is Artaxerxes II, and for others again it is Artaxerxes III.

Such being the case, Dr. Van Hoonacker is convinced that he is quite justified in adding yet one more to the already long category of hypotheses advanced to throw light on the text. Accordingly, in his brochure enti-

tled "*Néhémie et Esdras*"¹ he begins by establishing the precedence, both in time and in importance, of Nehemias over Esdras. It is true that in our Bibles the book of Esdras comes first and the book of Nehemias comes second in order. For no other reason than because of this arrangement many have inferred that these two men must have lived in the same order. Hence, as a matter of course, it was quietly taken for granted that Esdras, with his caravan of returning exiles, arrived in Palestine many years before Nehemias, but yet that both held their authority from the same king of Persia.

But Dr. Van Hoonacker reverses this order and contends that Nehemias was the first on the spot; that he took charge in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes I, and that on his death or retirement Esdras succeeded him in the seventh year of Artaxerxes II. Accordingly it is Nehemias who, on his arrival in the Holy City, finds everything in confusion and the people humiliated by their neighbors. It is Nehemias who takes three days to study the situation; who goes around inside, outside the city at night; who assigns to each group of inhabitants their share of the work of reconstructing the walls of the city; who took the first step against mixed marriages; who had the priests read the law to the people in public; who induced the people to confess their sins before the Lord, and who made them promise to observe the Law of Moses and to sign a new covenant with the Lord their God. Not Esdras, therefore, but Nehemias is the hero of that epoch; who rebuilds the walls of Jerusalem; who makes it the stronghold of the nation; who restores public worship, and becomes the real founder of the subsequent Jewish commonwealth. He was the strong, unflinching, uncompromising leader of the people, and as long as he lived Esdras was merely one of his many very pliant instruments for good,—the scribe, the reader, the priest, the interpreter of the law, but not the ruler, not the governor of the nation.

Yet Jewish tradition makes Esdras overshadow every one else at that time, and goes so far as to represent him as a second Moses who republished and even rewrote the Pentateuch; and several of the Fathers and many modern theologians have been induced by this Jewish tradition to adopt the same opinion and to exaggerate beyond measure the rôle played by this good man in the restoration of the Jewish Church and State. Also many critics of rationalistic tendencies have taken advantage of this exaggerated importance of Esdras, in order to ascribe to him the composition of the "*Sacerdotal Code*," which, they say, forms a very large portion of the Pentateuch, as we now have it, and to maintain the very late date of all the other parts of the same book. Dr. Van Hoonacker, by his hypothesis, takes the ground from under their feet; for,

¹ Louvain, J. B. Ista, 1890, pp. 85.

while the part played by Esdras is every way worthy of a good man, he certainly was not such a man as could have written the Pentateuch and imposed it on the Jewish people as the genuine work of Moses.

If there is any period in the pre-Christian history of the Jews that one would think ought to be accurately known, it is precisely the period of the reconstruction of the second Temple under Zorobabel. It was an historical period; it was relatively near to the Christian era, and the rebuilding of the Temple was an event of prime importance to the Jewish Church and nation, an event, moreover, which the books of Nehemias and Esdras would seem to express the intention of relating in all its many details. In proof of this apparent purpose to relate all the facts in the case, these books give us many dates, at first sight very circumstantial, together with the proper names of the principal personages concerned, and an itemized account of what was done, how it was done, why it was done, and by whom it was done. And yet, strange as it may appear, some of the most important details are omitted, and our path is beset with uncertainty at every step. The result is that honest critics are not agreed whether the foundation of the second Temple was laid in the reign of Cyrus or the reign of Darius; nor whether the Temple was completed under Darius, the son of Hystaspes, or under Darius II. In the midst of so much confusion, Dr. Van Hoonacker undertakes to introduce some harmony into the general chaos, which he does in a carefully written brochure entitled "*Zorobabel et Le Second Temple*."¹

Abram Kuenen, Professor at the University of Leyden, having called in question some of Dr. Van Hoonacker's conclusions, the latter replied in a third volume, entitled "*Néhémie en l'an 20 d'Artaxerxes I; Esdras en l'an 7 d'Artaxerxes II*."²

Professor Kosters, successor to Dr. Kuenen, acknowledges that Dr. Van Hoonacker is right in demanding a readjustment of the chronology of the history of the Jewish restoration, but takes exception to some of the details of his work. The volume which we are now reviewing is Dr. Van Hoonacker's rejoinder, and was primarily, not as a resumé, but as a supplement to his former writings on the same topic (general). After a brief review of the points already discussed, the author gives us in full the history of the rebuilding of the second Temple under Zorobabel, and establishes the chronological order of the events of that whole period. Nehemias, he thinks, reached Jerusalem about B. C. 445, and Esdras arrived about B. C. 398. Father Lagrange, Superior of the School of Biblical Sciences at St. Stephen's, Jerusalem, in an article published in the *Revue Biblique*, admits Dr. Van Hoonacker's principal thesis, that

¹ Gand et Leipzig, H. Engelcke, 1892; 2pp. 118.

² Ib. 1892, pp. 90.

Nehemias preceded Esdras in point of time and importance; but he would place the return of Nehemias in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes II, about B. C. 385, and the return of Esdras in the seventh year of Artaxerxes III, about B. C. 351. After an amicable exchange of views in the pages of the *Revue Biblique*, during which, strange to say, neither accused the other of heresy, Dr. Van Hoonacker has continued to pay special attention to this epoch in Jewish history, with the present volume as the result, and Father Lagrange has subsequently been convinced that Dr. Van Hoonacker is right.¹

Dr. Van Hoonacker, like Father Lagrange, is thoroughly conversant with the methods of modern biblical critics, and in the many tilts which he has had with such men as Kuenen, Kusters and Wellhausen, he has more than held his own,—he has sometimes driven them from the field. His last volume is an excellent example of the advanced, yet staunchly Catholic, biblical scholarship of our day. In this matter he has done what the Sovereign Pontiff says that Catholic exegetes should do,—“lead, not follow.” Though comparatively a young man, he has done more in the last decade than dozens of older men who still continue to thresh out old straw, whereas he has gone out into the abundant harvest field and gathered in the rich sheaves.

Dr. Van Hoonacker, among Catholic exegetes, belongs neither to the left nor to the right nor to the center party; he belongs neither to the narrow gauge nor to the broad gauge school; he belongs to a small class of workers, and is Catholic pure and simple.

Einleitung in die Heilige Schrift Alten und Neuen Testaments; Dr. Franz Kaulen. Erster Theil; Vierte, verbesserte Auflage. Herder, Freiburg, 1898.

This work has been many years before the learned world, and more than any other has been in use in the universities and theological seminaries ever since its first publication. By successive revisions, like the present, it is made to reflect the results of the most approved scholarship. It is a worthy companion to the other learned works that go to make up Herder's “Theologische Bibliothek.” This Introduction is intended primarily as a text-book for theological students, as well as a work of reference for the clergy and for the educated laity generally.

After a few pages of preliminary remarks on the nature, scope, and sources of Biblical Science, the author divides this first volume of his Introduction into two parts. The first, which is fundamental (*Grundlegender Theil*), discusses the inspiration and the Canon of both Testaments. As to the first, the only theory of inspiration that the author

¹ *Revue Biblique*, January, 1899, p. 162.

expressly rejects is the one which the Council of the Vatican also rejects—the theory of subsequent divine approval. The question of the Canon of both Testaments is handled both dogmatically and historically, and the declaration of the Church interpreting divine ecclesiastical tradition is proved to be the only adequate means of knowing which books are inspired and canonical and which are not.

In Old Testament times additions were made to the Canon from time to time by the competent authority, according as books recognized as divine in origin were presented for insertion on the catalogue of sacred books. Therefore, the tradition of the Jews and the opinion of so many Protestants that Ezra or the "Great Synagogue" formally and forever closed the Canon of the Old Testament must be rejected as void of all historical basis, else books written subsequently to their time never would have been admitted to the Canon, nor would the Jews in the first century before and after Christ have debated whether or not they should reject from the Canon such books as Proverbs, the Canticle of Canticles, Esther, and Ecclesiastes. Dr. Kaulen argues that men who are capable of deliberating whether they should reject such books were also capable of rejecting, and did actually reject from the Palestinian Canon, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, Maccabees, and all the other Deutero-Canonical books and fragments of the Catholic Bible. This opinion, which has always been repudiated by nearly all Protestants and by not a few Catholics, has recently received confirmation from an unexpected non-Catholic quarter.

The second part of this volume which is general (*Allgemeiner Theil*), is devoted to a thorough discussion of the languages, texts, and principal ancient versions of Scripture. It has always been remarked that there is a very close resemblance between the language used in the Pentateuch and that found in the Hebrew books written presumably a thousand years later. But in so long a stretch of time the Hebrew, like any other language, should have undergone more considerable changes in orthography, grammar, and syntax than are apparent between those books. How, then, is this resemblance to be explained? Dr. Kaulen frankly admits that we do not possess the Pentateuch in its absolutely original linguistic form. Books like the Pentateuch, which have been intimately identified with the life of a people, are often made to conform somewhat to the language of each period through which they live; in other words, such books are successively retouched and insensibly remodeled in the direction of the language prevalent at the different periods in the history of the books. Such books are, as it were, unconsciously translated into the current language, and thus imperceptibly lose many of their archaic and obsolete peculiarities. We have an instance of this in the poems of Homer, which

did not proceed from the pen or from the tongue of the blind bard in precisely the same form in which we now possess them, but were gradually assimilated to the style of each age, and received their present shape chiefly at the hands of the Alexandrine philologists. Another instance is Luther's translation of the Bible, which has gone through all the orthographical and grammatical changes that the German language itself has experienced since the days of Luther. So, too, our English versions, as well as the *Reinêke Fuchs* in German and the works of Shakespeare in English. But, of course, the modifications here referred to affect not the substance, but only some few of the accidentals of style.

Our author also makes full acknowledgment of the liberties taken with the sacred text by transcribers, whether designedly or undesignedly, and describes the means subsequently adopted to correct some of those mistakes and to prevent them for the future. He is particularly exhaustive in his treatment of the Greek and Latin versions, especially the Septuagint and the Vulgate. One desirable feature of his work is that he discusses, though, of course, not so fully as in his "*Geschichte der Vulgata*," the value and the meaning of the decree of the Council of Trent, which declares the Vulgate "authentic," and he points out in what sense it is authentic, and in what sense it is not authentic. The merits of the Vulgate have been so extravagantly minimized by some, and so extravagantly exaggerated by others, that it is a pleasure to find a man who is so sure of his position as not to be afraid to place the Vulgate upon its proper basis. All this is done with a sufficient abundance of detail to meet the requirements of the ordinary theological student, and far more fully than is done in most manuals of Introduction.

This work, when completed, will make a huge volume of about seven hundred large, closely printed pages. It is in every sense a model text-book. The style is concise, the construction remarkably simple, and the method of exposition so clear and so direct that the reader is never left in doubt as to the meaning. The author is very well informed about the latest results of critical scholarship, especially in higher and textual criticism. At the same time this is one of the safest manuals that could be placed in the hands of the young theological student. For critical acumen, for breadth of view, for philological equipment, for solid and extensive learning, and (what is most desirable in a text-book) for staunch Catholic principles, it is most commendable. Dr. Kaulen is one of the foremost scholars of the day, and deserves to be what he is,—the successor to Cardinal Hergenröther in the editorship of Herder's "*Kirchen-Lexikon*," a work which represents, on all theological subjects, the ripest scholarship of Catholic Germany.

"Questions Bibliques," extracted from the works of the Abbé de Broglie by the Abbé C. Piat. Lecoffre, Paris, 1897.

The Abbé de Broglie, whose tragic death was the cause of the most profound grief to his countless friends in France, was alike distinguished for his noble birth, for his active charities, for the modesty and simplicity of his bearing, and for his extensive learning. His many admirers will be happy to read this volume, which is largely composed of extracts from his numerous inedited works. As is well known, the author wrote, according to the needs of the actual controversies of the day, a quantity of notes, studies, articles and brochures on a great variety of topics; all, however, bearing on the general theme of Apologetics. Naturally, one only thought dominated and connected all into one whole in his own mind; only, from the nature of the circumstances, that thought could not be apparent to the reader. M. Piat, a personal friend, learned from the author himself that central thought, and has grouped around it all the apparently disjointed fragments that abound in his works. The result is a very readable and instructive book.

M. de Broglie was an Apologetist, and his purpose in this volume is to harmonize the traditional teaching of the Church with the well-ascertained results of the newer school of Criticism. But two difficulties beset his path; the one to determine precisely what is the import of this traditional teaching, and the other, to decide what are the well-ascertained conclusions of criticism, in so far as they regard the Pentateuch and the Prophets of the Old Testament.

In the first part of the volume the author shows that the chief source of error on the part of the critics is their philosophical prejudice against the possibility of the whole supernatural order in general and their denial of the peculiarly supernatural character of the Hebrew nation. These preconceived notions he vigorously refutes. In the second part the author discusses and rejects some of the modern theories concerning the mode and date of composition of the Pentateuch, and the degree of civilization of the Israelites at the time of the Exodus.

In the third part he shows how impossible it is to explain the Old Testament, unless we admit in it the presence of real Messianic Prophecies,—thoroughly supernatural in origin and character. The work ends with a chapter on the "Triumph of Monotheism."

EDUCATION.

1. **Directoire de l'Enseignement Religieux** dans les Maisons d'Education,—Organisation, Méthodes, Qualités du Professeur, Appendice Bibliographique; 2 vols., 8°, pp. 479-324. Paris: Delhomme et Brignet, 1899.
2. **Christian Education in the Dark Ages**, Rev. Eugene Magevney, S. J. Pedagogical Truth Library, Cathedral Library Association, New York, 1899.
3. **Why, When, How, and What We Ought to Read**, by Rev. J. L. O'Neil, O. P. Boston: Marlier, Callanan & Co., 1898; 8°, pp. 135.
4. **The Catechism of Rodez, Explained in Form of Sermons**, translated from the French by Rev John Thein. Herder, St. Louis, 1898; pp. 528.

1. These two volumes treat of the duties of ecclesiastics called to teach French youth in educational institutions. The first treats of the object of religious teaching, Christian doctrine and apologetics, the beliefs and history of the Christian Church. Considerations are added on the details of teaching,—time, place, distribution of classes,—and on the method to be followed,—the preparation of the professor, the nature of the questions, proofs and objections, the use of manuals, the stimulation of personal research, and some practical means of interesting the students. In the second volume useful and edifying instruction is given as to the development of knowledge, piety and zeal in the teaching ecclesiastic. Altogether, the book is well calculated to encourage the love of study. A brief bibliography of French works suitable for a teacher's library may be consulted with profit. The book suffers from a certain diffuseness.

2. In this reprint of a magazine article, Father Magevney offers a brief summary of the channels and spirit of Christian education in the early Middle Ages. The picture is drawn with fairness and moderation, and may well be recommended to non-Catholics, whose views on the history of pedagogics are too often drawn from prejudiced sources. It should be read in connection with the admirable studies of Brother Azarias.

3. Good advice as to reading never comes amiss,—hence, these notes of Father O'Neil are destined to be helpful to many. They are written with feeling and discretion, and we wish them a very wide audience.

4. Faith and the Creed, Hope and Prayer, Charity and the Commandments of God and the Church, Grace and the Sacraments, are the rubrics under which the Abbé Luche has compressed the religious teaching of the very popular French Catechism of Rodez. Father Thein presents us an English translation from the fourteenth French edition. The work contains what is rightly styled "a clear, methodical and well-considered exposition of the dogmatical and moral truths of religion," and is otherwise commendable for its brevity and succinctness.

HISTORY AND POLITICS.

1. **Prehistoric Art**, or the Origin of Art as Manifested in the Works of Prehistoric Man, by Thomas Wilson, Curator, Division of Prehistoric Archæology, U. S. National Museum, Washington: Government Printing Office. 1898. Pp. 336.
2. **L'Annee de l' Eglise 1898**, par Ch. Egremont, Première Année: Paris, V. Lecoffre. 1899. Pp. 509.
3. **The Referendum in Switzerland**, by Simon Deploige, Advocate, translated into English by C. P. Trevelyan, M. A., and edited with notes, introduction, and appendices by Lilian Tamm: Longmans, Green, & Co., London and New York, 1898. Pp. lxi-334.
4. **Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1897**. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1898. Pp. 1272.
5. **Les Villes Antiques**.—Rome, Athènes, Carthage, Jerusalem, Restauration Archéologique par Paul Aucler. Paris: Charles Delagrave, 1899.

1. Mr. Wilson is an indefatigable worker in the pre-historic field. In the present volume he offers us an account of the first artistic gropings of man in the paleolithic and neolithic periods. Rude engravings of animals on bone, horn, ivory, or stone, testify everywhere to an innate instinct for artistic expression that is especially noticeable in the neolithic time, with its drilled pipes and tubes, polished hatchets, pottery, bronze, gold, silver, and lapidary work. Extremely valuable is the section devoted to pre-historic musical instruments in Europe, Asia, Africa, and especially America, North and South. Horns, bells, rattles, trumpets, drums, whistles, pan-pipes, of bronze or gold or clay, are here collected and studied with scientific precision, making a first chapter in the history of music of surpassing charm. There are 325 illustrations, many of them rare, and most of them from the collections of the National Museum at Washington. Especially noteworthy is the account (pp. 482-83) of the (Louvre) bronze head supposed by some to be of Roman workmanship, about 100 B. C., and to represent a North American Indian, perhaps referred to by Pomponius Mela (*De Chorographia*, III. 5, 45) and Pliny the Younger (*Hist. Nat.* II. 67) where it is question of "Indos quosdam" cast away on the coast of Germany, and given by the King of the Suevi to Q. Metellus Celer (died B. C. 59). The resemblance to the Red Man as exhibited in the Catlin Gallery is most striking. The crouching lions (p. 485) cut out of the solid out-cropping rock west of the Rio Grande, in the country of the Cochitanos, are also

worthy of attention. So, too, are the thin copper plates from the Hope-well Mound, Ross County, Ohio, on which are seen the Swastika Cross and the Fish. Indeed, every page and every illustration of this valuable work have a more than ordinary fascination.

2. Something like the *Statesman's Year-Book* was very badly needed in the field of ecclesiastical history. In this publication M. Egremont undertakes an annual summary of all the important happenings of Catholic interest throughout the world. It corresponds to such useful guides as the *Année Politique*, the *Année Scientifique*, etc., and is sure to win a great many readers. We are all interested deeply in whatever touches the Catholic Church throughout the world, and here we may obtain just that bird's-eye view which busy workers seek for. Of the 508 pages 25 are given to the United States, and they are written with fairness and sympathy. We bespeak for this undertaking of the Maison Lecoffre an immediate success.

3. This work appeared originally in French. The Author, who is a professor in the University of Louvain, wrote it at a time when the Referendum was a living question in Belgium. He rightly believed that a careful examination of the institution as it operates in Switzerland would throw considerable light on the discussion in his own country. Now that the general question of direct legislation is becoming one of practical politics, there is a demand for information on the workings of the Referendum. This translation of Professor Deploige's work is, therefore, a real service to the English-speaking student of politics. The translation is accompanied by a valuable introduction from the pen of Lilian Tamm, and by a critical letter of great merit on the Referendum in Belgium by Professor Van den Heuvel of the University of Louvain. We commend the work earnestly to those interested in American politics. Direct legislation is a principle of our state life, as is shown by the town meeting, the vote of the people on amendments to constitutions, and on many specific questions, the demands of labor unions and of the populist party.

The appeal to direct legislation is, in a way, the logical result of the failure of representative government to represent the people. The conviction is rapidly growing in the United States that such is the case, hence we may expect to see the movement in favor of the Initiative and Referendum take on considerable proportions in the near future. Professor Deploige's lucid study of the question in Switzerland will be valuable for us in America, for we have as yet seen the principle of direct legislation applied only in a limited way.

4. The most important of the numerous historical papers contained in these proceedings of the American Historical Association for 1897 is the

"Bibliography of Alabama," by Thomas M. Owen (pp. 777-1248). If every State had such a list the work of historical research would be greatly aided. Other papers of value are: "The Protestant Revolution in Maryland," by Bernard C. Steiner (pp. 279-355); "European Blue Laws," by John Martin Vincent (pp. 355-373); the "Second Annual Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission" (pp. 397-681), and "Some of the Consequences of the Louisiana Purchase," by Samuel M. Davis (pp. 149-161).

5. These little brochures seem to meet a real need,—some succinct account of the result of the modern excavations on the sites of ancient cities. M. Aucler presents archaeological maps of Rome, Athens, Carthage and Jerusalem, made from the latest labors of scholars and excavators. In each case there are added accounts of the original documents on which are based the restorations in the maps, indications of the works that contain the results of excavations and reconstructions, explanations of controverted or important points, and indexes of the monuments referred to in the maps. From thirty to fifty pages of small octavo suffice to bring all necessary old and new knowledge before us,—henceforth these scientific booklets are really indispensable to those who cannot follow the difficult and technical literature of modern restorations of ancient cities.

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

Institutiones Theologicae de Sacramentis Ecclesiae. Auctore J. B. Sasse, S. J., 2 vols.: Herder, St. Louis. 1898.

Shortly after the appearance of the first volume of this work already reviewed in our pages, Father Sasse, its author, fell seriously ill and died, leaving to other hands the completion of his labors. This second volume, companion to the first, was edited by Father Lehmkuhl. The deceased author had left the greater part of his work in manuscript, ready for publication. What he had not thus immediately prepared for the press was reconstructed from the notes which he had compiled for the purpose of teaching; so that the editor, as far as possible, presents us with the work of the author, embellished by the explanatory footnotes and additions of his own. This second volume bears the character of the first in all respects. It deals with Penance, Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, and Matrimony, besides setting forth the doctrine of Indulgence as an appendix to the treatment of the Sacrament of Penance. The doctrine is clearly set forth and references to the Fathers are numerous and pertinent. In fact, the author never neglects the positive side of his treatise, as the erudition displayed throughout the work goes to prove. The opinions of theologians are quoted and given due con-

sideration, so that a student applying himself to the study of the various questions treated by the author is furnished with no meagre literature. A more expansive discussion of certain points is indeed desirable, but the author has touched upon all that is essential to a work of a general nature.

The divisions are well mapped out, the style is clear and concise, and the whole work commends itself to a student's attention. One rises from a perusal of the various points discussed, with a good idea of the doctrine and an abundant acquaintance with theological opinion.

La Destinée de l'Homme, par l'Abbé C. Piat. Paris: Alcan, 1898 pp. 244.

"The aim of this work is to prove that there is another life." The proof is to be teleological, not ontological,—drawn from the philosophy of ends rather than from the philosophy of causes. And the main thesis is this: although our mental processes considered simply in their nature as processes afford no incontestable guarantee of immortality, such a guarantee is found in the finality which characterizes our mental life.

M. Piat reduces the discussion of the problem to three general heads. Under the first (*Certitudes*) he examines the facts of consciousness revealed by introspection and by experimental research. The next (*Mécomptes*) is an analysis of the various forms of mental activity with a view to ascertaining whether and how far they manifest the spirituality and transcendence of the soul, and thereby justify the claim to immortality. The third bases this claim upon those beliefs and aspirations which are the directive influences in human activity (*Croyances*).

The attentive study of the mind shows that it has a life of its own. Both in their qualitative and in their quantitative aspects, mental processes present features which forbid us to identify them with any form of merely physical or organic activity. Sensation, thought, and feeling can never be reduced to modes of motion; their simplicity and indivisibility set them apart in a world distinct from the world of matter. They are phenomena; but back of them is the Ego, one, permanent and indivisible. The mind is not simply a passive recipient of impressions; it transforms, develops, originates. Its cognitions and emotions are more than pulses of nerve-energy or molecular vibrations of the brain.

What, then, is the ultimate nature of mind? If we consider our affective states, we obtain no satisfactory answer. Emerging from the depths of the unconscious and, even in consciousness eluding our grasp, these states do not warrant the inference that mind is radically distinct

from matter. Nor do we get much clearer light from the consideration of these higher processes, our ideas. The universality which characterizes these led to the concept of an impersonal, all-pervading reason; but this is merely an abstraction, opposed to the reality of our individual existence and to the data of experience: it is the result of defective analysis, metaphysical rather than psychological. And after all, the immortality of such a reason would afford us but little satisfaction.

The simplicity of our ideas, so often cited as evidence of the soul's spirituality, is not convincing. The dependence of thought upon organic conditions, the notable differences in mental capacity shown by different races, and the variations of intellectual energy in the same individual, are facts which the ontological argument is not prepared to meet. "Thus the depth of our intelligence escapes us. Much less can we trace to its roots that unique principle whence all our faculties issue as branches, that *vinculum substantiale* about which the philosophers have waged so many fruitless discussions."

Turning to the will, we have nothing, of course, to expect from that "noumenal freedom" imagined by Kant. It is freedom as we find it in consciousness that must guide our search. And the search itself is not more successful along this line than along others. The nature of freedom is shrouded in obscurity; and, at any rate, volition is only one of the many forms of mental activity: the substance of mind is as far as ever from our view.

So the metaphysical proofs of spirituality and immortality fall short. "When practical beliefs are in question, it is better to demonstrate nothing than to advance arguments which are not conclusive." Are we, then, to surrender and let materialism triumph? By no means: for the arguments against immortality are still weaker than those in its favor which we have found wanting.

Materialism has yet to prove that the soul is a mere development from matter, and were this fully established there would remain to be shown that the soul cannot survive its organism. The parallelism between mind and brain is far from exact; the influence of bodily activity upon the mind does not deprive the mind of its own activity or of its influence upon the body; the distinction of our faculties and the dependence of each process upon a particular cerebral area cannot destroy the consciousness we have of the simple, indivisible self. Materialism, with its ontology, fails; and this is its only basis.

Spiritualism has other resources at its command. It takes its appeal, when ontology is ruled out, to the "law of finality." However we may account for the existence of evil, physical and moral, in the world, certain it is that purpose is the dominant principle of life. Every vital

function has its correlative in reality,—this is the basis of all biological research. And on this basis we have to ask: Are there in us forms of life which demand life beyond the grave, which would lose their meaning and issue in nothing if immortality were not their support?

Thought, love, action—these are the forms in which human teleology asserts itself; and each assertion is a proof of immortality. Both the order of thought and the order of things proclaim the existence of a Being, eternal, intelligent, free. This is the sovereign object which forms the perspective of our intelligence. Unless we attain this object in unending life, the law of finality is violated. Our craving for the Absolute and the insufficiency of the present life have given rise to the great religious systems of the world. That positivism which bids us content ourselves with nature and ties us down to the little span of our existence here ends inevitably in pessimism. If he be not immortal, man, the supreme product of creation, is a supreme failure. On the practical side, positivism is no better. With all its declamation about “indefinite progress,” “humanity” and “respect for public opinion,” it can neither determine the end of our actions nor provide us with motives for acting. We need higher ideals, truer standards; and the final test can be applied only in a life to come. Morality means immortality.

The spiritualistic position finds its surest basis in this law of finality. Finality, too, is the foundation on which even the experimental sciences are built. As we accept their results unhesitatingly, so may we cling, with equal certainty, to our belief in immortality.

M. Piat's presentation of the subject is marked by order and clearness. The charm of an exquisite style is felt at every page, and is enhanced by a wealth of citations covering a wide range of literature. At the same time there is a tone of earnestness throughout the work; the author realizes the importance of the problem, and in a spirit of criticism and frankness seeks a solution that will firmly establish the doctrine of immortality in the face of modern thought.

In dealing with the ontological argument for spiritualism, he lays too much stress perhaps on simplicity of the soul as a middle term, and too little on subsistence, which is the central idea in the reasoning of St. Thomas.

With his contention that we cannot fully know the innermost nature or essence of the soul, scholastic philosophers will generally agree, though they will hardly accept the conclusion that the spirituality of the soul is not evidenced by its higher processes. If obscurity and incompleteness of knowledge is a bar to the ontological demonstration, the teleological may be challenged by the materialist on somewhat similar grounds. The very concept of finality is to-day under discus-

sion, and M. Piat could have strengthened his position by subjecting this concept to analysis and lighting it up with the clearness and definition which he so happily brings into other phases of the question. His development of the argument is nevertheless a service to philosophy, suggestive and inspiring. Though little or no account is taken of recent speculations as to the possibility and probability of a life hereafter M. Piat's contribution to the growing literature of the subject will be welcomed as an appeal to the nobler aspects of life in behalf of its true meaning and destiny.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(Acknowledgment under this rubric does not preclude further notice.)

Books and their Makers. A study of the conditions of the production and distribution of literature from the fall of the Roman Empire to the close of the seventeenth century, by Geo. Havens Putnam, A. M. Vol. I, 476-1600; vol. II, 1500-1709. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896-97.

Die Griechischen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter—Commission der Königlichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. I. Hippolytus, Erster Band, Exegetische und Homiletische Schriften. Die Commentare zu Daniel und Zum Hohenliede, Kleinere Exegetische und Homiletische Schriften, pp. xxvii-374; viii-309. II-III. Origines, Erster Band, Die Schrift vom Martyrium, Buch I-II, gegen Celsus. Zweiter Band, Buch V-VIII, gegen Celsus. Die Schrift vom Gebet, pp. xc-374 and 545. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichsche Buchhandlung, 1899. The price of Hippolytus is 18 marks; that of Origen (2 vols.) is 28 marks. There will appear an extensive review of these volumes in a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Etudes de Théologie Positive sur la Sainte Trinité, par Th. de Regnon, S. J. Troisième Série, Théories Grecques des Processions Divines. Paris, V. Retaux, 2 vols., pp. 584-592.

St. John Damascene on Holy Images, followed by Three Sermons on the Assumption. Translated from the original Greek by Mary H. Allies. London: Thomas Baker, 1899, pp. 216.

The Four Gospels, a new translation from the Greek text direct, with reference to the Vulgate and the ancient Syriac versions, by Very Rev. Francis Aloysius Spencer, O. P. Preface by His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons. New York: William H. Young & Co., 1898, pp. 280.

- The Kingdom of Italy and the Sovereignty of Rome, by William Poland, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1899, pp. 42.
- Die Advents-Perikopen, Von Dr. Paul Wilhelm Keppler, Bischof von Rottenburg; Die Propheten-Catenen nach römischen Handschriften von Dr. M. Faulhaber, Kaplan der Anima. The above are fasciculi 1, 2, 3, of the fourth volume of "Biblische Studien," edited by Dr. Bardenhewer. Freiburg: Herder. 1899. Pp. 143, 218.
- "Les Saints:" St. Henri, par Henri Lesêtre; 8°, pp. 213. St. Ambrose, par le Duc de Broglie; 8°, pp. 213. Ste. Mathilde, par Eugène Hallberg; 8°, pp. 176. St. Dominique, par Jean Guirand; Paris: Lecoffre; 8°, pp. 211. 1899.
- The History of the Popes, by Dr. L. Pastor. English translation, edited by Frederick Ignatius Antrobus, of the Oratory. Volume V. Innocent VIII, Alexander VI. (1484-1489). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1898; pp. lxvii-576.
- Le Cardinal Meignan, par l'Abbé Henri Boissonnot, son secrétaire intime. Paris: Lecoffre, 1899; pp. 558.

THE CHAIR OF AMERICAN HISTORY.

The American Catholic organization known as the Knights of Columbus have honored themselves and benefitted the cause of higher education by agreeing to establish in the Catholic University a Chair of American History. This was done at their late National Convention at New Haven on March 7th, and done with unanimous consent. On this occasion the Very Rev. Vice-Rector of the University, Dr. Philip J. Garrigan, made a stirring and persuasive appeal to these Catholic gentlemen to take up the cause of historical truth, and see to it that the four centuries of service and labor which are to the credit of Catholicism in the New World do not go without proper appreciation. History is a powerful weapon, for good or evil, and the temper of future generations depends greatly on the way in which the past is set before them. No greater service can be rendered the cause of Catholicism than to provide a sure foundation for original research and useful publications, a centre and nucleus of studies, professors, books, and appliances, such as history, in its modern form and aspect, imperiously demands. The Convention, representative of many thousand Catholic hearts and souls from one end of our country to the other, applauded with enthusiasm these noble sentiments, and agreed to carry them into execution. In a short time we may expect to see founded within the University the Knights of Columbus Chair of American History. Thereby the memory of one of the world's supreme benefactors will be duly honored, not by perishable stone or bronze, a dumb thing at the best, but by an undying voice multiplying itself infinitely, instructing, preaching, rousing, forever perpetuating itself through generations of students and listeners.

We are assisting to-day at a mighty transformation of institutions under the action of Democracy. Catholicism has nothing to fear from this. It is truly a religion of the people, and develops most majestically where it is allowed free access to the popular heart and mind. Until lately great universities had to be supported by the state,—we live to see individual generosity, especially in the United States, creating centre after centre of advanced studies, and bringing to all earnest youth both inspiration to learning and the means of acquiring it.

It is quite in keeping with this democratic spirit that for the first time in history we see large voluntary associations of men co-operating in the work of higher education,—a task that seemed hitherto beyond

their scope, or interests, or tastes. The Catholic Temperance Union contributed \$25,000 towards the foundation of a scientific and Christian teaching of the truths that lie at the basis of the organized work of the societies of Temperance. The Ancient Order of Hibernians collected the sum of \$50,000 for the perpetual teaching of the language, literature, history, and antiquities of the Gael. And now the Knights of Columbus propose to raise an equal sum in order to found a Chair of American History. Thus a deep popular interest in the work of the Catholic University is awakened in thousands of homes and households. The encouragements of Leo XIII to the Catholic laity to give of their wealth to the University are combined with a patriotic interest in our fatherland and a just pride in the services of our religion. A monument arises at the heart of the nation, living and energizing; doubtless only the first of many similar nuclei of historical teaching. Apropos of this foundation it is instructive to recall that the initial work of the American (Methodist) University in the city of Washington will be done in its Hall of History, the first of its buildings to be open to students.

The Catholic University is profoundly grateful for the generosity of the Knights of Columbus, and for that confidence in its future and its spirit which this noble act betrays. Both are engaged in work of the highest character, the formation of the individual man to higher standards of goodness and knowledge; the one in the stillness of academic life, the other in the bustle and turmoil of business and social activity,—the bond between them is a common devotion to the highest ideals of Catholicism, love of religion and love of country.

THE NEW HOLY CROSS COLLEGE.

The corner-stone of the new college of the Holy Cross was laid on Sunday, March 19, by Rt. Rev. Thos. O'Gorman, Professor Emeritus of Church History in the University, now Bishop of Sioux Falls. He was assisted by Very Rev. Dr. J. A. Zahm, Provincial of the Holy Cross Congregation, who, since the purchase of the site, has carried forward his plans with characteristic vigor. The professors and students of the University and the members of the various affiliated institutions also attended the ceremony. In the stone were deposited a copy of the Holy Bible, copies of the leading newspapers, specimens of all the coins of the United States, and other appropriate mementos.

After performing the ceremony, Bishop O'Gorman addressed the assemblage as follows:

"Unheralded and informal as may be the laying of this corner-stone, yet it marks an important stage in the growth of the Catholic University of America. The first decade of its existence is coming to a close, but what a decade of struggle for life and of progress through difficulties and of triumph over obstacles. We do not repine, we do not regret, we do not complain; for does not growth mean, in institutions as in men and everything else that lives and grows, resistance to and victory over resisting forces? And if growth means also a favorable environment, has not this University been favored with the warm sunshine and fertilizing waters of papal protection and love, with the fostering care of hierarchy and clergy, with the warm and generous sympathy of laity, eager for the blessings of the highest and best education? The force of circumstances, or rather, to speak the language of a Christian, the ruling of Providence, has made this youthful institution, during the first ten years of its existence, the centre, storm as well as sunshine centre, of the Catholic Church in the United States; so that the history of our church in the decade just closing is contained in the history of the Catholic University in the same period. Struggle shows life, environment accounts for growth.

"I have named some factors of the environment in which the university has prospered; this ceremony draws attention to a factor of the greatest power and importance. From this hill where we stand, behold the imposing halls of the university itself, and see clustering around them the houses of studies established by the Paulists, the Marists, the Franciscans!

"This building, the corner-stone of which is blessed this afternoon, will be the home of the students of the Congregation of the Holy Cross. The dimensions, the solidity, the architectural beauty of this college, prove that its founders have confidence in the future of the University as an undoubted centre of higher education for the Catholics of the United States. In the Middle Ages the great universities became sooner or later the great rallying points of numerous colleges erected by different nations, or provinces, or monastic and religious bodies. Thus grew Oxford and Cambridge, Paris, and Salamanca. Thus, in our own days, grows Louvain, where Dominicans and Jesuits and Redemptorists and others have grouped their respective houses of studies around the university.

"History is repeating itself in our time, on our soil, in this Capital of the Nation. . As in the administration, so in the educational sphere the District of Columbia is to be the theatre of a growing centralization. Here converge around the dome of the Capitol the departments of the nation's political existence. Here are converging and will converge more and more with time, around Caldwell and McMahon Halls, the houses of studies of our religious orders, men and women. The days of doubt and hesitation are over; the future is secure; we hail the blessing of the corner-stone of this building as the augury of a second decade more successful, even if less stormy, than the first decade of the University."

NECROLOGY.

MRS. EUGENE KELLY.

Mrs. Eugene Kelly, a notable benefactress of the University, died in New York, February 10. She was born Margaret Anna Hughes near Youngstown, Pa., where her father, Patrick Hughes, had settled in 1818. In 1840 the family removed to Grovemont, near Watertown, in Jefferson county, N. Y. Mrs. Kelly was one of the first students of the Academy of the Sacred Heart, at Manhattanville, and, in 1857, was married to Mr. Eugene Kelly by her uncle, Archbishop Hughes. Her life was spent in unostentatious service of God through the poor and the ignorant. The New York Foundling Asylum, The Sisters of the Bon Secours, the Little Sisters of the Assumption, the Ladies' Auxiliary of St. Vincent's Hospital, the Eucharistic League, and other pious or charitable enterprises consumed her time, strength and devotion. It has been well said of her that there was scarcely any foundation for woman's work in which she did not take an active interest.

Mrs. Kelly founded in the University the chair known as the "Margaret Hughes Kelly Chair of Holy Scripture" at the same time that her husband founded the "Eugene Kelly Chair of Ecclesiastical History." For this purpose each gave the sum of \$50,000. During the ten years of the life of the Faculty of Theology over two hundred young priests have enjoyed a very superior training in the knowledge and use of the Scriptures. For this not only they, but the congregations which they serve, are indebted to this excellent woman. And the good work thus started will go on, we hope, for many a century, just as professors and fellows and students are yet living at Oxford and Cambridge on the revenues of similar foundations by noble and generous Catholic women.

We would not depreciate by an iota the generosity that is moved by the needs of the poor, the abandoned, the public worship of Catholicism; yet we cannot help reflecting that in some respects the great sums of money devoted to the higher training of Catholic youth are richer in permanent results, have a wider efficiency, go on operating long after the donors have departed, bear forever to the world the memory of their

foresight, and of their charity to posterity. They are true blazons of nobility; when time and change have obliterated all else, these foundations remain, public, energizing, vivid acts of faith and love long after the person of the donor is reduced to dust.

The administration, teachers, and students of the University condole sincerely with the bereaved family; the members of the Faculty of Theology, with their students, regret particularly the demise of a principal benefactress, whose memory they shall ever hold dear at the altar, in all public solemnities, and in that general sentiment of gratitude which goes out unceasingly to those who have given of this world's goods that Catholic theology might be forever presented with that dignity, charm and effect which should grace the divine truth.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Fifth Annual Meeting of the Alumni of the University was held at Murray Hill Hotel, N. Y., February 7th. The gathering was the most enthusiastic and the largest in point of numbers that has yet been held. After the reports of the officers had been read, discussed, and accepted, twenty-one new members were elected. The constitution was amended to the effect that the meeting shall be held in Washington every third year, and Philadelphia was then selected as the place of meeting in 1900. It was voted to admit professors of the University into the association, and the Executive Committee was instructed to formulate a clause to that effect, which would be introduced into the constitution as an amendment. The Right Reverend Rector addressed the meeting and made many valuable suggestions for the development of the association.

The following officers were elected: President, Rev. Lemuel B. Norton; vice-presidents, Rev. P. J. Hayes, Mr. F. P. Guilfoile; secretary, Rev. W. J. Kerby, Ph. D.; treasurer, Rev. G. V. Leahy; executive committee, Revs. L. A. Deering, F. J. Sheehan, W. J. Fitzgerald, W. C. Currie, J. W. Melody. The office of historian was created and Rev. P. C. McClean was elected to it for the next meeting.

When business had been concluded the annual banquet was held, the seat of honor being occupied by the Right Reverend Rector.

Conference of Catholic Colleges.—With a view to co-ordinating and strengthening the entire system of collegiate education, the Rt. Rev. Rector has invited all the Catholic colleges of the United States to take part in a conference which is to be held in Chicago, April 12th and 13th. Sixty colleges have responded, expressing their approval of the conference and promising to send representatives. They have also sent valuable suggestions regarding the scope of the conference and the character of the work it should undertake. After careful consideration, it has been decided that at this first meeting the college idea and its place in the educational system should be discussed, and that the conference should determine the character of subsequent meetings. The following topics have been selected: 1. The Typical College: What Should it Teach and How; 2. Problems of Catholic Education in Our Present Social Needs; 3. The Catholic College as a Preparation for a Business Career;

4. What the College may do for Preparatory Schools; 5. College Entrance Conditions; 6. Requirements for College Degrees; 7. Drift Towards non-Catholic Colleges and Universities—Causes and Remedies. In order that some practical good might be reached, representatives of the various teaching bodies who have charge of collegiate work have been requested to prepare papers on these topics. The reading of each paper will be followed by general discussion. Addresses will also be delivered by men prominent in the work of Catholic education. Other details will be arranged by the local committee, and every effort will be made to facilitate the work of the conference and ensure results worthy of our colleges.

Spiritual Retreat.—During the week immediately preceding the Easter recess, the professors and students of the University enjoyed the benefits of a retreat which was conducted by Rt. Rev. Thos. O'Gorman. These annual exercises have as their special purpose the due observance of the Paschal solemnity, and in view of this several conferences were given daily on the nobility of Christian life and the performance of Christian duty.

Keane Hall.—At a recent meeting of the Academic Senate it was voted that the dormitory erected two years ago for the accommodation of lay students should in future be known as "Keane Hall." To Archbishop Keane, its first Rector, the University is forever indebted; its organization and growth will be a lasting monument to his devotion and untiring energy in behalf of Catholic education.

Bishop Spalding's Discourse on Higher Education.—It was the privilege of the teachers and students of the University to hear on January 13th an admirable discourse from Bishop Spalding on the true object and spirit of all superior education,—the development of the mind and heart of the individual. It is impossible to reproduce in a short notice the acumen and wisdom of this discourse,—all who were privileged to hear it bore away golden memories of its suggestiveness and of the graces of expression which rendered it so delightful and refreshing. A large audience from the city, quite filling Assembly Hall, attested the popular interest in the educational utterances of the Bishop of Peoria.

Gift of French Classics.—The Marquis des Monstiers de Méroville has donated to the Library of Comparative Literature in the English Department thirty-four volumes of French classics. The collection includes select works of Bossuet, Massillon, Bourdaloue and Fénelon, and the complete works of Racine, La Fontaine, Molière and Corneille. The teachers and students of the English Department return their sincere thanks for this valuable contribution to their working materials.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul.—This feast (January 25) is the patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology. This year Pontifical High Mass was celebrated in the Divinity chapel, in presence of the faculty and students of theology, by Rt. Rev. Edmund F. Prendergast, D. D., Bishop of Scillo. The sermon was delivered by the Very Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, D. D., Dean of the Faculty of Theology, who took for his subject, "St. Paul: Teacher of the Nations."

Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas.—The patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy was observed March 7. Solemn High Mass was celebrated in the University chapel by Very Rev. A. Magnien S. S., President of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore. Very Rev. Dr. Edward A. Pace, Dean of the Faculty, delivered an address which appears in this number of the BULLETIN. After the Mass, the Faculty were the guests of the Rector at dinner in Caldwell Hall.

Gift of Publications from the University of Upsala (Sweden).—We have received from the authorities of the University of Upsala in Sweden fourteen volumes, comprising publications of the University and other some valuable texts. Especially valuable is the "*Bibliothecæ Upsaliensis Historia*," by O. O. Celsio, (Upsaliæ, 1745), together with the large folio history of the University from 1872 to 1897. This token of amity from our academic brethren of the great northern nation is very dear to us. We hope that this seat of learning may prosper for many a century and exert the profoundest influence on the hearts and minds of the people of Sweden. We append a list of the works:

O. F. Tullberg—*Mālavikā et Agnimitra*. Bonnae ad Rhenum, 1840 (Textum Sanscritum). J. T. Nordling—*Den Svaga Verb-bildningen I Hebreiskan*; Upsala, 1879. K. Hildebrand—*Johan III och Europas Katolska makter*; Upsala, 1898. J. T. Nordling—*De Allmänna Vokalförändringarna I Hebrieska Språket*; Upsala, 1879. O. F. Tullberg—*Gregorii Bar Hebraei in Iesaiam Scholia*; Upsala, 1842. O. F. Tullberg—*Gregorii Bar Hebraei in Psalmos Scholiorum Specimen*; Upsala, 1842. J. T. Nordling—*Ijjöbs Bok*; Upsala, 1877. C. Annerstedt—*Om Samhällsklasser och Lefnadssätt under Förre Hälften af 1600-Talet*; Stockholm. O. O. Celsio—*Bibliothecæ Upsaliensis Historia*; Upsaliæ, 1745. O. Guensel—*Bidrag Till Svenska Liturgiens Historia*, 2 vols.; Upsala, 1890. H. Hjärne—*Sveriges Ställning Till Främmande Makter*; Upsala, 1884. *Catalogus Centuriae Librorum Rarissimorum MSS. et partim Impressorum, Arabicorum, Persicorum, Turcicorum, etc.*; Upsaliæ, 1706. C. J. Tornberg—*Codices Arabici, Persici et Turcici*; Lundae, 1849. *Upsala Universitet 1872-1897, Festskrift*; Upsala, 1897. *Upsala Universitets Årsskrift, 1890-97*, 8 vols.

Other Gifts to the University Library.—Among the valuable accessions to the University Library within the last few months, we note the following:

From the Université de Lille: Travaux et Mémoires de l'Université de Lille, Nos. 15 to 21. F. Tourneux—Atlas d'Embryologie, Lille, 1892. J. Flammermont—Album Paléographique du Nord de la France, Lille, 1896. S. Baudry—Eléments de Pathologie Chirurgicale Générale, Lille, 1894.

From Right Rev. Camillus Maes, D. D., Covington, Ky.—59 vols., mostly on American Church History.

From the University of Chicago—Reports and Catalogues, 9 vols.

From Rev. E. P. Graham, Cleveland, O.—Gottfried Arnold, Kirchen und Ketzer Historien. Schaffhausen, 1740; 3 vols.

From Rev. R. Cranby, Morganfield, Ky.—Joannis a S. Thoma—Cursus Theologicus, Parisiis, 1886; 10 vols.

From the Authors' Club, N. Y.—Liber Scriptorum. Copy No. 147;.

Pittonia.—The April number of *Pittonia* (vol. IV, part 20) contains the following original studies: New Species of *Castilleia*, A Fascicle of New Violets, New Western Species of *Rosa*, New Choripetalous Exogens, Notes on *Machæranthera*, Early Species of *Sisyrinchium*, New or Noteworthy Species, XXIV; Neglected Generic Types I, Two New *Gerardias*, (Plates ix and x).

Philological Association.—In order to encourage philological research and to render the work of the School of Letters more effective, an association has recently been organized under the direction of Dr. Henebry and Dr. Bolling. Meetings are held monthly for the presentation and criticism of papers on philological topics. At the March meeting Dr. Bolling read a paper on "The Study of Language." The subjects announced for April are: "The External Euphonic Combination of an Isolated Leinster-Irish Dialect," by Dr. Henebry. "The Play-House of the Restoration," by Mr. Elmer Murphy.

Public Lecture Course.—During the quarter just ended, lectures in this course were delivered as follows: By Rt. Rev. J. L. Spalding, D. D., "Life and Education." By Hon. Carroll D. Wright, "The Principles of Social Economics," "The Use and Abuse of Statistics," "Statistics in the Study of Social Economics" (2 lectures), "The Elements of Industrial Society," "Systems of Labor." By Hon. Geo. F. Hoar, "George Washington." By Dr. J. F. Spalding, "Nathaniel Hawthorne," "Oliver Wendell Holmes."

ANALECTA.

The Brain of Helmholtz.—In the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* (Berlin) Bd. XX, Heft 1, Professor David Hausemann gives an interesting account of the autopsy made by him upon the remains of the great physicist and physiologist. Helmholtz died September 8, 1894, of apoplexy. In spite of his advanced age, seventy-three years, section of the brain revealed no traces of senile atrophy. The hæmorrhage affected chiefly the right hemisphere, producing a double lesion that corresponded with the two apoplectic strokes. The brain-weight, as estimated by Hausemann, was 1420-1440 g.—scarcely 100 g. above the average. There was nothing remarkable in the development of the convolutions, though the præcuneus showed extraordinary breadth and furrowing. What Flechsig calls "association fibres," i. e., pathways between central cells of the brain, were highly developed. But this, says Hausemann, affords no explanation of Helmholtz' superior intelligence; for similar anatomical features have been found in the brains of individuals whose mental capacity was not above the ordinary.

Hausemann, accordingly, seeks an explanation in function rather than in structure. It is not the growth of any particular region nor its richness in fibres, but the amount and character of *stimulation* sent into these favored areas that accounts for the exceptional vigor of the mind. The effects of stimulants, such as alcohol, coffee, tea and tobacco, are well known. The smell of apples sufficed to brighten up Schiller's fancy, and many an orator's eloquence waxes under the influence of a vast audience. To another class belong those minds which, after a brilliant precociousness in youth, fade out in middle life and drop to the average. There is no degeneration of cells or fibres, but simply a lowering of excitability; the brain is blunted or benumbed. The third group is decidedly pathological. It suggests the genius-insanity connection. Progressive degeneration is the typical condition. In the fourth place come strong enduring intellects,—the Newtons, Cuviers, Beethovens, Bismarcks. In each case some peculiarity of brain-stimulation may be expected. And as Helmholtz belongs to this class, we have to look for something that spurred up continually his cerebral activity.

Hausemann has put his finger on the cause. Helmholtz suffered, or rather we may say enjoyed, a slight chronic hydrocephalus. Accumulation of fluid means increased pressure, and consequently increased stimulation of the brain. The result where certain regions are well

developed, as in this instance, is more cerebral activity, higher intelligence. And Hausemann very properly concludes that what we need to put such explanations on a sure footing is the examination of brains, as numerous as possible, of individuals whose mental powers are accurately known.

Helmholtz himself was very logical. From the epileptic attacks to which, occasionally, he was subject, he probably inferred that his trouble was hydrocephalic. Whether he was duly grateful for the fluid and strain is not recorded. But we have no longer any reason to pity cases of "water on the brain." When they are mild, the business of science is to get a manometer that will register the pressure. We have "ohms," "volts" and "ampères." Why not a list of cerebral units? It might, of course, be long; it would certainly grow in length as whims of structure and function arose from the modest rôle of conditions to that of causes.

Institute of Bacteriology at Louvain.—The inauguration, on February 2, of the Institute of Bacteriology is an important step in the development of the Catholic University of Louvain. For many years past bacteriological research has been conducted there, and has yielded brilliant results; but the quarters were cramped and the equipment limited. These drawbacks disappear in the new institute. Ample accommodations are secured in three groups of buildings, which comprise laboratories, libraries, museums, professors' lodgings, and housing for the various animals needed as subjects of experiment. These structures present a fine combination of the useful and the ornamental, and are surrounded by spacious grounds which are also arranged to suit the special purposes of the Institute.

At the ceremony of inauguration the rector of the university, Mgr. Hebbelynck, presided and delivered the opening address. Professor Denys gave an interesting account of the work already done at Louvain in Bacteriology, especially in the preparation and application of serum. Mgr. Abbeloos paid an eloquent tribute to the enlightened zeal and generosity of the Belgian episcopate, under whose direction the University has made such progress on all lines. There, indeed, is a fact worth considering: The bishops of Belgium, with all the absorbing cares of densely populated dioceses, find time and means to establish one of the finest institutes of bacteriology in the world. This is a practical sort of "Apologetics." It not only shows that faith and science are in harmony, but it also preserves and strengthens the faith of the people by putting the best methods of scientific research within their reach. If Belgium is to-day so thoroughly Catholic and so progressive, it is because the episcopate has controlled and developed, by their active co-operation, the University of Louvain.